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Abstract
Why do some conflicts last longer than others? Previous work on conflict duration
posits information asymmetries and credible commitment problems can cause
protracted civil wars. The bifurcated nature of conflict studies, based on the
notion that civil and interstate wars are qualitatively different, has so far prevented
studies from including both types of conflict in the same dataset. Thus, empirical
evidence is lacking as to whether the explanations apply to both types of conflict,
or they are indeed separate phenomena.
This dissertation expands on the Cunningham and Lemke (2013) study on
combining civil and interstate wars by including a large number of predictors
taken from the rich civil war literature. The proposed framework unpacks the
bargaining failure framework into three components governing power projection
over distance, which I argue to be the main determinant of duration: material
capability, politics, and geography. In doing so, I do not discriminate between the
‘types’ of war and provide a general theory of conflict duration.
I empirically test the general theory using a multi-method research design. First,
I employ predictive modelling techniques such as machine learning, deep learning,
and ensemble methods to demonstrate that the majority of predictive covariates
of war duration are indeed common to both civil and interstate wars. Further,
in most cases, the direction of the effect holds across types, suggesting that the
underlying mechanism operates in a similar fashion. Second, I provide a shadow
case study of the Sierra Leone Civil War to illustrate how capability shifts can occur
on the ground that cannot be captured by observational data. Taken together,
I contribute to the rationalist literature by providing a diverse set of empirical
evidence showing that a unified model can explain the duration of both types of
war.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The Puzzle
Why do conflict scholars study civil and interstate wars separately? In the
literature at large, theories of conflict onset, duration, and termination differ
by conflict type. For example, decades of formal work on bargaining1 is built on
state actor interactions and firmly situated in international relations. The divide
in conflict scholarship is not confined to the theoretical realm; even when a theory
crosses over from one realm to the other, as the work on civil war bargaining did in
mid 2000s, the scope of empirical analyses continues to be limited to only one type
of conflict. As a result, our understanding of conflict processes become conflict
type-dependent: we do not entertain holistic applications to conflict research.
More specifically, even though there are empirical studies on both civil and
interstate war duration, the great temporal variation found in war is exclusively
studied in civil war settings. We ask why some wars last longer than others,
but what we mean is why some civil wars last longer than others (Fearon, 2004).
Simple descriptive statistics of war duration provide ample justification for this
1See Powell (2002) for an overview.
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decision: on average, civil wars do tend to last longer than interstate wars.2
Yet, this scholarly divide prevents us from realising the true explanatory and
predictive powers of our existing models. Why do civil wars last longer than
interstate wars in general? Civil wars differ from their interstate counterparts
in many aspects. First, there is an inherent asymmetry between the actors in
civil wars in terms of international recognition and coercive power infrastructure
(Driscoll, 2012; Clayton, 2013). Both factors are relatively more balanced
in interstate war dyads. Belligerents in civil wars are geographically more
constrained compared to state actors (Fearon and Laitin, 2003), whereas state
actors can fall back to their sovereign territories. Further, rebel factions face
more severe commitment issues as they are expected to fully demobilise during
peace talks, while defeated state actors retain some levels of fighting capability
(Walter, 1999).
However, they also share a multitude of commonalities. Both state and non-state
actors behave strategically to achieve political goals (Atran et al., 2007). All actors
require material capabilities (e.g. manpower, resources) to wage war (Bennett and
Stam, 1996; Wood, 2010). Similar political and leadership issues play a crucial
role in all wars (Cunningham, 2006; Weisiger, 2016); logistics matter (Kane, 2012),
geography matters (Buhaug and Gates, 2002; Buhaug et al., 2009). Still, because
we do not study them together, we cannot ascertain the level of empirical support
for these commonalities between civil and interstate wars.
Further complicating matters, in some cases, the line between a state and a
non-state actor can be blurred. One example is actor capabilities, which display
a great amount of variation. Some rebel organisations are considerably more
capable than the state actors they fight (for example the NFLP in Liberia), either
2The mean duration of civil war episodes since 1946 (n = 304) is 5.64 years, with 18% of
all civil wars lasting longer than a decade (n = 56), 7% lasting longer then 20 years (n = 21),
and slightly less than 2% going over 40 years (n = 5). Interstate wars, in contrast, last 1.95
years on average (with 10% (n = 6) going longer than 5 years; maximum length 11 years) as
well as being far in-between in quantity (n = 62). All figures are based on the combined dataset
compiled by Cunningham and Lemke (2013).
16
locally (PKK in South-eastern Turkey) or even nationally (Houthis in Yemen since
2016). The annual income of certain rebel organisations rival that of the states.
The FARC was estimated to be worth $200m to $3.5 billion at its peak,3 such that
the high estimate would make it wealthier than 33 countries in terms of Gross
Domestic Product.4
Some governments are fragile and fractured (Somalia) to a degree that most
material capability advantages reserved for state actors hardly apply. In contrast,
certain rebel organisations display strong central command and act as quasi-states
(EFLP against Ethiopia prior to Eritrean independence). Rebels are sometimes
pictured as being ‘stuck’ in their country in comparison to two sovereign state
actors that can fall back to the protection of their own borders. However, some
countries suffering from civil war are so vast in size (e.g. Mali, Sudan) that the
distance between the capital (government power base) and the conflict zone (rebel
power base) could be further apart than the average distance between two warring
state actors.5
In cases like above, where does one draw the line? Do limited interstate wars
behave more like civil wars than large-scale interstate wars? Conversely, do civil
wars featuring militarily-strong governments and highly-capable rebels have more
in common with interstate wars than small-scale civil wars? We do not have
answers to such queries because conflict scholars specialising in either type of war
do not talk to each other; and even if they try, they lack combined datasets to
empirically test their claims.6
To test whether there are indeed empirical commonalities pertaining to war
longevity, I posit a unitary framework for modelling conflict duration using a
model of limitations on capability projection. Building on the rationalist concept
3The Economist (2014) The FARC’s Finances: Unfunny money. [online] Available at: https:
//www.economist.com/the-americas/2016/04/14/unfunny-money [Accessed 7 Jul. 2018].
4World Bank (2018). World Bank National Accounts Data. [online] Available at: https:
//data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD [Accessed 7 Jul. 2018].
559% of all interstate wars are contiguous affairs (Slantchev, 2004).
6Cunningham and Lemke (2013) being a sole exception to the rule.
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of bargaining, I propose a conflict-type agnostic model of limitations on power
projection consisting of three components: baseline material capabilities in
conjunction with physical and non-physical limitations acting upon them.
Baseline material capabilities refer to human, economic, and military capital
of conflict actors—e.g. population, Gross Domestic Product, troop size. These
represent the existing capabilities on an ideal level; in many conflicts actors do
not mobilise completely (Wagner, 2000). The latter two components are modelled
as constraints on the sustainability of applied force; i.e. negative force multipliers.
For example, political factors such as veto players or a divided executive and
geographical constraints such as vast distances and rough terrain can be thought
of in this way: they can diminish the existing capabilities of an actor.
Finally, I expose the proposed unitary model to empirical testing by employing
algorithmic predictive modelling to find out whether common patterns exist
in each of the three components across both types of war. Instead of using a
Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) framework that looks backwards
(favouring in-sample explanation), I employ a forward-looking forecasting
approach that puts premium on out-of-sample predictive accuracy. The misuse
and misinterpretation of NHST have been frequently criticised in political science
(King, 1986; Gill, 1999; Gerber et al., 2008). Using predictive heuristics is one of
the recommended solutions for addressing the over-deterministic nature of the
traditional models that rely on statistical significance (Ward et al., 2010).
1.2 The Answer Writ Short
I provide strong empirical support for the proposed general framework that
conceptualises duration as a function of limitations on material capability.
Building on the rich empirical findings of the quantitative civil war literature,
I demonstrate that the majority of predictive covariates that explain civil war
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longevity also predict interstate war duration. Furthermore, excluding a handful
of exceptions, the findings show that the direction of the predictors also hold
across conflict types; if a covariate has a prolonging effect in civil wars, it also
makes interstate wars longer.
More specifically, many operationalisations of material capability are ranked
as top predictors of conflict duration. States with higher CINC7 scores and
Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP p.c.) tend to fight longer than those
with lower capabilities. Increasing total population and troop sizes, as well
as increased military expenditures, are also consistent predictors of prolonged
conflicts. Natural resources in certain forms—hydrocarbons (crude oil and natural
gas) and gemstones—affect conflict duration: access to oil has a shortening effect
while mining gems has a prolonging effect.8
Several political factors also play a crucial role as determinants of war duration.
Politics in this context is conceptualised as non-physical limitations on the head
executive regarding the continued application of military force. Both democracy
as a regime type and the amount of political constraints on the head executive
(Henisz, 2017) are the most influential covariates of this component that are
associated with shorter wars. On the other hand, conflicts associated with coup
d’etat have a slight prolonging effect on duration.9
Thirdly, time-dependency is also a robust predictive factor for both types of
conflict. This is a topic of contestation in the literature—whether conflict
is duration dependent or not—given the contradictory findings (Vuchinich
and Teachman, 1993; Bennett and Stam, 1996). This project shows that
7Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) of a state is measured as an index using
six indicators of material capacity: total population, urban population, military expenditure,
military personnel, iron and steel production, and energy consumption (Singer, 1972).
8For a structured comparison of the effect of various natural resources on conflict intensity,
see Lujala (2009).
9Although there are numerous outliers in civil war cases in which the direction of the effect
is reversed (leading to shorter wars), a finding more in line with Fearon (2004). Further, data
limitations must be carefully considered in the case of coups—there are significantly more cases
of civil wars in the data.
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time-dependency exists in war, further, it behaves similarly regardless of conflict
type. Modelled as cubic splines, time t displays a slight shortening influence on
both types of war. However, both the squared t2 and cubic t3 time are associated
with longer conflicts. Taken together, this suggests the time-dependency of
conflict has a specific functional shape that is consistent amongst both types:
initially and up to a point, increasing duration is positively associated with
conflict termination. However, as wars get more and more protracted, they
become less likely to end. This can explain why we observe fewer protracted
interstate wars in comparison to civil wars—actors with high baseline capabilities
and projection capacity might cluster in time period t and rarely progress beyond
(terminated early). Conversely, actors with low initial capabilities and projection
rates are more likely to achieve their aims in time t and continue fighting.
1.3 Structure of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows. In Chapter Two, I lay out
the theoretical framework guiding the project. I posit a general theory of conflict
duration, primarily drawing on robust empirical findings borne out of the rich civil
war literature. If the underlying data generating mechanism is indeed similar for
both types of conflict, we should expect important predictors of civil war duration
to perform well in interstate wars as well. Building on the extant literature, I
describe a model of constraints revolving around the limitations and difficulties
of sustained use of force. Using three main components—material capabilities,
political and societal constraints, and geographical factors—I highlight the ways
in which baseline fighting capacity can be hindered through projection.
Chapter Three is devoted to the research design. The first section covers the major
methodological decisions influencing this mixed-methods project. First, I motivate
why an integrative multi-method design is a more suitable approach than the
more common empirical triangulation. Next, I justify why algorithmic predictive
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modelling with an emphasis on out-of-sample prediction accuracy is likewise more
apt than the Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) approach. Third, I
briefly cover the three most prominent approaches to conflict forecasting and
situate the project in algorithmic modelling. Finally, I explore how case selection
after quantitative analysis using extreme and deviant cases can lead to discoveries
beyond what numbers can achieve. In the latter part of the chapter, I explain the
data procedures undertaken for the large-n component of the project. Finally,
I briefly summarise the semi-structured interview process and the respondent
selection strategy.
Chapter Four is the first of the three inter-linked empirical chapters. It consists
of a quantitative assessment of the conflict duration literature. First, I replicate
16 studies using Binary-Time-Series-Cross-Section (BTSCS) data on conflict
duration that include time-varying covariates recorded at yearly intervals. Next,
I run various feature selection algorithms to identify which covariates are highly
predictive. Then, I run logistic regression, elastic net, and random forest
models using out-of-sample cross-validation to see whether feature selection
and predictive modelling findings overlap. Finally, I conclude with a list of top
predictors of armed conflict duration.
Chapter Five offers the first machine learning application to conflict duration using
data that includes both civil and interstate wars. I build on the Cunningham and
Lemke (2013) study, to which I add the most predictive variables identified in
Chapter Four. For this purpose, I select six machine learning algorithms using a
distance-metric that maximises model diversity. Next, I fit linear and meta-model
ensembles of the aforementioned models. Finally, using the state-of-the-art Keras
infrastructure running a TensorFlow back-end, I employ deep learning to capture
the complex non-linear interactions between the covariates.
Chapter Six is a stand-alone mixed-methods chapter that provides in-depth
analysis of the predictive modelling findings alongside the shadow case study
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of the Sierra Leone Civil War. The first section of the chapter focuses on
the most robust findings of Chapter Five. Using the Local Interpretations
of Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) framework, I unpack the ‘black box’
findings of the complex machine learning algorithms. Doing so enables me to
provide directionality of the results, making them more interpretable. In the
second part of the chapter, I provide five pathways that can shift the material
capabilities of an actor beyond the large-n findings.
Finally, Chapter Seven provides the conclusion of the project. First, I summarise
the empirical findings of the predictive modelling enterprise. Next, I discuss
the forecasting performance of the models. As the field moves towards a more
predictive direction, it is important to provide performance metrics to which
future work can be benchmarked against. I conclude by offering direction for
future research and the need to collect more inclusive data to avoid empirical
bottlenecks that can be caused by theory and tradition.
1.4 Contribution
Overall, this project makes three explicit contributions to the conflict literature.
First, on a theoretical level, I provide a general theory of conflict duration.
This conflict type-agnostic framework captures the commonalities of power
projection that apply to both state and non-state actors by shifting the focus on
actor capabilities. The proposed framework expands the mainstream bargaining
approach to war by making it less prone to certain theoretical blind spots such
as perpetual conflict and total war. A model built on material capabilities and
constraints on power projection helps bound the theoretical implications of failed
bargaining.
Second, empirically, the contribution is two-fold. One, I provide a sensitivity
analysis of duration studies literature by replicating 16 BTSCS studies and
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identifying the most consistently accurate predictors of conflict duration. I find
that factors usually included in models as controls—democracy, GDP per capita,
population, ethnic fractionalisation—have immense predictive power in both
types of conflict. Two, I enrich the only existing combined dataset (featuring
both types of war) by adding 20 more covariates to the original Cunningham
and Lemke (2013) study. Doing so will allow other researchers to identify further
variables that are robust to conflict type, as well as paving the way for replicating
and expanding on the findings of this project.
Taken together, a general theory of conflict duration tested on a combined
dataset answers the question of whether there are commonalities in conflict that
can be captured without categorising wars. A unitary approach to modelling
war duration reveals that instead of binning conflicts into binary types and
studying them separately, one can treat actor capabilities on a continuous scale
and investigate them in unison. The implication is that actors with similar
material and projection capabilities—regardless of whether they are state or
non-state—also do behave similarly. This opens up new avenues for the unitary
forecasting of conflict onset, duration, and termination.
Third, on methodological grounds, I show the utility of employing machine
learning and predictive modelling in conflict research. The random forest
algorithm, which has been shown to adapt well to conflict studies (Muchlinski
et al., 2016), greatly outperforms the literature-standard logistic regression in
out-of-sample predictive accuracy. One commonly mentioned drawback relating
to ‘black-box’ algorithms like the random forest is that even if their results are
highly accurate, they are not interpretable. However, using various explainers
designed to address this issue, I unpack the random forest predictions into
interpretable chunks of information. This nullifies one of the main drawbacks
of using similar algorithms, and it should encourage practitioners to consider
adding such techniques to their methods toolbox.
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Chapter 2
Theoretical Framework
2.1 Introduction
Why do some wars last longer than others? Further, to what extent do
structural factors—absolute baseline material capabilities and their relative
projections—govern armed conflict duration? In an attempt to answer these
questions, I develop a general theory of conflict duration. I focus on three
parameters of longevity: material capabilities in conjunction with non-physical
(e.g. politics) and physical (i.e. geography) constraints that act upon them. I
conceptualise material capabilities as a ‘resource pool’ (i.e. military capital) that
can be spent on power projection. In other words, I model conflict duration as a
function of the actors’ sustainability of force projection.
Doing so allows me to put forward a general theory of duration that is applicable
to and testable in both interstate and civil war settings. Most features
differentiating civil wars from interstate conflicts can be attributed to differences
in material capabilities.1 Further, it extends the applicability of bargaining theory
1However, there are several notable differences that cannot be explained away by differences
in material capability. For example, state actors are usually recognised in the international
system whereas the rebels are not (Svensson, 2007). Further, unilateral disarmament of the
rebel factions as a prerequisite for peace talks puts the rebels into a precarious scenario while
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to duration studies by going beyond the established information asymmetry
and credible commitment problem frameworks: a duration model built around
projected material capabilities alleviates some of the existing theoretical blind
spots of the bargaining approach (i.e. perpetual conflict, total war) to war.
The great temporal variation found in war has not escaped the scholars of conflict.
From a bargaining perspective,2 the rationalist arguments for why some wars last
longer mirror their explanations of war occurrence: information failure, credible
commitment problems, and issue indivisibility (Fearon, 1995). The informational
approach posits that rational actors may go to war as long as they have incentives
to misrepresent their own strength, or when the actual power distribution is not
common knowledge. This type of unilateral miscalculation, or mutual optimism,
is cited as the main reason for why parties go to war (Fey and Ramsay, 2007;
Slantchev and Tarar, 2011).
Fighting loses its informational value once the belligerents agree on the actual
distribution of power (Slantchev, 2003), which then leads to a negotiated
outcome. Assuming wars erupt because of information issues, and recurrent
fighting rectifies information asymmetries by offering non-manipulable3 evidence
from the battlefield, the rationalist theory postulates that actors are better off
settling as soon as possible after the actual power distribution is known by all
parties involved (Powell, 2004). In other words, they should not make the same
mistake twice: at least one party has already miscalculated its chances and
decided to wage a costly war instead of settling (Powell, 2006).
Consequently, one would expect an empirical examination of war duration to
highlight this learning mechanism at work. However, when applied to protracted
conflicts, the information failure explanation gives a skewed reading of history:
defeated state actors (post-WWII) keep their army intact (Walter, 1997).
2The conceptualisation of conflict as a bargaining problem can be traced back to Schelling
(1960). See Powell (2002) for a survey of formal approaches to bargaining.
3Slantchev (2003) maintains that learning while fighting can occur in two ways: (1)
Strategically manipulable negotiation behaviour, and (2) non-manipulable battlefield outcomes.
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After several years of fighting, both sides have gathered enough information
regarding their opponents’ resolve and capabilities, but the fighting rarely ends
afterwards (Powell, 2006). This observation has led to the view that civil
wars are typically driven by problems of credible commitment (Fearon, 2004).
Commitment issues arise when parties prefer a settlement that is beneficial to
both, but they cannot credibly commit to uphold the agreement as the powerful
side will have future incentives to renege on the terms of the deal once it has
been signed.
The scholarly investigation of commitment problems in war has led to a multitude
of explanations in the literature. Fearon (1995) provides three: pre-emptive war,
preventive war, and conflict over issues that affect future bargaining power.4
According to Fearon, either the winning or the losing side can be the instigator of
the commitment problem.5 Similarly, Walter (2002) claims that commitment
problems arise because of the treacherous demobilization process that follows
negotiated settlements, and agrees with Fearon that both sides can initiate the
commitment problem.
Later studies further examine commitment issues in an attempt to pinpoint
which faction is more likely to create the commitment problem. Svensson (2007)
argues that there is a rebel-sided commitment problem: As the government6 is
a recognized international actor, formal talks with the previously unrecognised
rebel faction will prompt the rebels to renege on the deal once their standing in
the international arena is improved. In contrast, Powell (2012) asserts that state
consolidation is the most likely exogenous shock to power distribution in civil
wars, which suggests that the faction who controls the government creates the
commitment problem.
4As Fearon himself readily admits, he does not claim to be first to draw attention to such
mechanisms. Indeed, the foundations of both arguments can be traced back to the classical
works of Blainey (1973) and Waltz (1979).
5See Gartzke (1999) for a more elaborated review of Fearon’s proposed arguments.
6At least, the majority of the time vis-a-vis a non-state actor.
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The arguments put forth by Fearon and other leading rationalists have contributed
greatly to our understanding of underlying conflict mechanisms. However, the
rationalist literature on war still suffers from several critical shortcomings. First,
on a theoretical level, although commitment issues explain how parties fail to
locate a mutually-beneficial agreement ex-ante or during hostilities,7 they do not
tell us much about how conflicts terminate endogenously. With the exception of
attrition as a military strategy (Bennett and Stam, 2009; Langlois and Langlois,
2009), solutions to commitment issues usually involve the introduction of some
exogenous factor into the equation. For example, Walter (1997) posits third-party
guarantees can alleviate such problems by acting as a commitment device. While
she offers empirical support in favour of her theory, it does not explain how conflict
parties can overcome commitment problems by themselves.
More problematic is the hidden implication of perpetual conflict. If commitment
issues are indeed so salient, actors only have two options once a conflict is
under way: termination via complete annihilation of the opponent or suffer a
never-ending war.8 This deduction is again at odds with the empirical track
record: 55% of all interstate wars (Walter, 1997) and 40% of all civil wars
(Hartzell and Hoddie, 2007) end in negotiated settlements. Theories based on
commitment issues thus fail to inform us about how nearly half of all conflicting
parties eventually find a way to credibly commit to peace, nor do they shed light
on how conflict duration is affected by this process.
Moving from theory to empirics, even when an effort is made to integrate conflict
termination in the theoretical framework, it has only been tested in civil war
settings. More specifically, the scholarly literature focuses on why some civil wars
last longer than others.9 The question of why civil wars as a whole last longer
7For a study on whether war is still inefficient ex post, see Chiozza and Goemans (2004).
8Wagner (2000) addresses this theoretical drawback of relying on commitment problems
by differentiating between ‘absolute war’ (war-in-theory) and ‘real war’ (limited wars that we
usually observe in reality). With that said, the formation of the conceptual divide stretches
back to Clausewitz’s seminal work On War (Clausewitz, 1832).
9For a review of the quantitative literature on civil wars, see Sambanis (2002).
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than interstate wars, however, appears to be understudied. Only most recently,
such an attempt has been made by Cunningham and Lemke (2013).
A theory build around baseline material capabilities and their limited projections,
by design, less prone to extreme logical conclusions such as perpetual conflict
or total war. Power projection in this context can be conceptualised as usage
rate, with the baseline material capabilities acting as the main resource pool.
War-as-attrition approaches in many scientific fields mimic this logic: animal
contestation in biology (Bishop and Cannings, 1978), firm competition in
economics (Bulow and Klemperer, 1999), and World War II tank warfare in
operations research (Peterson, 1967). The main commonality across all these
studies is the winning strategy—attrition warfare emphasises the gradual wearing
down of the opposition via sustained casualties.
Higher usage rates, unless coupled with high baseline material capabilities,
indicate shorter conflicts on average. In contrast, low usage rates even with
moderate material capabilities can be sustained for longer periods of time.
Certain edge cases—e.g. the current (legal) status of war between North Korea
and South Korea since the 1953 armistice—will still be predicted as protracted
conflict due to the infinitesimal usage rates and massive capabilities on both
sides.10 However, a capability-spending model makes bounded predictions for all
cases of armed conflict (both interstate and civil) without relying on exogenous
factors. In the next three sections, I make a case for why we should tackle conflict
from an unitary perspective; posit a general duration model of limitations by
extending the bargaining approach; and outline empirical expectations of such a
model.
10I would argue that the case of Koreas is a significant outlier; and further, it can be excluded
from analysis by employing defensible scope conditions either in theory or application (empirics)
without loss of generality.
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2.2 Bifurcated Study of War
Existing models of conflict are bifurcated on the basis of theory-driven war ‘types’
(Cunningham and Lemke, 2013). Conflict scholars formulate exclusive theories
and perform separate empirical tests depending on whether we study interstate
or civil wars. Case in point, a common way of motivating a duration study is to
provide descriptive statistics on conflict duration stratified by type (see Fearon,
2004). However, once it is established that civil wars (either on average or in
the extreme) last significantly longer than interstate wars—a well-established
empirical fact—the authors then proceed to limit their analyses to civil wars only.
By limiting our analyses to certain subset of wars, however, we lose the
opportunity to develop general theories of conflict. This has implications in
both domains—theoretical and empirical. On theoretical grounds, we develop
frameworks aiming to explain the temporal variation found in civil wars.
Empirically, we only test our theories within the type of war we study. In other
words, we have no way of knowing whether they will hold across war types.
Indeed, if there are vast differences between interstate and civil wars, we should
not necessarily expect that the findings will hold. On the other hand, if we had
empirical evidence showing determinants of long civil wars do not overlap with
that of interstate wars, this would make a strong case for the justification of the
separate study of wars.
Alas, we have yet to see such a non-finding. We have come a long way in terms of
providing explanations—especially the rationalist strain of conflict scholars—to
why some civil wars last longer than others. But we do not speculate much on
what explains long interstate wars; further, whether the underlying mechanism is
the same or some interstate wars last longer than others for reasons separate
from their civil war counterparts. Can some civil wars be conceptualised as
localised, small-scale interstate wars? Or, do civil wars taking place between
two highly-capable (i.e. in terms of manpower, resources) parties behave similarly
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to interstate wars rather than small-scale civil wars? It is difficult to answer such
questions because we consider them categorically different phenomena.
Instead, civil wars became the dominant focus as they possess a higher risk
of running into commitment problems for a multitude of reasons in the
literature. For instance, Walter (2002) suggests that the duration of civil wars
can be drastically shortened if credible and potent third-party intervention is
guaranteed. Svensson (2007) provides empirical evidence that the commitment
problem caused by the rebel groups can be alleviated when mediators are biased in
favour of the government. Yet, as stated above, both studies concern themselves
only with a subset of all wars, rendering their findings incommensurable to the
literature at large.
In sum, in the past two decades, the rationalist literature on war longevity is built
upon civil war, both theoretically and empirically.11 Commitment problems have
come to be associated with civil wars to a degree that they are seldom applied to
interstate wars, which is problematic. We rarely discuss deploying peacekeepers
or sending mediators to alleviate commitment problems in interstate wars as we
would in similar civil war settings.
To give an example, the US War on Terror has exceeded the median duration
of interstate wars by tenfold, and the power distribution between the US and
the Afghan Taliban has been common knowledge to both parties for many years.
They would be better off if they located a mutually beneficial agreement, which
always exists given the costs of fighting. The obstacle then, one might argue, is the
inability to credibly commit to upholding the terms of such a settlement.12 Yet,
the conflict between the US and Taliban has not been labelled as a commitment
failure in the literature, even after when Taliban opened a short-lived ‘diplomatic’
11A curious development, given that the initial theorisation that led to the formation of
concepts such as information failure and commitment problem focused solely on state actors
and interstate wars. For example, Fearon (1995) does not mention civil wars or non-state actors
once in his seminal article.
12Also see Lake (2002); Lake (2003).
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office in Qatar.13
Altogether, the absence of empirical validation14 relating to war duration begs
several critical questions: What is the true nature of the relationship between the
longer duration of civil wars and commitment issues? How do parties eventually
overcome commitment problems and terminate hostilities? Is it even feasible for
interstate actors, such as the most powerful ones like the US, to commit to war
for decades? Do civil wars last longer than interstate wars because domestic
opponents are somewhat less credible than their international counterparts? Or
is it that civil wars are characterized by commitment problems because structural
factors constraining the longevity of interstate wars do not apply fully to civil
conflict?
2.3 A Unitary Framework
To this end, I provide a unitary model of conflict duration. The main motivation
behind this undertaking is to unpack—both theoretically and empirically—what
constitutes the variation in civil war duration and make those factors the
main parameters of the model. Put simply, I aim to identify the structural
determinants of conflict duration. Doing so gets rid of the notion that wars
have unique characteristics depending on whether there is zero, one, or two state
actors involved in it (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013). Instead of categorising
conflicts into two based on whether ‘Side B’ is a government actor or not, I take
conflict as it is and let the actor parameters (capabilities) dictate the outcome
(duration).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I offer a model of
13Taliban and Afghan officials hold ‘reconciliation’ talks in Qatar,” The Guardian,
May 2, 2015. Accessed May 5, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/02/
taliban-and-afghan-officials-hold-reconciliation-talksin-qatar
14For an experimental testing of the rationalist explanations for war in a laboratory setting,
see Quek (2017).
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constraints that acts as a unitary model of armed conflict duration inspired by
the standard rationalist model of conflict bargaining. The unitary nature of the
proposed framework is based on the idea that one should be able to draw on the
expanded civil war literature to identify the most important variables of both
types of conflict. The implication is that if the process is really unitary—the
underlying mechanism is structurally similar for both interstate and civil
wars—the established findings from one domain should transfer to the other. The
general model is characterised by three main components: limitations on physical
ability, commonly thought as material capabilities of an actor; limitations on the
use of such power, as political constraints on the head executive; and the loss of
strength gradient, the waxing and waning of military force as it is projected over
distance. Finally, I conclude by making explicit the empirical expectations borne
out of the proposed theoretical framework.
2.3.1 A Model of Limitations
In this section, I parameterise a general theory of conflict duration. As the idea
is to build a framework that does not rely on categorical labels such as interstate
or civil war to capture the temporal variation, the theoretical parameters are
designed to proxy the underlying commonalities between the two types of war.
General theories are important in empirical domains that rely on cumulative
progression. International relations as a discipline also heralded the imminent
unification. David Lake provided the following conjecture on the interstice of
international relations and internal conflict as early as 2003 (Lake, 2003, pp. 81):
“We are approaching a single, unified theory of political violence
of which interstate and intrastate war may be particular forms. I
emphasize approaching because this general theory has not yet been
fully worked out and may because the particular forms of violence
and the relationships between them have not yet been defined.
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Nonetheless, considerable progress has been made.”
Fifteen years later, we are not any closer to a general theory of conflict.
Even though considerable progress has been made since 2003—both in our
understanding of conflict dynamics and conflict data collection efforts—these
innovations have remained exclusive to the type of conflict under scrutiny. To
this end, I utilise the classic rationalist framework of bargaining space (Fearon,
1995) and expand on it to provide a general model of conflict duration. Figure
2.1 illustrates the conventional bargaining space approach demonstrated in a
conflict dyad.
For simplicity, assume a one-shot game in which two conflict parties, denoted here
as A and B, have well-defined preferences over the division of an issue (for example,
a disputed territory). Both actors prefer to control all the territory, as this would
maximise their gain. Without loss of generality, projected on a single dimension
and bounded in respect to [0, 1], the ideal point for A is all the way towards 1;
conversely, B’s ideal point is located at the very far left at 0. The division of
the issue is determined according to the outcome of the contest q—representing
war—which could be actual or expected. If the actors choose to fight over in order
to alter this division, they incur costs a and b, respectively. As such, their net
gain (as opposed to settling) obtained by fighting becomes q − a for A and q + b
for B.
Since fighting introduces additional costs that are otherwise not applicable if the
sides could agree on a settlement, this opens up what is deemed a bargaining
space. This is the theoretical space—stretching between q − a and q + b in
Figure 2.1—where any division of the issue located within is preferred to actual
fighting, given the costs. Note that this formulation is not susceptible to future
capability shifts. Assume p represents the expected outcome of a war under a new
distribution of capabilities. Even if one side becomes more powerful and could
shift the division to p, the bargaining space would simply shift to p− a and p+ b.
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Figure 2.1: Bargaining space, as illustrated in Lake 2003. Settling is always
preferable to fighting given the costs associated with war.
Thus, even though one side becomes more powerful and the old status quo (q) is
no longer satisfactory, both parties still have an incentive to settle rather than
wage war.
The rationalist bargaining space approach can be transformed into a duration
framework by disaggregating the distribution of capabilities p into separate
parameters. Indeed, many earlier interstate duration models have implicitly
utilised this approach (Wittman, 1979; Morrow, 1985; Vuchinich and Teachman,
1993; Stam, 1996; Bennett and Stam, 1996).
The main assumptions of such frameworks are as follows. Once a conflict is
under-way, rational utility-maximising leaders periodically make a decision to
whether continue fighting or to settle. The conflict ends when no actor chooses
to fight in a given period. The decision to terminate fighting is conceptualised as
a function of expected benefits and costs. Different types of actors have different
material—and even political—capacities that might affect their cost-benefit
calculus. It follows that the duration function can be modelled using parameters
that capture the actors’ abilities to obtain war benefits and absorb accumulating
costs of conflict.
Figure 2.2 offers a simple demonstration of this concept. Recall that in Figure
2.1 demonstrating single-shot bargaining, the status quo is denoted as q, and the
new distribution of capabilities is p. Both points are displayed simultaneously to
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Figure 2.2: Conflict duration as a function of multiple-round bargaining.
drive home the implication that given the costs of fighting, there always exists
a mutually-beneficial agreement—even in the case of power shifts such as q →
p. However, these shifts need not happen instantaneously. Instead, significant
changes affecting the power distribution in a dyad take place over time.
Assume q represents the distribution of power at onset and p denotes the
configuration at the time of conflict termination. In other words, belligerents
start fighting based on the information (i.e. power parity) revealed by q, and
cease fighting when the information is updated to p. Thought this way, the
duration of a dyadic conflict becomes a function of the length of the iterated
bargaining game between two players. For a conflict dyad i, such phenomena can
be modelled as
duration = Ωi : f(q → p).
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Based on this formulation, the function Ωi maps the two crucial states of
war—onset and termination. Duration, then, becomes the length of time it takes
for this state transformation. As the success of bargaining depends on credible
power projection, the quantity (and the perturbations in such capacity) of force
used—i.e. applied power—should act as a proxy for the underlying process.
In the next three subsections, I provide the parameters of this general duration
model function Ω. The scope of the theoretical components is not constrained to
those borne out of the bargaining literature. Instead, I cast a wide net to identify
empirical regularities in the conflict literature at large. If these determinants of
conflict duration are truly transcendent, one should observe their manifestations
in both civil and interstate wars.
I identify three main components proxying the cost-benefit calculus of
rational decision-makers: baseline material capabilities (population, troop
size), non-physical (e.g. leader characteristics, issue salience) and physical
(i.e. logistics, geography) limitations on power projection. Each component acts
as an umbrella category that brings together a multitude of empirical findings
from the civil war literature. Next, I provide a real life example of the War of
the Triple Alliance as a stylised illustration of the proposed framework. Finally,
I highlight the expected directionality of the empirical findings of such a model
and how it can be tested using a predictive modelling framework.
Figure 2.3 demonstrates the generation of the force use as a function on material
capability subject to limitations. The baseline material capabilities of an actor
is denoted by γ. There are two possible constraints on this baseline; politics
(non-physical) α and those relating to the nature of power projection (physical) β.
Latter components can be thought of as negative force multipliers on the use of
force. In the end, whatever force ends up being utilised to fuel the conflict takes
the form γ · α · β. I call this final product of force applied power. Doing so links
the proposed general duration framework to the mainstream bargaining approach
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Figure 2.3: Illustration of the limitations on the amount of force application.
Baseline material capabilities of an actor are subject to physical and non-physical
constraints when projected away from the power base. All three components are
dynamic and their values can change drastically over the course of the conflict.
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adopted in the rationalist literature. Below, I unpack the main determinants of
power projection as they relate to conflict duration Ω.
2.3.2 Material Capabilities
The first component of the general model encapsulates physical capacity to use
force. This is the broadest category of the model, stretching from absolute and
relative capabilities on one side of the spectrum to natural resources and other
exploitables on the other.15 This is not surprising; the study of power is often
referred as the crux of international relations (Kennedy, 1987).
The fighting capabilities of the rebel organisations are found to affect civil war
longevity. States are often unable to achieve a decisive victory against weaker rebel
groups, as they often choose to engage in irregular warfare. In contrast, stronger
groups are found to be more likely to receive concessions from the government
(Cunningham et al., 2009; Lujala, 2009; Thomas, 2014), which results in relatively
shorter conflicts.
Access to lootable natural resources (Stedman, 2001) as a means of increasing
fighting capacity (Ross, 2004)—as well as providing a different set of incentives for
the belligerents other than achieving military victory (Addison et al., 2002)—has
been heavily studied since the earlier debates on greed vs. grievance (Collier and
Hoeffler, 2002, 2004). Hydrocarbons16 (Fearon, 2004), gemstones (Ross, 2004;
Gilmore et al., 2005; Lujala, 2009), drug cultivation (Lujala, 2009), contraband
(Fearon, 2004), primary commodity exports (Doyle and Sambanis, 2000), and
smuggling (Conrad et al., 2018) are common independent and sometimes control
variables included in civil war duration studies. Finally, natural resources may
also aggravate existing commitment problems between the government and the
rebel forces (Walter, 1997; Wagner, 2000).
15See Hendrix (2010) for a sensitivity analysis of various definitions and operationalisations
of state capacity.
16That is, crude oil and natural gas.
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Material capabilities can be enhanced through external interventions (Elbadawi
and Nicholas, 2000; Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Regan, 2002; Cunningham,
2010; Escribà-Folch, 2010). However, it is argued that its not the sanctions
themselves, but the military force that usually accompanies them that creates
the desired effect (Pape, 1997, 1998).
Moving the focus from non-state actor capabilities to that of state-actors, one
of the most well-known power proxies in the literature is the Composite Index
of National Capability (CINC) score (Singer, 1972). The CINC score of a
state consists of six indicators of material capability: total population, urban
population, military expenditure, military personnel, iron and steel production,
and energy consumption. The six components are measured yearly in units
relative to the system total, while the composite index score itself is the average
of six components. In other words, they are indicators of relative material
capabilities. However, the CINC score by itself or as a ratio has yet to show
much significance as a reliable predictor in the literature (Maoz, 1983; Carroll
and Kenkel, 2016).
In contrast, certain relative material capability indicators regularly do turn
out to be statistically significant predictors of war duration. Population ratio
(Vuchinich and Teachman, 1993; Hegre and Sambanis, 2006) and the balance
of forces17 (Bennett and Stam, 1996, 2009; Nilsson, 2012) are commonly cited
as important covariates. Furthermore, in some cases absolute versions of
the aforementioned variables—total population (Cunningham et al., 2009),
geographic size (Buhaug et al., 2009), and total troop size (Bennett and Stam,
1996)—are found to be influential factors pertaining to conflict duration. Finally,
military technology—such as the questionable effectiveness of conventional armies
against irregular warfare (Lyall, 2009, 2010), the nullification of air-superiority in
certain conflict settings (Kocher et al., 2011; Allen and Martinez Machain, 2017),
and the efficacy of combined warfare (Caverley and Sechser, 2017)—also affect
17i.e. the ratio of the higher CINC score to the total CINC value of that dyad.
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the longevity of violent conflict.
Military strategy and ‘technologies of war’ (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014)—conventional,
irregular, and symmetric non-conventional—also hold explanatory power in the
literature. Bennett and Stam (1996) find that the interaction of strategy
(maneouver, attrition, and punishment) and doctrine (offensive or defensive) is a
strong predictor of interstate war duration, a finding that is also replicated by
Nilsson (2012). Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) show that civil wars characterised by
irregular (i.e. guerilla) fighting last longer than conventionally-fought civil wars.
However, I do not explicitly include strategy in the theoretical model as a
main component. A general model is foremost focused on the core causes, not
by-products. One of the commonly cited differences between the two types of war
is that some civil wars are more likely to be fought in an irregular fashion,18 even
though there are cases of irregular interstate fighting as well; e.g. the Vietnam
‘quagmire’ (Krepinevich, 1986). Such, I expect the aforementioned material
capability variables and their interactions to capture the empirical exposition
otherwise explained away by technologies of war.
2.3.3 Non-Physical Constraints
The second component of the general model is the effect of non-physical
constraints on the use and application of force. If material capability is
conceptualised as force, non-physical constraints can be thought as a moderator.
In other words, the latter can dampen or enhance the former. There is a wide
range of factors that can be consolidated under this heading; the next three
sub-sections briefly summarise some of the most commonly studied variables.
Politics
Regime type is one of the most-studied variables of conflict (Maoz and Abdolali,
18See Balcells and Kalyvas (2014) for a more through review of the subject.
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1989; Maoz and Russett, 1993; Russett, 1994; Filson and Werner, 2004).
Specifically, democracies are shown to be more pacific (Benoit, 1996; Weeks,
2008) than their autocratic counterparts when studied dyadically;19 however
the methodological validity of the so-called democratic peace findings is now
challenged (Dafoe, 2011; Dafoe et al., 2013) or some of its explanatory power
further unpacked into pre-existing socio-economic factors (Hegre, 2014). Recently,
more nuanced parameters than categorical regime type are generated for the
study of conflict. Political constraints is a CINC-like composite index that
aggregates a multitude of political pressures on the head executive (Henisz, 2017).
As the use of military force in a conflict is a top-down decision, we should expect
regime type and political constraints to be important predictors of duration.
In bargaining, the number of veto players (Tsebelis and Yataganas, 2002) is shown
to prolong civil wars by acting as a barrier to peaceful settlement (Cunningham,
2006). In the same vein, the number of actors in a conflict is also widely included
in duration models (Cunningham et al., 2009). Internal cohesion of rebel groups
(Elbadawi and Nicholas, 2000; Collier, 2000b; Bakke et al., 2012) as well as their
fragmentation (Driscoll, 2012; Pearlman and Cunningham, 2012; Akcinaroglu,
2012; Fjelde and Nilsson, 2012; Brenner, 2015) can alter the number of conflict
parties drastically. It must be noted that even though conflicts with more actors
might run into coordination problems and thus influence war duration through
executive decision-making, they can also work by affecting the material capability
equation of the conflict—it is included here for theoretical coherence.
Societal Factors
The role of ethnicity is another important factor in conflict studies (Horowitz, 1985;
Licklider, 1995; Kaufmann, 1996, 1998; Rose, 2000; Van Evera, 2001; de Rouen Jr
and Sobek, 2004; Fearon, 2004; Kaufman, 2006; Cunningham et al., 2012). With
19Raknerud and Hegre (1997) show that, using non-dyadic modelling approaches, the tendency
of democratic actors to join each other in wars is much pronounced than their avoidance of
mutual fighting. Meaning, democracies are not necessarily less war-prone than autocracies.
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that said, ethnic diversity or ethnic fractionalisation are not found to be significant
predictors in various studies at the rebel-organisation level of analysis (Collier,
2000a; Fearon, 2004; Collier et al., 2004b; Cunningham, 2006; Brandt et al.,
2008; Cunningham et al., 2009; Cunningham, 2010).20 However, Wucherpfennig
et al. (2012, p.111) empirically show that “ascriptive ethnicity and state-enacted
exclusion along such categorical lines” indeed do lead to longer conflicts.
Leader Characteristics
Finally, leader characteristics can also greatly influence conflict dynamics
(McGillivray and Smith, 2000, 2004; Chiozza and Goemans, 2004; Wolford, 2007;
Gibler, 2008). Studies on leader tenure (Thyne, 2012), replacement (Tiernay,
2015; Weisiger, 2016), culpability (Prorok, 2018), and previous combat experience
(Fuhrmann and Horowitz, 2014) show that leader characteristics and their priors
(i.e. information) can have an effect on termination and duration dynamics.
2.3.4 Physical Constraints
The final component of the general model pertains to power projection, distance,
and geography. If the non-physical component can be thought as a possible set of
constraints on the use of force via ‘soft’ means (e.g. decision-making), this heading
covers factors capturing the ‘hard’ constraints on existing material capabilities
caused by its projection over distance.
On the linkage between proximity and power, the seminal work of Boulding (1962)
is widely cited as the foremost of its kind. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the concept
of Loss of Strength Gradient (LSG) graphically (Sakaguchi, 2011). At its core, it
highlights the nature of the interaction between power and proximity: as nations
project power further from their base, the projected power diminishes as a function
of the distance. All states suffer from this loss-of-strength gradient, however
20Consult Saideman (2017) for a criticism of ethnic fractionalisation indices in quantitative
research.
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Figure 2.4: Boulding’s loss of strength gradient concept, taken from Sakaguchi
2011
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more capable actors can project further due to their higher baseline capabilities.
Distance is cited as the most punishing penalty on power projection (Russett and
Oneal, 2001). Further, government investment in power projection capabilities is
found to help explain the historical polarity in international relations (Markowitz
and Fariss, 2018).
Even though it was developed with state actors in mind, the LSG framework
has been applied to civil wars as well. Buhaug (2010) finds that when the
government possess high material capabilities, conflicts take place far away from
the capital. Ruggeri et al. (2016) study where UN peacekeepers are deployed
within the countries they have been sent. Finally, Tollefsen and Buhaug (2015)
explain how various dimensions of inaccessibility influence the risk of localised
conflict.
Furthermore, distance can be thought as a medium that can create or break
power parity between actors. For instance, Gartzke and Braithwaite (2011) show
that violent conflicts are more likely to occur at proximities where both states’
capabilities are roughly equal to one another after applying a penalty for distance.
Coupled with the above, we should expect distance and proximity indicators to
hold predictive power on conflict duration as a modifier of material capability.
Various other impacts of geography on conflict are also well-studied. Terrain
characteristics—such as dense forests and mountains—can act as another force
multiplier for material capabilities (Fearon and Laitin, 2003; Buhaug et al., 2009).
Research shows that conflicts last significantly longer when the rebel group
operates in close proximity to remote international border areas, which may allow
them to regroup outside the grasp of the government forces (Buhaug et al., 2009;
Mukherjee, 2014). Finally, conflicts are known to cluster in space (Buhaug and
Gleditsch, 2008).
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2.3.4.1 The Paraguayan War 1864-1870: An Example
This calculus can be seen on display during the Paraguayan War 1864-70. Also
known as the War of the Triple Alliance, named after the opposing bloc consisting
of Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay fighting against Paraguay, it is the most
devastating war in the history of South America (Bethell, 1996). Several theories
have been posited on the causes of the war; namely the colonial aftermath of the
centuries long Portuguese-Spanish power struggle in Latin America (Whigham,
2002), the contested territories surrounding the fertile Platine basin that had
already led to the Platine War (1851-52) in Uruguay (Box, 1967), and the
conflicting interests of the regional hegemons (Brazil and Argentina) and the
countries that they exercise influence over (Paraguay, Uruguay) (Centeno, 2002).
Figure 2.521 shows the contested territories in the region and the configuration of
the belligerents just before the onset of the war.
Further, the distribution of material capabilities across actors displays great
variation. Brazil (10 million), Argentina (1.5 million), and Uruguay (200-350,000)
were up against a total population of 300-400,000.22 However, Paraguay actually
enjoyed military superiority at the beginning of the war, and they were the
initial aggressors (Hooker, 2008). With a standing army size estimated to be
in the range of 28,000 and 57,000 plus about 25,000 reserves, virtually the
whole male population of Paraguay mobilised for war (Bethell, 1996). The
combined might, in terms of military troops that can be sent abroad,23 of Brazil
(17-20,000), Argentina (10-15,000) and Uruguay (5,000) was at best a match for
Paraguay, but probably inferior. The Paraguayan army was also better-trained
21Vectorised map by Hoodinski, distributed under a CC BY-SA 3.0 license.
22Population estimates of Paraguay prior to the war is hotly contested in the literature. This
mostly stems from the fact that initial reports put the total population of Paraguay about 1.3
million (Chartrain, 1972), making the post-war loss ratio closer to 90%. Later studies (Reber,
1988, 2002) corrected the pre-war population estimate to a more conservative 300-400,000; which
is line with other studies claiming Paraguay lost about half of its population in a span of five
years (Kleinpenning, 2002).
23For example, the Argentinians had an army size of 25-30,000; however, at least half of the
army needed to stay put in the capital to ensure political consolidation of power during a period
of “newly achieved internal unity and stability” (Bethell, 1996).
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Figure 2.5: The region of Platine in 1864 showing the conflict parties of the War
of the Triple Alliance and the location of contested territories
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and better-equipped than its neighbours at the onset (Clodfelter, 2002).
After the initial Paraguayan offensive successes, however, the tide had quickly
turned against them on the battlefield. More specifically, after the defeat of
the Paraguayan navy by Brazil at the Battle of the Riachuelo taking place at
the Paraná River on June 11, 1865, any threat to Argentina from Paraguay
was neutralised. In the next three years, the Allies pushed towards interior
Paraguayan territory, although opposition put up by Paraguayan soldiers greatly
hindered their progress (Hooker, 2008). The Allied army finally entered Asunción
in January 1869. Nevertheless, the end of the war did not come. Known as the
‘Campaign of the Hills’, the defeated Paraguayan president López retreated to
the mountains where he led 9,000 resistance fighters against the occupying Allied
forces (Esposito and Rava, 2015). The war finally ended when López was killed
in the Battle of Cerro Corá on March 1, 1870.
The aftermath of the war was especially devastating for Paraguay. It is estimated
that the immediate post-war population of Paraguay was around 150–160,000;
of whom only 28,000 were adult males (Whigham and Potthast, 1999).24 Still,
even the estimated loss of 50-70% of their population puts Paraguay above
Germany or Russia during World War II in terms of sheer magnitude, and it
would take Paraguay 50 years to reach its pre-war population again (Clodfelter,
2002). Finally, Paraguay was also forced to cede 55,000 square meters of land to
the victorious Allies, setting back their subsequent post-war reconstruction even
more (Bethell, 1996).
Bartolomé Mitre, the Argentinian president and the supreme commander of
the Triple Alliance forces, famously quipped that the Allies will be in Asunción
in three months25 (Rosa, 1968). However, it took four years for the Allies to
24It should be noted that at the time, infectious disease was as, if not more, deadly than the
enemy itself (Clodfelter, 2002).
25“…My fellow countrymen, I promise you: in 24 hours we shall be at the barracks. In two
weeks, in Corrientes [the Argentinian province at the border that was attacked by the Paraguayan
army]. And in three months in Asunción!”
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enter the Paraguayan capital and another year fighting against the guerilla
warfare campaign put up by the loyalists. How come it took the Allies this
long to subjugate Paraguay, a landlocked country—sharing vast borders with
both Argentina and Brazil no less—slightly larger than Germany with a
population of 400,000? The following account sheds some light on why the
Triple Alliance—which was essentially reduced to Brazil after the first year
of the war—had to fight a longer than anticipated war in which they enjoyed
superiority in both material capability and military power for the vast majority
of the conflict (Bethell, 1996, pp. 8):
“…Brazilian governments faced enormous logistical problems, first
organising, then transporting their troops thousands of kilometres
either overland or by sea and up river, and finally supplying their
troops. And breaking down Paraguay’s excellent land and river
defence was not an easy task. But it is also true that Brazilian
commanders demonstrated a high degree of strategic and tactical
ineptitude. On the other hand, the Paraguayan troops, indeed the
Paraguayan people, remained loyal to Solano Lopez and fought with
extraordinary tenacity and in the end, when national survival was at
stake, heroically. This, and the Allied determination to pursue the
war to the bitter end, also explains why the war was so bloody.”
The limitations on power projection, as they were applicable to Brazil in
the Paraguayan War, overlaps greatly with the existing theories on civil
war duration.26 The effect of distance (Buhaug, 2010), terrain (Fearon,
2004), and geography (Buhaug et al., 2009) in general; the advantages
obtained by having larger populations (Hegre and Sambanis, 2006), military
personnel/rebel combatants (Cunningham et al., 2009), and strong central
command (Wucherpfennig et al., 2012); and leader characteristics (Uzonyi and
26See Hegre (2004) for a succinct introductory essay on the factors influencing civil war
duration.
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Wells, 2016) and technologies of war (Balcells and Kalyvas, 2014) are shown to
be influential factors affecting civil war duration.
More specifically, the components of the proposed power projection model as
a duration framework can be directly observed in this conflict. Even though
the Triple Alliance had possessed impressive material capabilities on paper, they
were never able to mobilise them to a great extent. The enormous combined
landmass of Brazil and Argentina, coupled with the manpower available to Brazil,
provided the Triple Alliance many advantages against the much smaller and
less populous Paraguay. However, most of these advantageous features could
not be translated into battlefield success. Even though they had high-capacity,
the Alliance saw their power projection drastically dampened by political and
non-political constraints.
First, the political situation in both Argentina and Brazil was not conducive to
power projection. As alluded earlier, the Argentinian president was not popular
at home, and he was forced to maintain a large contingent of the army garrisoning
the capital against a potential putsch. The effect of this was two-fold: directly,
it limited the amount of troops that could be sent to the front; indirectly, it
constrained the deployment of such troops temporally (as the longer the soldiers
stayed away, the greater the risk at home). On the other hand, the Paraguayan
people supported their leader fervently. This effect was further exacerbated by
the fact that, after the initial Paraguayan aggression, Paraguayans were now
fighting for their survival and annihilation. Taken together, while the Alliance
had their material capabilities reduced by political factors, Paraguay saw their
lesser capabilities enhanced.
Second, the terrain nullified the material capability advantage of the Brazil.
Distance acted as an equaliser; as the Alliance made progress further and
further into Paraguay, there existed a power parity between the worn-down
Paraguayan troops and the much larger Alliance contingent. The Paraguayans
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were closer to their base, managed to set up elaborate defence networks, and
their reinforcements—galvanised by Lopez and eager to follow him to the bitter
end—were quick to replenish the soldiers in the ever-approaching front. Brazilian
soldiers, in contrast, had to traverse a much longer distance, further away from
their base of power. This was not helped by their non-existent logistical support,
which was yet another factor limiting them from translating their potential
capability to actual power on the ground.
In sum, the Triple Alliance acted as, in relative terms to Paraguay, a high-capacity
yet low-projection power. They possessed high capacity because their latent power
was considerable. However, due to political and non-political constraints on their
power projection, they were not able to mobilise to their full extent. This, paired in
a dyad with the low-capacity but high-projecting Paraguay, prolonged what should
have been (given the drastic differences in capability) a swift contest otherwise.
2.4 Empirical Expectations
At its core, this project is a predictive enterprise build around important
variables27 and machine learning techniques. As such, I do not formulate the
theoretical expectations using a Null Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST)
framework. The choice of empirical validation is given more exposition in the
research design chapter.
Instead, I test the empirical validity of the proposed theoretical model based on
its contribution to predictive accuracy and its overall ability to correctly forecast
true positives and negatives. Given the predictors are selected based on their
‘performance’ in studies on civil war duration, the most important test is that
whether established predictors of civil war duration are also important predictors
27Variable importance is a term in machine learning denoting a influential set of predictors
that contribute positively to predictive accuracy. Roughly speaking, it can be thought of as a
machine learning equivalent of ‘statistical significance’ in traditional statistics.
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of interstate war duration. If this is indeed the case, it will act as strong evidence
in favour of a common underlying mechanism governing conflict duration.
Unlike traditional statistical methods, most predictive modelling techniques do
not establish directionality for their covariates. This makes the usual NHST
formulation—e.g. x is positively correlated with y—an ill-fit for the purposes of
this project. However, they are recent frameworks for extracting directionality
from what are sometimes called ‘black-boxes’. One such procedure—Local
Interpretations of Model-agnostic Explanations (Ribeiro et al., 2016)—will be
heavily utilised in the empirical chapters. Doing so will shed some light on how
important predictors of conflict duration behave in a unitary model.
Further, directionality is paramount to the conduct of political science.Theoretical
expectations guiding empirical research minimises the risk of identifying spurious
correlations that might arise in the data. Even though I refrain from formulating
alternative hypotheses against the null—a permanent feature of NHST studies—I
nevertheless lay out the empirical expectations of the proposed general duration
model in a predictive framework below.
First, from a probabilistic perspective, material capabilities γ are expected to
enhance the fighting capabilities of an actor. This logic applies to both types
of material capability; absolute and relative. Higher levels of absolute material
capability—population, size, standing army size etc.—act as a larger reservoir
of potential power. Relative capability, for example deployment numbers, are
also indicative of such capability as the realisation of the potential power. It
must be noted that both types of capability go hand in hand; further, their
destructive effect is dependent on the ability of their opponent to take punishment.
The dyadic nature of the model can be summarised as follows. A high-capacity
actor projecting large amounts of force (high-potential, high projection) against a
low-capacity actor can, on average, expect a shorter conflict. A high-capacity but
low-projecting actor fighting the same low-capacity opponent would experience a
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longer conflict, all other things being equal. If the high-capacity, low-projecting
actor is against a high-capacity opponent, the expectation would be even longer.
Plus, there will be further permutations depending on the projection ability of
the opponent. This shows that while both types of capacity are important, they
should be investigated in a dyadic setting as the process is one of interdependence.
Second, non-physical constraints α can either enhance or diminish the effect
of material capabilities. In the former case, history provides a multitude of
examples where the conventionally-weaker side has prevailed thanks to either
popular support for their cause or the lack of it in their opponents. The US
intervention in Vietnam is a well-known example of such a conflict. Similarly, in
the case of the War of the Triple Alliance, Paraguay was able to keep on fighting a
losing war longer than predicted by its opponents because the political power was
consolidated and the people of Paraguay was desperate. Brazil and Argentina, on
the other hand, neither had the popular support of their own populace nor were
fighting a war of survival (as they were the invading party). Public support can
also vary over time. Prior to Pearl Harbor, the US public opinion on their possible
entry to the WWII was not in favour. However, after the Japanese surprise attack,
the tide had turned which in turn allowed for the full mobilisation of the US
population and its industry—and not wavered until the unconditional surrender
of the Imperial Japan.
Similarly, the effect of physical constraints β on power projection is also dependent
on baseline material capabilities. US projecting power all the way to Afghanistan
in itself is a show of power. On the other hand, the fact that the military power of
US inevitably decays as it is projected from its base, it gives the Afghan Taliban
a fighting chance. Simply put, distance acts as an equaliser for power parity. This
feature is also reflected in civil wars.28 Often, in cases in which both the state and
28Of all the components considered, distance is one of the most defensible parameters in
favour of a meaningful divide between interstate and civil wars as it conveys a different meaning
depending on the setting. In interstate contexts, it is a display of power if one can project power
over vast distances. On the other hand, in civil wars, distances are relatively constrained as
they usually (but not always) take place in the same country. However, the difference between
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the rebel forces are weak, the latter can put up a better fight if they can utilise
the terrain to their advantage. Thus, we should expect physical constraints on
power projection to prolong conflict in either case of war.
Taken together, the model of effective power projection as a determinant of
duration can be thought of as the stability of a systemic reaction. Highly-capable
conflict dyads will tend to be more chaotic systems than those which lack the
capability. As a classic example, the duration of a hypothetical war between
the Soviet Union and the US would be a volatile prediction given their immense
capabilities. It can end in an instant, if the nuclear option is realised. It can
be brief (but not instantaneous), if there was an initial escalation but the
decision-makers decide to cooperate—perhaps in light of the first possibility.
Or, if they choose to not directly engage each other but dabble in proxy wars,
the conflict—depending on definition—can last decades. Plus, there are various
other predictions that can be realised situated between these broad categorical
outcomes.
Furthermore, there would be additional outcomes that are not even considered
by political theorists or historians. For example, there could have been cases
that allow for limited nuclear strikes rather than any nuclear option leading to
Mutually-Assured Destruction (MAD). One of the parties can initiate a limited
nuclear strike, and the other can sue for peace—probably in order to not to escalate
the situation to MAD. With the aid of hindsight, we may not consider such
possibilities; however from a modelling perspective, these would be additional
outcomes that will not play out amidst low-capability actors.
In sum, the point being, higher destructive capacity γ ·α·β leads to a large number
of possibilities that are not available to low-capacity actors. This, in turn, makes
the forecasting of such conflicts a more volatile affair. Probabilistically speaking,
the two can be traced back to material capabilities—state actors that can project power over
distances can do so because of their high material capabilities, whereas state actors that are
fighting rebels and are constrained by rough terrain do so because they lack the resources to
nullify the effects of difficult terrain.
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higher amounts of applied force should result in shorter conflicts. However, it still
depends on the punishment-taking capacity of the opponent. If the opponent has
vast reserves of manpower and material capacity themselves, they can replenish in
time and prolong the duration of the conflict. This highlights the dyadic nature of
the predictive model, which is a common way of studying conflict in the literature.
2.5 Conclusion
This chapter provides the foundations of a general model of war duration that
aims to capture the common underlying dynamics of violent conflict. It is built
on the notion that the findings borne out of theoretically-vast and empirically-rich
literature on civil war dynamics should transcend to interstate war cases.
The model has three inter-related components: material capabilities limited by
physical and non-physical constraints. The inter-connected nature of the theory
makes it flexible enough so that there is enough dynamism in the conceptual
framework to account for the temporal variation found in war. Indeed, the
majority of the parameters that make up the three main components can vary
within conflict, between conflict dyads, and from year to year.
The heading of material capabilities capture several absolute and relative metrics
of physical force and potential destructiveness. Absolute capability refers to
parameters that are not necessarily utilised to their full extent but nevertheless
act as ceiling values (e.g. population, troop size). On the other hand, relative
capability indicators convey magnitude in comparison to that of the opponent
(population/troop ratio).
The non-physical constraints encapsulate domestic and/or international pressures
on decision-makers, which often acts as a limitations on the usage of material
capabilities. Higher number of actors—either as veto players or mere allies—can
shift the distribution of capabilities on the ground. Regime type and political
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constraints on the head executive are also closely intertwined with the application
of military use of force.
Finally, difficulties associated with power projection via physical constraints can
also penalise existing material capabilities. The crippling effect of distance on
power, widely known as the loss-of-strength gradient, has a significant impact on
conflict dynamics. It can create and break power parities, as well as clustering
conflicts in space. Features of terrain that limit government reach are also shown
to effect war longevity.
The contribution of a general model is two-fold. First, it enables comparative
study of interstate and civil war that share similar characteristics. Some
interstate wars are low-capacity conflicts fought between poor state actors. The
Eritrean-Ethiopian War (1998-2000) was fought by two of the poorest countries
in the world. In contrast, some rebel organisations have standing armies (Kachin
rebels in Northern Myanmar), engage in taxation (FARC in Colombia), and have
a higher GDP than thirty-something countries. At its peak, counter-terrorism
specialists and security experts estimated the annual turnover of ISIS to be
around $2 Billion.29 These cases are historically studied separately. However,
they might share more similarities with each other than they do with cases that
their ‘type’ belongs to.
Second, it broadens our understanding of both types of conflict. Certain predictive
variables are studied more thoroughly in one setting, or reveal themselves more
readily in certain contexts. The US entanglement in Afghanistan is not usually
thought as a credible commitment problem, whereas many similar civil war
situations—the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict; Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka to name
a few—are. By putting forward a general model, we allow these otherwise
disconnected findings to inform one another.
29Forbes (2014). The World’s 10 Richest Terrorist Organizations. [online]
Available at: https://www.forbes.com/sites/forbesinternational/2014/12/12/
the-worlds-10-richest-terrorist-organizations/#5fda6de34f8a [Accessed 7 Jul. 2018].
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The general theory provides us a set of possible predictive covariates of conflict
duration that should explain war duration. Mostly studied in civil war settings,
this rich set of variables should also hold exploratory and predictive power in
forecasting models. This provides the empirical benchmark for which the proposed
framework will be tested against; that is, whether the empirical results in the
extant civil war literature can be generalised to include interstate wars as well.
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Chapter 3
Research Design
This chapter lays out the overall design of the project. The heavy emphasis
on empirics throughout the dissertation—theory-building, sensitivity analysis,
replication studies, and predictive modelling using feature selection—necessitates
a multitude of methodological choices to be made. For the same reason, the
project utilises a large number of datasets, which requires adherence to common
standards and data wrangling procedures. Both of these points are covered
separately next.
The first part of the chapter deals with the general methodological approach
undertaken throughout the project. Its contents provide justifications for the
various choices of inference and validation. It starts off with a comparison
of empirical triangulation (Webb et al., 1966; Jick, 1979; Tarrow, 1995)
vs. integrative multi-method research (Seawright, 2016). Next, the dominant
Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) approach (Neyman and Pearson,
1933; Fisher, 1937, 1956) in the social sciences is compared to algorithmic
predictive modelling (Marascuilo and McSweeney, 1977; Kuhn and Johnson,
2013). I posit several arguments in favour of the latter as being better suited
for the needs of the project. Thirdly, I briefly summarise the three prevalent
forecasting approaches in conflict research and where I situate the project.
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Finally, I conclude the section with justifying the qualitative component—case
selection after quantitative analysis—of the multi-method design.
The second part of the chapter pertains to data. Chapter Four provides a
quantitative assessment of the conflict duration literature; and as such, utilises
16 replication studies. The selection process resulting in these studies and various
data transformations to ensure overall compatibility and coherence are discussed
here. Next, I justify the selection of Sierra Leone as a shadow case by explaining
its conflict actor structures and how this can be leveraged to identify possible
shortcomings of predictive modelling.
3.1 Methodology
This section consists of four inter-related debates on methodological choices. First,
I motivate why integrative multi-methods research is a better methodological
approach than empirical triangulation. Second, in the same vein, I make a case
for predictive accuracy being a better indicator of empirical assessment than
mainstream p-value significance testing. Third, I outline strengths and limitations
of algorithmic conflict forecasting. Forth, I provide justifications for why the case
of Sierra Leone Civil War is apt for the purposes of this research, and how it can
be utilised to highlight the empirical blind spots of algorithmic forecasting.
3.1.1 Triangulation vs. Integrative Multi-Method Research
In social sciences, triangulation as an empirical strategy is the most common
application of mixed-methods research (Seawright, 2016). The concept of
triangulation is named after the geometrical concept of using two known points
in some Euclidean space to situate an unknown point located in the said space
(Mertens and Hesse-Biber, 2012). In the same vein, researchers may employ
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multiple methods or empirical techniques to inquire about a question of interest.
In doing so, they will be able to make causal inferences supported by two different
strains of empirical methods. Such findings are thought to be superior to that of
those that are borne out of a single empirical method (Olsen, 2004).
However, the added-value of triangulated research has been questioned (Seawright,
2016). Putting aside the criticism raised on post-modernist and post-structuralist
grounds,1 there are at least two major flows inherent in triangulation frameworks.
Assume a study that utilises both qualitative and quantitative methods. Further,
the practitioner has been implementing both methods in order to answer the same
research question. One possible outcome of this enterprise is that the empirical
findings may not actually converge. In other words, what conclusion should
(or can) be drawn when the results contradict each other? Even though this
shortcoming has been elaborated at length in the research methodology literature
(Robson, 2002), there is no clear answer that can be generalised.
Second, even if the findings do overlap, what inferences can be made? Seawright
(2016) gives the following example2 using the finding of mountainous terrain (as
a logged percentage of state’s territory) in Fearon and Laitin (2003). The logit
coefficient of 0.219 is statistically significant at the conventional levels, meaning
increasing coverage of mountainous terrain has a positive effect on the onset of
civil war. Seawright (2016) then provides several anecdotes relating to the role of
mountainous terrain in Colombia; i) naturally, different parts of the country had
varying levels of elevation, ii) mountainous terrain did indeed had some positive
effect on conflict onset at certain times (but not always), and conversely iii) many
highly mountainous areas in Colombia have not seen conflict.
What conclusion can one triangulate combining the 0.219 logit coefficient with
1See Howe (1988) for the epistemological paradigm ‘incompatibility thesis’ on the mixing of
qualitative and quantitative methods.
2Even though he gives the account on the subject of non-overlapping results, the same
implications apply.
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the stylised facts supplied above? It can be argued that the coefficient captures
the average effect, and the sometimes-contradictory qualitative evidence is how
such an average effect can manifest itself in real life. However, given the great
epistemological differences underlying the two methods, the comparison can only
be made in an abstract manner.
A better approach is to aim for integrating mixed-methods rather than
triangulating. Integrative mixed-methods can be described as ‘…multi-method
designs in which two or more methods are carefully combined to support a single,
unified causal inference. With such a design, one method will produce the final
inference, and the other is used to design, test, refine, or bolster the analysis
producing the inference’ (Seawright, 2016, pp. 8).
Given the aim of the project—analysing civil and interstate wars using combined
data and a general theory—the more systematic method should be the main
method. Thus, I employ quantitative methods to generate the main inferences
from the data. However, for the reasons that will be explained in more detail in
the following section, I do not employ traditional statistical methods. Instead, I
employ algorithmic approaches drawn from various machine learning, ensemble,
and deep learning methods. These approaches are better suited to uncovering
non-linear effects and interactions, and such they are more appropriate for an
exploratory general theory empirics.
In contrast, I rely on the qualitative component to highlight any potential
shortcomings or empirical blind spots of the quantitative analysis. To achieve
this, I first conduct the quantitative analysis and let the systematic findings
guide me in my case selection process. Selecting a case study after quantitative
analysis informs the practitioner of the possible shortcomings of the latter and
acts as an empirical ‘follow-up’ (Seawright, 2016).
Indeed, an integrative mixed-methods design can evoke the concept of
complementarity. For example, by tackling the same case from two different
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paradigms, one can better understand how the data are constructed (and
subsequently, re-constructed). Rich concepts that can be scrutinised greatly
using qualitative methods are often reduced to inherently less-discriminatory
numerical values in quantitative research. By combining the data coming in from
both approaches, it is possible for a researcher to attain a holistic perspective on
the issue under investigation.
Complementary mixed-methods can enrich and illuminate the empirical findings
beyond the means of one singular approach. A quantitative scholar undertaking
a cross-country study is unlikely to be an expert in every single case in the
dataset. However, if she is inherently familiar with some of the cases and opts to
gather further information (e.g. conducting surveys, fieldwork), this can be used to
elaborate on the systematic findings borne out of quantitative studies. In the case
of this research project, the qualitative findings based on my fieldwork in Sierra
Leone informs the predictive modelling findings achieved by machine learning.
To this end, in Chapter 6, I conclude the shadow case study with a side-by-side
comparison of the data collected in the field and the algorithmic predictions of
the Sierra Leone Civil War using the Local Interpretations of Model-agnostic
Explanations (LIME) framework (Ribeiro et al., 2016). Doing so makes the
quantitative findings more interpretable and provides possible pathways for how
detail-rich narratives can manifest in systematic studies.
3.1.2 Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST)
vs. Predictive Modelling
Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing (NHST) is arguably the most common
procedure in quantitative social science (Nickerson, 2000). Succinctly summarised,
the method (Fisher, 1937, 1955, 1956) allows the researcher to compute the
probability of observing a result that is at least as extreme as a test statistic
(t-value), under the assumption that the null hypothesis h0 positing no effect is
61
Figure 3.1: Significance and p-values, taken from Turkheimer et al. 2004
true. This p-value in turn denotes the conditional probability of achieving the
observed or a larger outcome, making it a cumulative probability as opposed to
a point estimate (Nickerson, 2000).
Figure 3.1 demonstrates two common approaches to NHST; The Fisher test of
significance and the Newman-Pearson test of acceptance. In Fisher’s formulation,
the p-value3 estimation equals the area under the null probability distribution
curve starting from the observed test statistic and ending at the tail of the null
distribution (Turkheimer et al., 2004). This formulation has led to the notion
that the Fisher significance test operates via ‘proof by contradiction’ (Christensen,
2005).
3For an informative piece on the misinterpretation of p-values, see Cohen (1994).
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Figure 3.2: Twelve common p-value misconceptions by Goodman 2008
However, since its introduction NHST has been deemed as a controversial
technique (Rozeboom, 1960; Pearce, 1992). The criticisms are manifold (Bakan,
1966; Branch, 2014) and such, beyond the scope of this section. Still, I provide
some of the common criticisms associated with the NHST procedure below.
Most commonly, the concept of p-value is commonly misinterpreted or misused
by social scientists (Cohen, 1994). Figure 3.2 shows the twelve common p-value
misconceptions described by Goodman (2008). As most of the quantitative
research has been done using the NHST framework up until now, the vast
majority of our body of scientific knowledge stems from studies that exclusively
focus on in-sample explanation. Such studies usually have low out-of-sample
generalisability (Kukull and Ganguli, 2012); further, statistically significant
findings are not automatically good predictors (Lo et al., 2015).
Next, many assumptions underlying the NHST procedure are not met regularly in
published work (Lykken, 1991). This is a contributing factor to what is generally
known as the replication (reproducibility) crisis in science (Moonesinghe et al.,
2007; Begley and Ioannidis, 2015). Especially in studies with low statistical power,
the p-value has a large variance across repeated samples, which makes it unreliable
for the purposes of precise replication (Halsey et al., 2015).
In the same vein, the policy of enforcing stringent requirements of statistical
significance in scientific journals exacerbates this problem. Commonly referred
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as publication bias (Begg and Berlin, 1988), this type of path-dependency is
especially harmful to science given its cumulative nature, as eventually findings
will be skewed to a point where existing body of research will no longer be
balanced (Song et al., 2010). Perhaps in light of this and other contributing factors,
prominent political methodology journal Political Analysis has recently announced
updated procedures relating to publications using statistical significance (Gill,
2018).
Other pitfalls can also arise; including the practitioners’ mixing of Fisher and
Newman-Pearson methods interchangeably (Tukey, 1960); lack of sufficiently large
sample sizes (Biau et al., 2008); susceptibility to subjective nature of hypothesis
definitions (Gigerenzer, 2004); the inability to account for prior beliefs and/or
given data (Masson, 2011); and the arbitrarily low threshold (p < .05) of statistical
significance (Benjamin et al., 2018).
Finally, the perils of p-value driven research are also studied in the specific context
of political science (Ward and Bakke, 2005; Ward et al., 2010). In yet another
example of methodological issues relating to Fearon and Laitin (2003), which was
used in a New York Times Op-Ed written by the academic Jacqueline Stevens
as a proof for political scientist being lousy forecasters.4 One main reason as to
why the Fearon and Laitin (2003) study fails at prediction is their emphasis on
in-sample explanation, as opposed to out-of-sample prediction (Ward et al., 2010,
pp. 479):
“The poor predictive performance is not an indictment of Fearon
and Laitin’s contribution, nor is it evidence that prediction is
too treacherous to attempt. Rather, it points to an opening for
social scientists and to the benefits of embracing prediction as a
concept. First, it establishes a framework for rigorous and ongoing
4The New York Times (2012). Political Scientists are Lousy Forecasters.
[online] Available at: https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/24/opinion/sunday/
political-scientists-are-lousy-forecasters.html [Accessed 7 Jul. 2018]
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Figure 3.3: Cross-validation and data splitting procedures
cross-validation of our models. This cross-validation offers us the
opportunity to test our theories, their scope, and their portability,
which can provide valuable input in the theory-building process.
Finally, generating predictions makes the implications of our research
more accessible to the policy community and the general public.
Specifically, it underscores the opportunity for developing better
models.”
A predictive modelling approach build on out-of-sample cross-validation does not
share the above shortcomings characterising the NHST procedure. Figure 3.3
demonstrates the cross-validation procedure undertaken in for this project.
The general process of cross-validation can be described as follows. First, the
available data—assumed to be sampled from the same population—is split into
two groups; training and test.5 The ratio of this split depends on multiple factors,
5Data permitting, it can also be split into three parts—training, validation, and test.
Validation set is used for hyper-parameter tuning, so that the best tuned algorithm can be
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including but not limited to, the overall sample size, class-imbalance, temporal
dynamics of the data, and domain knowledge of the practitioner (Breiman, 1984;
Kohavi et al., 1995; Varma and Simon, 2006). For the purposes of this project, the
data are split into approx. 70%/30% to training and test samples, respectively.
The training set is referred to as the cross-validation set, in which an iterative
process similar to the one described in Figure 3.3 occurs. This 70% split of the
data is then further split into ten folds. During each iteration, one fold is held
out for validation. That is, during hyper-parameter tuning and/or algorithm
selection processes, the models use nine folds to train on and then predict the
values of the unseen tenth fold. This hold-out fold changes with every iteration.
Once all individual folds are tried, the top performing model based on its
out-of-sample6 prediction accuracy within the 10k-fold cross-validation is selected
as the candidate model for the final forecast.
The test data (30% from the initial data split), also called the hold-out, is never
exposed to the learning algorithm during the cross-validation process. This
ensures the integrity of the validation test; the algorithm has never seen the
test data and can only predict the outcomes if the patterns it learned during
the cross-validation generalises to the test data. The cross-validation process
thus optimises for external validity, and it is a superior approach to in-sample
validation (which maximises internal fitness) for research that focuses on
prediction. At this stage, the top performing model predicts the outcome values
of the final hold-out, and this is what is reported as out-of-sample accuracy.
In sum, I opt for algorithmic predictive modelling using out-of-sample validation
as the main quantitative component of the project. Doing so i) ensures
applied to a never-seen-before data (that is, test). However, if the sample size is small, it is
generally advised to skip the validation set (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013). Also see Korjus et al.
(2016).
6This should not be confused with the test data split that is held-out from the beginning.
Given the folds are created within the 70% training data split, it is technically ‘in-sample’;
however, the selection procedure of 10k-fold still maximises external validity as seen in Figure
3.3. In this dissertation, the 10k-fold cross-validation is referred to as ‘in-sample’, whereas the
predictions based on the true hold-out (test split) is called the ‘out-sample’.
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the replicability of the results; ii) provides a better fit for empirically testing
generalisable theories; and iii) gets rid of many methodological concerns stemming
from using NHST procedures (Cranmer and Desmarais, 2017). Finally, I add a
limited case study, which is selected after the conclusion of the large-n study, to
uncover the limitations of the covariates used in predictive modelling.
3.1.3 Forecasting in Conflict Research
Conflict research, similar to its preceding fields of political science and
international relations, has historically favoured backward-looking causal
explanations over forward-looking predictive power (Schneider et al., 2011).
However, in the last decade, conflict forecasting has gained considerable
momentum thanks to the innovations in variable measurement, the gathering
of disaggregated data, and the introduction of more complex computational
techniques to the practitioners (Schrodt et al., 2013).
There are three main approaches to conflict forecasting: expert-driven,
game-theoretic, and algorithmic modelling (Schneider et al., 2011). Further,
these three components can be combined in various ways to create ensemble
forecasts (Montgomery et al., 2012). Expert predictions are probably the most
well-known and the most visible type of political forecasting. However, they are
not necessarily the most precise. In a highly-cited study, expert predictions on
geopolitical events over the course of two decades failed to outperform random
guesses on average (Tetlock, 2005). There are reasons why this may be the
case: experts are incentivised to have strong positions, otherwise they run the
risk of being ‘dull’; and they rarely suffer any serious setbacks in case they fail
(Chadefaux, 2017). Still, human predictions can aid computational forecasting,
especially via an iterative process that selects for high marginal utility. For
example, human forecasters in tournaments have beaten sophisticated algorithms
and other ‘superforecasters’ (Tetlock and Gardner, 2016).
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Game-theoretic approaches to conflict forecasting emphasise formal models to
generate predictions. The need to formally specify models puts a high premium
on theoretical completeness, making them more precise in comparison to informal
models (Powell, 1996). Formal modelling focusing on prediction is a two-step
enterprise. First, an expert identifies a set of relevant factors. Then, the model
is constructed to capture the predicted interactions in the data. This type of
setup has been successfully employed in several studies (Gurr and Lichbach,
1986; De Mesquita, 2010). On the other hand, game-theoretic expectations of
human behaviour are usually at odds with observed empirical patterns because
of their complexity (Axelrod, 1984; Kahneman and Egan, 2011). Agent-based
approaches—models following a simple set of rules but come with a high
computational cost—can overcome the shortcomings of game-theoretic models
as they allow for the comparison of different scenarios and the evaluation of the
counterfactuals (Cederman, 2002). However, agent-based models are complex in
their own regard, making them difficult targets to draw causal inferences from
(Chadefaux, 2017).
Finally, algorithmic modelling is a theory-led approach to conflict forecasting with
a computational bend. It can utilise logistic regression and other members of
the increasingly sophisticated generalised linear methods family (Rummel, 1969;
Goldstone et al., 2010; Weidmann and Ward, 2010; Bell et al., 2013; Gleditsch
and Ward, 2013; Hegre et al., 2013; Ward et al., 2013; Owsiak, 2015; Bagozzi,
2015; Hegre et al., 2016; Chiba and Gleditsch, 2017; Witmer et al., 2017) or
Bayesian approaches (Brandt et al., 2011, 2014), but lately expanded to include
machine learning and neural networks (Brandt and Freeman, 2006; Muchlinski
et al., 2016; Bessler et al., 2016; Colaresi and Mahmood, 2017; Bagozzi and
Koren, 2017). The introduction of highly disaggregated data, both for spatial and
temporal domains, has allowed conflict researchers to identify and predict episodes
of violence with increasing precision (Schrodt and Gerner, 2000; Chadefaux, 2014).
In a similar vein, the automation of news report coding has led to more accurate
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forecasts (Schrodt, 2009). However, automated text analysis still suffers from
several shortcomings (Eck, 2012; Weidmann, 2015). First, complex sentence
structures and implied meaning are difficult to capture (Croicu and Weidmann,
2015). Further, while temporal disaggregation in events can be achieved with high
accuracy, spatial disaggregation is still lagging behind in comparison (Croicu and
Hegre, 2018).
For the purposes of this project, I predominantly follow the algorithmic approach.
However, I also incorporate components from the other two approaches. First,
similar to formal modelling, I utilise a real life case—the Paraguayan War
1864-1870—to identify the relevant set of covariates for my theory. Next, I
draw upon the rich civil war duration literature and evaluate many empirical
operationalisations of the proposed theory. Finally, using a wide range of feature
selection and predictive modelling algorithms, I pinpoint which covariates are the
top predictors of conflict duration.
The aim of the predictive modelling enterprise, by definition, is to accurately
estimate a future outcome given some contemporary covariates. Yet, there is no
general consensus on whether conflict can be truly predicted; and if it indeed
can, what type of events should be prioritised (or even feasible) (Cederman
and Weidmann, 2017)? The oft-repeated quip, usually attributed to the Danish
physicist Niels Bohr on the nature of quantum physics—“prediction is very
difficult, especially about the future”—also accurately reflects the challenges of
forecasting in other scientific fields beyond physics (Ellis, 1970). War can indeed
be in the error term (Gartzke, 1999).
Further, even if it is not (i.e. war is predictable), some events are categorically
different than others from a forecasting perspective. Popularised by Nassim
Nicholas Taleb, the term ‘black swan’ refers to the unexpected, high-profile events
of large magnitude that mostly fall outside of the empirical detection of scientific
models given their astronomically low chances of occurrence ex-ante (Taleb, 2007).
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The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the September 11 terror attacks in
the U.S. are some of the common examples of black swan events. In contrast,
Gleditsch (2017) argues that predicting ‘white swan’ events—that is, regularities
in conflict—has greatly increased our understanding of various conflict processes
over time.
I subscribe to this point of view as well, evidenced by the unified nature
of my proposed theory and the inclusiveness of my empirical testing without
stratifying conflict by type. Plus, duration forecasts—especially using a structural
model—are more prone to displaying convergent properties than onset predictions,
which are more likely to be the result of more idiosyncratic factors. In sum, I
employ algorithmic predictive modelling to uncover the regularities pertaining
to armed conflict duration that are applicable to both civil and interstate wars.
However, every conflict prediction undertaking shares the same limitations and
this project is not an exception. First, several strong assumptions are required for
prediction: i) the covariates truly capture the phenomena they proxy and they
are linked to the underlying data generating mechanism, ii) the linkages between
the predictors and the outcome captured in the past will continue to hold in the
future, and iii) exogenous factors (‘the world’) will largely stay the same. These
assumptions are readily made; however they can be challenged—either singularly
or as a group.
Some of the most important predictors of conflict are nigh-impossible to capture.
Leader personalities, characteristics, and even ‘moods’ have an immense influence
on conflict processes that are conceptualised as bargaining or signalling games.
Yet, they are difficult to measure accurately (Chadefaux, 2017). Further, conflict
settings are usually characterised by an interacting set of decision-makers who all
have incentives to break rules and avoid pattern-detection, which makes prediction
problematic (Cederman and Weidmann, 2017). As alluded to earlier, black swan
events can alter the course of the history in ways beyond the adaptation capacity
of a predictive model. In addition to unknown-unknowns, known phenomena
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can also change the world as we know it (e.g. oil depletion, climate change,
post-antibiotics). Thus, while I abide by the three rather strong assumptions,
I am aware of the potential pitfalls surrounding conflict forecasting.
3.1.4 Case Selection after Quantitative Research
The literature on qualitative methodology is abound with case selection strategies
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008). Still, given the possible range of options to choose
from, the practitioner needs to justify why they opt for one technique over another.
As the role of the case study in this particular project is discovery, certain case
selection strategies make more sense than others.
For example, deliberate sampling with the intention of maximising variation found
in the data (King et al., 1994) and completely random sampling (Fearon and
Laitin, 2008) are two possible case selection strategies. However, both approaches
are ill-suited if the goal of the case study research is to learn beyond what is
already established by the large-n component (Seawright, 2016).
In contrast, both deviant and extreme-on-X case selection strategies (Seawright
and Gerring, 2008) are shown to be most successful at i) identifying the sources of
measurement error (King et al., 1994); ii) searching for omitted variables (Collier
et al., 2004a); iii) testing causal paths (George and Bennett, 2005); and iv)
establishing substantive boundaries of the set of cases sharing the same underlying
causal mechanism (Collier and Mahoney, 1996).
Given the proposed general model focusing heavily on material capabilities, the
case of the Sierra Leone Civil War ticks many boxes for being both a deviant
and an extreme case. First, I motivate for which independent variables it is
considered as an extreme case. Even though a case can be selected on the outcome
(extreme-on-Y ), it is shown to be problematic for causal inference (Seawright and
Gerring, 2008; Seawright, 2016). Thus, I only consider which variables in the
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Sierra Leone case on the right-hand side of the equation have extreme values with
regards to the large-n averages.
Seawright and Gerring (2008) define extreme as “an observation that lies far away
from the mean of a given distribution; that is to say, it is unusual.” More formally,
the Extremity (E) value of the ith case can be defined using the sample mean
(X¯) and the standard deviation (s) for that variable as the following:
Ei =
∣∣∣∣∣Xi − X¯s
∣∣∣∣∣
which is equal to the absolute value of the Z-score (Stone, 1996) for the ith case.
Given the proposed theoretical framework, a stylised typical case can be defined
as
E(durationi) = β0 + β1Capabilityi + β2Politicsi + β3Projectioni.
The case of Sierra Leone consists of several extreme values pertaining to material
capability. For starters, both main conflict actors—the Government of Sierra
Leone and the Revolutionary United Front (RUF)—possessed minimal capabilities
at the onset. Sierra Leone has the 27th lowest CINC score and 6th lowest
military expenditure in 1991.7 The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) was mostly
ceremonial (Richards et al., 1998), and only had slightly more than 3,000 military
personnel—in a country with a population of four million and half the size of
England—when the war broke out. Similarly, the RUF is estimated to have 100
combatants8 at the beginning of their insurgency. This dyadic lack of capabilities
puts them under the symmetric non-conventional designation of technologies of
rebellion (Kalyvas and Balcells, 2010), which accounts for only 13% of all civil
7Excluding countries with zero or missing values in military personnel or military expenditure
variables (Singer, 1972).
8Uppsala Conflict Data Program (Date of retrieval: 30/06/18) UCDP Conflict Encyclopaedia:
www.ucdp.uu.se, Uppsala University.
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wars since 1944.9
If extremity implies unusualness, then deviantness signals anomalousness. Deviant
cases, in reference to some accepted understanding of an issue—common sense,
established theory or a proposed model—demonstrate a surprising value and
they are therefore “closely linked to the investigation of theoretical anomalies”
(Seawright and Gerring, 2008). More formally,
Deviantness(i) = abs[yi−E(yi|x1,i, . . . , xK,i)] = abs[yi− b0+ b1x1,i+ · · ·+ bKxK,i]
Defined this way, cases on the regression line has a deviantness score of 0, while
the upper bound of the measure is theoretically positive infinity. As a result, one
should be interested in selecting from the set of cases with the highest overall
estimated deviantness (Seawright and Gerring, 2008).
In certain components of the proposed theoretical framework, the case of Sierra
Leone displays certain deviant qualities, especially in conjunction with other
components. For example, there was a lack of material capabilities affecting both
main warring parties as alluded above. However, both had access to rich natural
resources; the Sierra Leone Civil War is commonly included in the ‘blood diamond’
conflicts (Le Billon, 2008). On the other hand, in many cases, it was difficult for
the rebels to take control of the mines10 and to maintain control once they had
captured them11. Thus, it is not clear how much the rebels had benefited from
conflict resources, or the full extent of the influence of conflict diamonds on the
fighting capacity of the rebels.
In addition to extreme/deviant qualities, the Sierra Leone case has other
advantages that makes it a suitable focus study. Most importantly, it had a
9The percentage rises to 26.09% for the post Cold War period (1990–2004).
10Big Daddy (senior RUF commander), personal interview, Makeni, 09/03/2017.
11Security advisor, personal interview, Freetown, 18/03/2017.
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diverse set of conflict actors. Even though the war started between the SLA and
the RUF, many domestic and international actors ended up joining the fight.
Early on, the government had secured the services of the South African private
military company known as the Executive Outcomes (EO). The EO was quite
capable; commonly referred as well-trained and well-equipped (Harding, 1997).
They were exclusively stationed in the mining areas, where they were credited
to stop the rebel advances and made sure the diamond revenue was flowing
toward the government forces (Fitzsimmons, 2013). Domestically, tribal hunters
from the Mende ethnic group known as Komojors entered the frey, fighting
against the both sides at certain times during the war. They continued to be
important actors throughout the conflict (Zack-Williams, 1997), but they have
been accused of major human rights violations as well (Ero, 2000). In 1997, the
Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
intervened in Sierra Leone, consisting of mostly Nigerian soldiers numbering
around 16,000 possessing armoured vehicles and fighter jets (Adebajo, 2002).
The UN peacekeeping force (UNAMSIL) entered Sierra Leone in 2001 with a
force largest on its kind at the time (Olonisakin, 2008). Finally, the UK was
involved in several crucial military engagements towards the end of the conflict
(Keen, 2005).
Even though the combination of weak governments, rebel infighting, militia
formations, and peacekeeping operations are not special to the case of Sierra
Leone, the involvement of numerous actors that possess such a diverse set
of material capabilities and political constraints—as well as distance-related
projection problems in some cases—makes it an apt target for further scrutiny.
In addition to idiosyncratic actor capabilities and political interests, many actors
also saw their capabilities and political agenda transform during the course of
the conflict. Both the between- and within-actor variations are quite valuable as
a means of going beyond the typical case and learn more about the limitations
of the large-n findings.
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Finally, there are several other factors mainly relating to feasibility that makes
Sierra Leone an ideal choice. Sierra Leone is one of the safest post-conflict settings
to conduct fieldwork; the civil war ended fifteen years ago and there have been no
serious relapses since then. Second, even though Creole (Krio) is de facto language
amongst the local populace including in Freetown, owing to their British colonial
history, one can get by conducting interviews in English. Third, the case of Sierra
Leone has been widely studied by scholars, resulting in a research infrastructure
that is immensely beneficial to first-time interviewers.
3.2 Data
The next two sub-sections provide empirical background and motivate
various secondary methodological choices influencing the data. First,
the selection and filtering procedure of conflict duration studies using
binary-time-series-cross-section data is explained. Next, I describe the replication
procedure. Finally, I provide background information on the case of Sierra Leone,
including the interviewing strategy and the raw-data processing.
3.2.1 Replication Studies
Similar to the methodological approaches taken by Hegre and Sambanis (2006)
and Hendrix (2010), I start out by quantitatively assessing the conflict literature
to identify which covariates are consistently chosen as good predictors of conflict
duration. This enterprise can also be seen as a sensitivity analysis on the
determinants of war longevity. However, several guidelines need to be established
to ensure apples are indeed compared to other apples.
First, I locate existing quantitative research on armed conflict duration without
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discriminating between inter- and intra-state wars.12 This search results in
about 1,698 matches in total, containing 46 eligible studies. Table 3.1 provides
basic descriptive statistics of these studies: number of observations, number of
predictors, degrees of freedom, time coverage, conflict type, and the choice of
statistical model. The most common data structure used in this batch of studies
takes the shape of binary-time-series-cross-section (BTSCS). Within that subset,
the vast majority of studies have yearly-data when they include time-varying
covariates. I drop studies that use disaggregated data at the level of days (e.g.
Weisiger, 2016) to maintain uniformity, as well as studies without replication
data and do-files. In the end, I am left with 16 BTSCS studies—two on interstate,
thirteen on civil war, and one combined study.
I follow the original model formulation of the authors; however two interventions
are made. First, most duration studies using traditional statistical tools
naturally employ various parametric (e.g. Weibull) and semi-parametric (Cox
Proportional-Hazards) forms of survival analyses. Algorithmic predictive
modelling does not do well with survival processes (Zupan et al., 2000), especially
in the presence of time-varying covariates (Ripley and Ripley, 2001).
One common approach to circumvent this shortcoming is to convert survival
analysis into a classification problem (Abbott, 1985). In contrast to survival
analysis, classification algorithms are well-developed in the machine learning
literature (Weiss and Kulikowski, 1991). Most simply, a duration study can be
transformed into a logistic regression in which time is included as a covariate
(see Cunningham, 2006, for an example). However, the inclusion of cubic splines
is advised to properly capture the inherent time-dependency found in duration
data (Beck et al., 1998; Carter and Signorino, 2010). Thus, all selected studies
are turned into classification problems with their original model specifications
left intact:
12LSE library search results with the keywords ‘conflict | war + duration’ in title, English
language, peer-reviewed, journal article, political science | international relations | war | conflict
fields.
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y ∼ x1 + · · ·+ xk + t+ t2 + t3.
Other common data transformations are also applied. Most machine learning
algorithms perform better when the underlying data is either normalised or
standardised (Witten et al., 2016). All predictors are thus centred and scaled.
Algorithms also find missing values hard to deal with (Jerez et al., 2010).
As such, variables with severe missingness (>= 25%) are dropped from the
models. Less severe missingness is dealt with out-of-bag imputation (Stekhoven
and Bühlmann, 2011).13 All predictive modelling is done using caret and
caretEnsemble packages (Kuhn, 2018; Deane-Mayer and Knowles, 2016) in R (R
Core Team, 2018).
Finally, the replication enterprise is built on the fact that the predictors are made
consistent across studies. Even though a certain percentage of the independent
variables (including controls) such as GDP P.C., population size etc. are labelled
consistently in all studies, certain alterations are made to others to ensure
uniformity.
First, variable names are reduced to the core concept they are measuring.
Meaning, transformations (‘log’, ‘square’)14, descriptors (e.g. ‘size’, ‘total’, ‘per’),
and various other qualitative labels are discarded. The initial stemming process
is done using the quanteda package (Benoit, 2018) and then manually checked
for accuracy.
Second, the data section of the articles are consulted to identify how variables are
operationalised. This is more salient when a variable is constructed specifically
for the problem at hand. For example, Bennett and Stam (1996) operationalises
‘balance of forces’ as the ratio of the higher CINC value to the sum of the CINC
13Also see Honaker and King (2010) for a primer on dealing with missingness in time-series
cross-section data.
14With the exception of cubic splines t+ t2 + t3.
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values of all participants. This is allowed to exist alongside the regular CINC
variable as it provides additional information regarding capabilities; however, any
other study that has CINC ratio as a variable has its label changed to ‘balance of
forces’. This ensures uniformity across studies and minimises the risk of including
the same operationalisation under different labels.
3.2.2 Case Study Interviews
For the qualitative component of the project, I conducted 19 semi-structured
interviews in Sierra Leone between January-March 2017. Kajornboon (2005)
quotes the following explanation of the semi-structured interview technique
(Corbetta, 2003, pp. 270):
“The order in which the various topics are dealt with and the wording
of the questions are left to the interviewer’s discretion. Within each
topic, the interviewer is free to conduct the conversation as he thinks
fit, to ask the questions he deems appropriate in the words he considers
best, to give explanation and ask for clarification if the answer is not
clear, to prompt the respondent to elucidate further if necessary, and
to establish his own style of conversation.”
They also provide a suitable framework to the informants to say what they have
to say in their own terms (Carruthers, 1990). Plus, the open-ended nature of the
interviews allows for additional observations depending on what the correspondent
chooses to disclose (or not), the vocabulary they use, and the linkages they make
(Drever, 1995).
Further, these are in addition to the common advantages of conducting interviews
as a means of obtaining data such as i) being well-suited to the exploration
of attitudes, values, beliefs and motives (Richardson et al., 1965); ii) providing
the opportunity to assess the validity of the respondent’s answers via observing
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non-verbal indicators, especially regarding sensitive issues (Gorden, 1975); iii)
facilitating comparability by making sure all questions are answered by each
respondent (Bailey, 1987); and iv) ensuring that the respondents cannot receive
assistance from others while formulating their own responses (Bailey, 1987).
If it was permitted, I recorded the interviews (12/19) given the open-ended nature
of the semi-structured interview process. However, in seven cases, the interviewees
expressed concerns about being on record and directly quoted. The information
obtained from these interviews still informed my thinking, however they are not
explicitly expressed or attributed in the manuscript.
I targeted a wide range of interviewees from both sides of the conflict. I paid
special interest to ex-combatants and military personnel who were active during
the civil war, as well as individuals close to the powers-that-be. The former
group ended up including several high-ranking officers in the army, a senior RUF
commander, and a multitude of rebel rank-and-file soldiers. In contrast, the latter
set of correspondents work in the national security apparatus, the law enforcement,
or involved in the personal security of high-ranking civilian administrators.
Special attention was also paid to select individuals who were involved in the
conflict from day one. For example, a senior RUF commander who fought the
whole war turned out to be an invaluable source of information on how the
targeting strategies of the RUF had changed as a result of shifting fighting
capabilities and other information obtained in the battlefield. In other cases,
some of the interviewees originally fought on the side of the rebels, but later
integrated into the army at the later stages of the civil war. Interviewing these
soldiers provided a rare glimpse into how certain developments such as foreign
military interventions were perceived differently by the warring factions.
Non-military personnel were also targeted. I interviewed local academics, human
rights lawyers, UN personnel, and a Western diplomat. Doing so made me aware
of the concerns that were secondary to that of those expressed by the combatants.
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Some of the ex-combatants that I interviewed were involved in major human
rights violations themselves, making such inquiries an especially sensitive topic.
This, combined with the semi-structured interview technique, meant that such
violations were only expressed if the interviewee chose to disclose them willingly.
This was alleviated greatly by interviewing civilians with the aforementioned
qualifications.
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Table 3.1: Quantitative studies on armed conflict duration (n = 46) as identified
by the LSE Library keyword search
Study Obs Features df Start End Type Model
Akcinaroglu, Radziszewski 2005 103 8 12.88 1946 1992 Interstate CoxPH
Aliyev 2017 240 10 24.00 1991 2015 Civil War CoxPH
Aydin, Regan 2011 1617 13 124.38 1945 1999 Civil War CoxPH
Bagozzi 2016 2464 17 144.94 1945 2004 Civil War CoxPH
Balcells, Kalyvas 2014 906 15 60.40 1944 2004 Civil War Weibull
Balch-Lindsay, Enterline 2000 152 14 10.86 1820 1992 Civil War CoxPH
Bennett & Stam 1996 169 22 7.68 1823 1990 Interstate Weibull
Briffa 2014 44 5 8.80 1823 2003 Interstate Logit
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 1412 12 117.67 1946 2003 Civil War Weibull
Burgoon et al 2015 1378 16 86.12 1975 2000 Civil War CoxPH
Caverley & Sechser 2017 615 22 27.95 1967 2003 Civil War Weibull
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 732 20 36.60 1960 1999 Civil War Exponential
Conrad et al 2018 586 20 29.30 1990 2009 Civil War CoxPH
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 1586 12 132.17 1946 2008 Combined CoxPH
Cunningham 2006 15932 10 1593.20 1946 2003 Civil War Logit
Cunningham 2010 1223 15 81.53 1946 1998 Civil War CoxPH
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 2426 19 127.68 1945 2003 Civil War CoxPH
DeRouen, Sobek 2004 92 16 5.75 1944 1997 Civil War Competing Risks
Escriba-Folch 2010 608 21 28.95 1960 1998 Civil War Logit
Fearon 2004 128 6 21.33 1945 1999 Civil War Weibull
Fukumoto 2015 2201 10 220.10 1946 2003 Civil War Weibull
Hartzell 2009 105 12 8.75 1945 1999 Civil War CoxPH
Kirschner 2010 68 15 4.53 1945 2004 Civil War CoxPH
Koch 2009 588 11 53.45 1945 1992 Interstate Weibull
Koch, Sullivan 2010 793 19 41.74 1960 2000 Major Power Intervention Competing Risks
Krustev 2006 1450 9 161.11 1950 1992 Interstate CoxPH
Langlois, Langlois 2009 55 9 6.11 1823 1990 Interstate Weibull
Lyall 2010 307 9 34.11 1800 2006 Counterinsurgency Weibull
Meernik, Brown 2007 871 13 67.00 1948 1995 US Interventions CoxPH
Metternich 2011 1013 15 67.53 1946 2003 Civil War CoxPH
Moore 2012 94 11 8.55 1946 2002 Civil War CoxPH
Mukherjee 2014 116 16 7.25 1945 1999 Civil War Weibull
Nilsson 2012 150 23 6.52 1823 1978 Interstate Weibull
Ohmura 2017 2272 8 284.00 1946 2003 Civil War CoxPH
Prorok 2016 21200 15 1413.33 1980 2011 Civil War CoxPH
Regan 2002 13048 14 932.00 1944 1999 Civil War Weibull
Regan, Aydin 2006 13243 12 1103.58 1945 1999 Civil War Weibull
Shannon, Morey, Boehmke 2010 55048 14 3932.00 1950 2000 Interstate Weibull
Shirkey 2012 34984 16 2186.50 1816 1997 Interstate Weibull
Slantchev 2004 104 8 13.00 1816 1991 Interstate Log-logistic
Stanley, Sawyer 2009 78 15 5.20 1816 1990 Interstate Weibull
Thyne 2012 782 10 78.20 1975 2004 Civil War Weibull
Thyne 2017 17319 7 2474.14 1950 2009 Civil War CoxPH
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 2361 11 214.64 1945 2003 Civil War CoxPH
Weisiger 2016 36322 12 3026.83 1823 2003 Interstate CoxPH
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 1941 15 129.40 1946 2005 Civil War CoxPH
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Chapter 4
A Quantitative Assessment of
Duration Studies
How sensitive are the empirical findings of the civil war duration studies? There
is no equivalent study that can be compared to Hegre and Sambanis (2006),
who focus on the common predictors of civil war onset drawn from a pool of 88
variables taken from the literature. Sensitivity analysis allows one to summarise
the literature in a succinct way by separating the more robust findings from the
more idiosyncratic ones. In order to find out which predictors are more persistent
in the literature, I will begin by establishing a baseline of common determinants
of armed conflict duration.
The value of a model lies in the quality of its predictions (Miller, 2014). As such,
unlike the approach taken by Hegre and Sambanis (2006), who uses statistical
significance as their criterion, I instead focus on predictive accuracy. As an
initial step, I first employ various empirical strategies to identify which covariates
are better at prediction than others in the literature at large. To do so, I
replicate a representative sample of published armed conflict duration studies
using binary-time-series-cross-section (BTSCS) data. This data format allows for
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time-varying covariates (Beck, 2008) and is widely adopted in conflict research,1
which makes it an apt choice for the task at hand.
However, some BTSCS studies could not be replicated due to several reasons: i)
not employing traditional survival analysis, e.g. Briffa (2014), Fukumoto (2015);
ii) replication data unavailability (Conybeare, 1992; Bennett and Stam III, 1998;
Balch-Lindsay and Enterline, 2000; Goemans, 2000; Langlois and Langlois, 2009;
Kirschner, 2010; Aydin and Regan, 2012; Mukherjee, 2014; Prorok, 2018); and iii);
replication script unavailability (Vuchinich and Teachman, 1993; Aliyev, 2017).
Further, non-BTSCS duration studies such as Fearon (2004), Slantchev (2004),
and Moore (2012) are also excluded, as well as most non-yearly BTSCS studies—in
which variable values vary on month/week/day intervals—such as Shannon et al.
(2010), Lyall (2010), Shirkey (2012), and Weisiger (2016).
I argue that the unavailability of some studies should not affect the validity of
results for two reasons. First, the empirical expectations of the theoretical model
are formulated in variable importance terms. This is in contrast to mainstream
hypothesis testing, in which the practitioner usually posits a directed correlation
against a null effect. However, as I aim to test whether there are common
predictors of conflict duration, there is no precise directionality embedded with
the theory. Second, the number of possible predictors is high enough to allow
for robust variables to come through. Meaning, it is unlikely that removing
one study and including another will severely shift the results, given the wide
range of operationalisations—16 studies comprised of 232 independent variables
are disaggregated into three components—captured by the whole replication
procedure. Moreover, if multiple studies using different datasets (which might
feature different operationalisations of similar concepts) identify a common
variable, it only strengthens the notion that the results are robust and not
idiosyncratic in nature (Eck, 2005).
For the next step, I stratify all independent variables specified by the authors into
1Consult Beck (2001) for a review of BTSCS studies in political science.
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two groups: predictive and not predictive.2 This is a fitting metric for a non-NHST
study; predictive accuracy in machine learning can be thought of as statistical
significance in traditional statistics in terms of explanatory impact. However, it
should be noted that statistically significant variables are not necessarily good
predictors (Lo et al., 2015).
Variable importance is one application for filtering out predictive covariates from
noisy predictors. Feature selection is another common procedure that can greatly
reduce the dimension of a dataset and identify relevant predictors (Kuhn and
Johnson, 2013). I employ four different approaches when it comes to feature
selection: recursive feature elimination, genetic algorithm, simulated annealing,
and variable importance after fitting elastic net and random forest models. The
entire replication enterprise fits about 300,000 models. Overall, the covariates
that are selected more than others across studies—including both interstate and
civil wars—will inform the model specification of the next chapter, in which I
fit various machine learning ensembles and utilise deep learning on a combined
dataset constructed by Cunningham and Lemke (2013).
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I briefly explore the BTSCS
studies on conflict duration. Next, I analyse the replication studies to identify
common methodological pitfalls and select appropriate pre-processing procedures.
Then, I employ three feature selection algorithms and fit predictive models.
Finally, I present in-sample performance metrics and out-sample predictive
accuracy of the replication studies as the main empirical contribution of this
chapter.
2The precise definition of the difference between predictive and not predictive depends on
the algorithm at hand and explained accordingly during model fitting.
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Table 4.1: Example non-BTSCS data subset
country casename waryrs lpopl1 ef _d
COLOMBIA FARC, ELN, etc 1963- 9.730026 0.656000 0
SIERRA LEONE RUF, AFRC, etc. 1991- 8.327484 0.763997 0
TURKEY PKK 1984-99 10.776390 0.298504 1
AFGHANISTAN v. Taliban 1992- 9.706864 0.750797 0
4.1 BTSCS Studies on Conflict Duration
4.1.1 Brief Review
Modelling techniques specific to duration entered mainstream conflict literature
in late 90s (Beck et al., 1998). Previously, scholars either fit Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) to capture duration as an outcome given its continuous nature
(De Mesquita, 1978) or simply fit curves without any independent variables
(Morrison and Schmittlein, 1980). These approaches were found to be statistically
inappropriate in the former case (as duration is always positive by construction)
and uninformative in the latter (Bennett and Stam, 1996). Thus, the introduction
of appropriate duration models to political science immensely aided the study of
war longevity.
These earlier models, however, mostly featured single spells per event; whole
conflicts would occupy only one row regardless of whether they lasted a month
or several decades owing to data limitations at the time. Table 4.1 demonstrates
this type of data structure using seminal work by Fearon (2004). The variable
waryrs denote the time-frame of the conflict, and covariates such as ethnic
fractionalisation ef and the binary outcome _d are not allowed to vary within
that time-frame. Such covariates would either contain onset, termination, or
averaged-over-time values; in other words, they are time-invariant.
Scholars quickly recognised the serious shortcomings of this approach, and opted
for more dynamic models that include time-varying covariates (Beck et al., 1998).
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Table 4.2: Example BTSCS data subset
sidea sideb year parallelconflict lgdppcl territorial _d
China Peoples Liberation Army 1946 0 5.451038 0 0
China Peoples Liberation Army 1947 1 5.420535 0 0
China Peoples Liberation Army 1948 0 5.513429 0 0
China Peoples Liberation Army 1949 0 5.545178 0 1
Table 4.2 demonstrates the concept of BTSCS data using a splice of Buhaug et al.
(2009) study on conflict geography.
In the example above, covariates parallelconflict and lgdppcl—log of GDP
per capita—are time-varying, as well as the outcome variable _d. Territorial
conflict dummy territorial however is not. The values are updated every
time unit, in this case year. It should be noted that even when a variable is
time-varying with regards to the whole dataset, it could still be a constant within
a cluster. For example, if the degree to which a terrain is deemed ‘densely forested’
is measured by some function of forest coverage in a specified area, its value may
not vary during the life span of certain conflicts.
With that said, the effect of the added dynamism obtained by inclusion of
time-varying covariates cannot be overstated (Beck, 2008). When covariates are
allowed to vary within clustered observations (e.g. conflicts or dyads), models
have access to a larger amount of possible sources of information that they can
use to explain the variation in outcome. Further, time-varying values provide a
more robust empirical challenge for the proposed theories under scrutiny, as the
assumption of permanence is less defensible than allowing for variation. Finally,
time-varying covariates allow for comparing different strata of variables within
and between themselves. Case in point, the time-varying nature of the common
conflict duration predictors (i.e. population, GDP p.c., troop size) allows me
to test the effect of the same covariates on both types of war. It opens up
the possibility that certain interstate wars, based on the set of values of their
covariates, could be more similar to certain civil wars than they are to other
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interstate wars that are characterised by a vastly different set of covariates
(and vice-versa). In essence, the testing of this general hypothesis is the main
empirical goal of this project.
4.1.2 Replication Procedure
The replication procedure is as follows. First, I identify peer-reviewed studies
on armed conflict duration by conducting a curated search.3 After filtering for
quantitative studies with replication materials, this resulted in 46 studies in total
covering the publication period from 1996 to 2018.4 These studies cover a wide
range of topics studied in conflict research. To maintain conceptual and empirical
consistency, I further filter the initial batch of studies.
Quantitatively, more than half of the studies did not meet at least one of the
necessary criteria for inclusion: i) covariates are time-invariant/single spell
conflicts (Fearon, 2004), ii) contain only minor additions to an already-included
study e.g. Stanley and Sawyer (2009), and iii) being in a format that is difficult
to streamline (i.e. using daily data) such as DeRouen Jr. and Sobek (2004),
Krustev (2006), Meernik and Brown (2007), Sullivan (2008b), Sullivan (2008a),
Koch (2009), and Metternich (2011). These studies are accordingly dropped and
not replicated using predictive modelling.
Qualitatively, I select for studies that focus on explaining the duration of violent
conflict. Some papers (Hartzell, 2009) study peace duration as opposed to
conflict. Others, such as Briffa (2014), focus on drawing parallels from theories
of animal contestation to test the empirical relationship between material
capabilities (i.e. disaggregated CINC components) and war duration. I leave out
such studies and only include ones that aim to explain conflict duration making
3Precise search parameters are specified in section 3.2.1 of the Research Design Chapter.
4Full list of considered studies can be found in Table 3.1 in section 3.2.1 of the Research
Design chapter.
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a novel empirical contribution.5
After eliminating such papers, I am left with 16 BTSCS studies on conflict
duration. I argue that 16 is a large enough number for a sensitivity analysis
such as this, drawing on the sample size of similar studies. For instance, Carroll
and Kenkel (2016) uses 18 replication studies to determine how well their new
measure—called dispute outcome expectations—fares against the standard CINC
measure, which they intend to replace.
Except for Cunningham (2006) and Escribà-Folch (2010), who use logistic
regression, the remaining 14 studies utilise either parametric (Weibull/Accelerated
Failure Time) or the semi-parametric (Cox Proportional-Hazards) survival models.
Machine learning in general does really well on regression and classification
problems, but less so in survival analysis (Zupan et al., 2000), one big drawback
being the lack of support for time-varying covariates (Cruz and Wishart, 2006).
Logistic regression can be used on survival (time-to-event) data if the inherent
time-dependency is adequately controlled for. A common way of doing so is to
introduce cubic splines in the form of t+ t2+ t3, where t denotes the time to event
(Beck et al., 1998; Carter and Signorino, 2010). Thus, I transform the survival
models into logistic regression with added splines to allow for classification
algorithms to be utilised.
4.2 Exploratory Data Analysis
Before training predictive models, I briefly explore the included replication studies.
This serves two purposes. First, the included papers vary greatly in terms of
their selection of predictors. Doing a quantitative assessment of the literature
will inform the reader about the foci of the papers under scrutiny. Second,
akin to traditional statistical models, machine learning algorithms perform better
5i.e. introducing a new variable, either in the form of measurement or operationalisation, or
alternatively, data merging (bringing together novel covariates for the first time).
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Table 4.3: Descriptive statistics of the replication studies
Study Obs Features _df_ Start End Class Bal. Type Model
Bagozzi 2016 2464 17 144.94 1945 2004 0.86 Civil War CoxPH
Burgoon et al 2015 1378 16 86.12 1975 2000 0.96 Civil War CoxPH
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 1412 12 117.67 1946 2003 0.86 Civil War Weibull
Bennett & Stam 1996 169 22 7.68 1823 1990 0.54 Interstate Weibull
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 732 20 36.60 1960 1999 0.93 Civil War Exponential
Cunningham 2006 15932 10 1593.20 1946 2003 0.99 Civil War Logit
Cunningham 2010 1223 15 81.53 1946 1998 0.86 Civil War CoxPH
Conrad et al 2018 586 20 29.30 1990 2009 0.72 Civil War CoxPH
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 2426 19 127.68 1945 2003 0.85 Civil War CoxPH
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 1586 12 132.17 1946 2008 0.85 Combined CoxPH
Caverley & Sechser 2017 615 22 27.95 1967 2003 0.83 Civil War Weibull
Escriba-Folch 2010 608 21 28.95 1960 1998 0.93 Civil War Logit
Nilsson 2012 150 23 6.52 1823 1978 0.51 Interstate Weibull
Thyne 2012 782 10 78.20 1975 2004 0.88 Civil War Weibull
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 2361 11 214.64 1945 2003 0.85 Civil War CoxPH
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 1941 15 129.40 1946 2005 0.86 Civil War CoxPH
when certain conditions are met regarding the underlying data. Diagnosing these
features helps me choose what type of pre-processing is required before fitting the
models.
4.2.1 Summary Statistics
Several trends are readily visible in table 4.3. First, only three studies out of 16
include interstate wars; Bennett and Stam (1996) and Nilsson (2012) exclusively,
and Cunningham and Lemke (2013) in conjunction with civil wars. The following
studies only consider civil war duration: Bagozzi (2016), Burgoon et al. (2015),
Buhaug et al. (2009), Collier et al. (2004b), Cunningham (2006), Cunningham
(2010), Conrad et al. (2018), Cunningham et al. (2009), Caverley and Sechser
(2017), Escribà-Folch (2010), Thyne (2012), Uzonyi and Wells (2016), and
Wucherpfennig et al. (2012).
Studies on interstate wars also go back in time significantly more (1823 is
the starting year for both studies) than civil war datasets, which start their
coverage post-1945. It is also worth noting that interstate war duration studies
include more variables than their civil war counterparts even though they
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have significantly fewer observations—the median degrees of freedom (df)6 for
interstate studies is 7.1 whereas civil war studies enjoy 86.9 degrees. Given these
figures, these studies are at risk of being what is termed ‘garbage bin’ regressions
by Achen (2005). Citing the famous Anscombe quartet (Anscombe, 1973)
demonstration,7 Achen (2005) further posits that regression model findings by
themselves are useless without “either a formal model or detailed data analysis”.
Additional robustness and sensitivity tests on top the main models are thus
highly encouraged to establish the validity of the findings in such cases (Ray,
2003, 2005).
Finally, in terms of outcome classes, which are coded as 0/1 (continuation/termination)
consistently for each row (i.e. year) across all included replication studies, class
balance reflects the summary statistics of duration across war types. The column
Class Bal. in Table 4.3 denotes the prevalence of the dominant class; the
percentage of the observations having the dominant class label (i.e. no event).
Interstate war studies are well-balanced (0.525). This contrasts the severe class
imbalance inherent in civil war duration studies: on average, 87.5% of the
observations in a dataset are non-events. If not addressed, class-imbalance might
lead to ‘lazy’ algorithms that exclusively predict the dominant class. For example,
predicting all zeros (no event) all across the board would lead to an accuracy
of around 85% for most of these studies. Hence, a more nuanced performance
metric is required to gauge the true informative value of the models, such as
the Receiver Operator Characteristic (ROC). Note that ROC is not immune to
falling prey to lazy models; however it is more resistant to them in comparison
to naive accuracy.
Class imbalance can also be rectified using zero-inflated models (Lambert, 1992);
however, to preserve consistency across multiple machine learning algorithms,
6The ratio of observations to the total number of variables; the rule of thumb being 30 degrees
of freedom to satisfy common statistical assumptions.
7Commonly used to illustrate the importance of data visualisation, Anscombe’s quartet
comprises of four datasets that have nearly identical descriptive statistics—mean, sample
variance, correlation, linear regression line, and R2—that appear vastly different when graphed.
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class imbalance is dealt with sub-sampling. At the most basic level, the data
can be up- or down- sampled.8 The former uses bootstrapping to ensure the least
frequent class has as many observations as the most frequent class; in contrast, the
latter reduces the number of most frequent class observations to match the least
frequent class. In cases of severe imbalance, however, down-sampling will lead to
immense data loss: all civil war duration studies would lose about 70% of their
observations. For this reason, I utilise up-sampling in both feature selection and
model fit stages. Anecdotally, up-sampling can lead to slightly lower out-of-sample
ROC values compared to down-sampling (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013), however, the
magnitude of potential data loss is too great to overlook.
4.2.2 Further Diagnostics
Even though the ill-effects of multicollinearity are felt more in traditional
statistical approaches that estimate coefficient sizes, correlated variables can
also affect the predictive performance of classification algorithms (Toloşi and
Lengauer, 2011). Collinear predictors can lead to over-fitting as they contain
similar information about the outcome (Hill and Judge, 1987). Thus, I start out
with a simple correlation analysis of all independent variables in each study.9
Figure 8.1 in the appendix displays the correlation matrices of all 16 studies.
Even though there is no general pattern of cluster blocks, there are multiple
variables in most of the datasets that are strongly correlated with each other in
one direction or the other. This can be appreciated more when we move away
from the big picture and zoom in on a single paper.
A useful study is Cunningham and Lemke (2013), as they combine both types
of armed conflict in their dataset. Figure 4.1 highlights some basic correlations.
We see that the log of total population and total number of troops are positively
8There are also hybrid methods combining both approaches such as SMOTE and ROSE. However,
as both of them generate a large number of bootstrapped observations (much more than regular
up-sampling), I do not consider them here.
9Outcome and cubic splines are left out of the process.
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Figure 4.1: Correlation analysis of Cunningham and Lemke 2013
correlated with each other, while showing strong negative correlation with the
civil war dummy. To prevent unwanted effects of collinearity, I pre-process the
data by dropping the redundant correlated variables during model fitting.
Finally, I employ Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to determine how many
components are needed for each dataset to explain 95% of the variation. PCA
is a dimensionality reduction technique that relies on identifying orthogonal
predictors (Wold et al., 1987). Figure 4.2 visualises the how a multivariate
Gaussian distribution can be reduced to two components. If there is meaningful
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Figure 4.2: Example of a principal component analysis of a multivariate Gaussian
distribution
variation across the studies in terms of how many principal components are
required, this can help differentiate parsimonious models from over-specified
ones.
Alas, the results fail to reveal any significant insights; for all 16 replicated studies
only require two components to capture 95% of the variation.10 One interpretation
of this result is that virtually all variation in the outcome can be reduced to
two dimensions, regardless of the original number of the independent variables.
Although this makes comparison meaningless across replication studies, given the
result holds across all, it could be signal of model over-specification: for example,
Thyne (2012) has 10 predictors, while Nilsson (2012) has 23; however in both
cases only two components are necessary. One takeaway is that all studies under
scrutiny can be significantly reduced on the right-hand side of the equation: such
a high reduction ratio obtained by PCA suggests the majority of the independent
variables are linearly correlated with each other.
In sum, given the lack of variation across studies, coupled with the fact that PCA
makes findings less interpretable, I choose not to pre-process the datasets using
10The results still hold when the threshold is increased to 99%.
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PCA. Instead, I achieve dimensionality reduction using feature selection, which is
explained in the next section.
4.3 Predictive Modelling with Feature Selection
Prior to model fitting, I utilise three wrapper algorithms for feature selection.
In machine learning, feature selection—also known as variable selection—is the
process of selecting a subset of relevant features (i.e. predictors) to construct
models. Feature selection has many benefits (James et al., 2013), of which all are
highly desired: i) model parsimony, so that they are easier to fit and explain;
ii) greater generalisability, by reducing over-fitting; iii) avoiding the curse of
dimensionality; and iv) computational efficiency.
I employ feature selection to reduce the models specified by the authors, not the
whole dataset. To give an example, Bennett and Stam (1996) fits the following
model to their data consisting of only 169 observations (cubic splines excluded):
Outcome ~ Strategy: OADM + Strategy: OADA + Strategy: OADP + Strategy:
OPDA + Terrain + Terrain x Strategy + Balance of Forces + Total Military
Personnel + Total Population + Population Ratio + Quality Ratio + Surprise +
Salience + Repression + Democracy + Previous Disputes + Number of States
It is likely that their model is over-specified given the observations-to-predictors
(n/p) ratio. Still, they only utilise 17 variables out of 37 included in the
complete dataset. Meaning, there has already been a feature selection—the
model specification. However, in light of the PCA results, expanding feature
selection to the whole dataset (e.g. outside of the authors’ specified model) is
problematic for several reasons.
First, mere inclusion does not necessitate meaningful contribution; most datasets
are built on others and contain multiple auxiliary variables (e.g. version,
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backwards-compatibility codes etc.). Second, more common in older studies
given how most statistical software worked back then, many constructed variables
(i.e. natural logs and other transformations, interaction terms, normalisation
etc.) are included next to their raw counterparts. Applying feature selection
to such datasets will drop a vast majority of the features; however, it would be
difficult to assess whether this can be traced to bad predictive performance per
se or indicative of the uninformativeness caused by the redundant covariates.
Third, the computational costs of increasing the number of variables—sometimes
over hundred—in a dataset often exponential (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013) while
not guaranteeing an improvement in predictive accuracy. Thus, I limit feature
selection to the original model specifications and aim to further parsimonise the
predictive models.
The following algorithms try to get at the best subset of covariates in terms
of predictive accuracy. For all algorithms, both the internal and external
performance measures are set to ROC maximisation. Selection is based on
external ROC; as maximising internal ROC is prone to over-fitting. I use
bootstrapped cross-validation (repeated 50 times) for both performance measures.
I fit logistic regression models to leverage its computational efficiency. I do not
fit a new model with the selected features as doing so will lead to selection bias
(Friedman et al., 2001). Cubic splines are added to the model specifications to
control for time dependency; however they are not reported if they are selected
as predictive features. Next, I briefly introduce the algorithms and provide their
respective pseudo-codes taken from Kuhn and Johnson (2013). Top predictors
identified by the feature selection algorithms will not be covered here but in the
upcoming findings section after model fitting.
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Figure 4.3: Recursive feature elimination algorithm
4.3.1 Recursive Feature Elimination
Recursive Feature Elimination (RFE) is a simple feature selection method that
focuses on the size of the variable subsets. It is considered as a greedy algorithm
as it only considers each subset once and never goes back again. Thus, it is
susceptible to getting stuck in local maxima (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013). However,
it is relatively fast to implement, making it an adequate starting choice as a
benchmark.
Figure 4.3 provides the step-by-step guide of the RFE algorithm. Given the
relatively lower number of covariates in the replication studies, I try all possible
subset sizes; e.g. Nilsson (2012) has 23 predictors, so the RFE algorithm fits
subset sizes of 1, 2, 3, . . . , 22, 23.
Table 4.4 shows the results of the RFE procedure across studies. The reduction
factor achieved by the RFE is also included. Around 50% of the studies have a
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Table 4.4: Recursive feature elimination results
Study Covariates Selected Reduction % ROC
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 10 8 20.0 0.819
Cunningham 2006 8 2 75.0 0.808
Bagozzi 2016 15 9 40.0 0.797
Nilsson 2012 21 21 0.0 0.742
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 10 10 0.0 0.741
Cunningham 2010 13 13 0.0 0.741
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 13 10 23.1 0.733
Bennett & Stam 1996 20 18 10.0 0.723
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 17 16 5.9 0.711
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 9 9 0.0 0.703
Caverley & Sechser 2017 20 18 10.0 0.684
Burgoon et al 2015 14 14 0.0 0.658
Thyne 2012 7 5 28.6 0.655
Conrad et al 2018 18 13 27.8 0.648
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 18 17 5.6 0.640
Escriba-Folch 2010 19 14 26.3 0.619
reduction rate less than or equal to 10%. The magnitude of the reduction ratio
seems to go hand-in-hand with higher ROC values; the top three studies in terms
of ROC (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013; Cunningham, 2006; and Bagozzi, 2016)
have reduction rates of 20%, 75%, and 40%, respectively.
4.3.2 Genetic Algorithms
Genetic algorithms (GAs) simulate Darwinian forces of natural selection to locate
optimal solutions to a function. Mimicking the original theory (Darwin, 1859),
the underlying logic is that in an iterative process, less suited individuals (specific
models) to the environment (prediction problem at hand) are less likely to survive
(achieve high predictive accuracy) and thus, less likely to reproduce (selected for
the next iteration of predictions).
More formally, initial sets of candidate solutions are created with corresponding
fitness values. These are known as the population, whereas each solution is called
an individual. These individuals with the highest fitness values are randomly
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Table 4.5: Genetic algorithm results
Study Covariates Selected (Avg.) Pop. Size Elitism ROC
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 10 7.5 4 1 0.818
Cunningham 2006 8 6.0 3 1 0.804
Bagozzi 2016 15 11.6 5 1 0.793
Nilsson 2012 21 15.2 7 2 0.747
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 10 8.5 4 1 0.735
Cunningham 2010 13 10.8 5 1 0.734
Bennett & Stam 1996 20 14.5 7 2 0.725
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 13 11.0 5 1 0.722
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 17 14.4 6 1 0.706
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 9 8.1 3 1 0.697
Burgoon et al 2015 14 10.5 5 1 0.665
Caverley & Sechser 2017 20 14.7 7 2 0.662
Conrad et al 2018 18 12.8 6 2 0.643
Thyne 2012 7 5.1 3 0 0.643
Escriba-Folch 2010 19 13.6 7 2 0.624
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 18 13.4 6 2 0.613
combined to procreate the next generation of solutions (Mitchell, 1998). During
this process, the individual can undergo cross-over with a certain probability, as
well as being subject to random mutations. This process is repeated many times,
(theoretically) leading to better and better solutions.
The implementation of the GA is explained in Figure 4.4. For feature selection,
the individuals are subsets of predictors that are encoded as binary based on
whether they are included or not. The fitness values are the measure of model
performance; in this case ROC. Similar to how hereditary characteristics become
more pronounced as they are passed on generation after generation (assuming no
or minimal cross-over), GAs can be aggressive during internal model fitting and
are prone to over-fitting. Thus, to prevent this from happening, I set the number
of generations to a relatively low number (20).11 The cross-over probability is held
at 0.8, population size is set to about one-third of the total number of covariates,
and elitism (i.e. number of subsets to survive at each generation) is allowed with
a probability of one-tenth.
GA findings are given in Table 4.5. Mimicking RFE findings, the same three
11Other numbers are also tried from 5 to 50; the selection of 20 generations is representative
of the optimal accuracy/performance ratio.
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Figure 4.4: Genetic algorithm
studies come up on top in terms of ROC rates. Smaller population sizes (<6)
tend to score a bit higher on average. As GA resamples internally and externally
many times (20 generations with 50-times repeated bootstrapping), the selected
covariate sizes are averages over resamples. Unlike the RFE rates, however, we
do not find a lot of feature reduction taking place.
4.3.3 Simulated Annealing
The Simulated Annealing (SA) algorithm mimics the process of annealing in
metallurgy. Annealing involves utilising the temperature to alter a material’s
physical properties. This is made possible by the changes in its internal structure:
as cooling occurs, the new structure becomes fixed; which causes the metal to
retain its newly-obtained properties. Figure 4.5 demonstrates the SA algorithm.
In simulated annealing, the temperature variable is utilised to simulate this
heating process. It is initially set high, and then allowed to cool down with each
passing iteration of the algorithm. When the temperature variable is high, the
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Figure 4.5: Simulated annealing algorithm
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Table 4.6: Simulated annealing results
Study Covariates Selected Reduction % ROC
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 10 6 40.0 0.830
Bagozzi 2016 15 8 46.7 0.797
Cunningham 2006 8 4 50.0 0.794
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 10 8 20.0 0.728
Cunningham 2010 13 7 46.2 0.718
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 17 7 58.8 0.708
Nilsson 2012 21 11 47.6 0.706
Bennett & Stam 1996 20 7 65.0 0.705
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 9 6 33.3 0.695
Burgoon et al 2015 14 9 35.7 0.690
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 13 5 61.5 0.663
Thyne 2012 7 3 57.1 0.653
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 18 13 27.8 0.648
Caverley & Sechser 2017 20 9 55.0 0.645
Conrad et al 2018 18 11 38.9 0.599
Escriba-Folch 2010 19 8 57.9 0.548
algorithm can accept solutions that perform worse than the current solution.
This is where SA diverges from RFE and GAs; as this gives the SA algorithm
the flexibility to get out of local maxima located in earlier iterations. As the
temperature cools down, it gets less and less likely to consider jumping out of
such local maxima, allowing the algorithm to stabilise towards the end of its run.
The process of gradual cooling tied directly to the flexibility of the algorithm is
what makes SA remarkably effective at finding a close-enough optimum solution
when dealing with problems containing multiple local maxima. In similar settings,
greedy algorithms like RFE and GAs will be stuck with suboptimal solutions.
Table 4.6 displays the results of the SA feature selection. Again, the same studies
occupy the top three spots in ROC calculations. However, we see that SA is highly
successful at dimensionality reduction; the minimum reduction rate is 20%, the
mean reduction rate is 46.34%, with seven studies being reduced by more than
50%.
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4.4 Model Training
The feature selection algorithms are fit using logistic regression. Logistic
regression is a commonly used classification algorithm that is both computationally-efficient
and has no hyper-parameters that need tuning. However, as the focus of this
chapter is find out which covariates are better at prediction than others, there
is utility to be gained from switching to tune-able algorithms. Therefore, I
select two suitable algorithms for the task: the elastic net, an extension of
the generalised linear model that has a built-in feature selection tool; and
random forest, an ensemble decision-tree algorithm that specialises in uncovering
non-linear interactions between the predictors.
4.4.1 Elastic Net
The so-called elastic net is a generalised linear model that combines two common
types of regularisation; L1 and L2. The L1 regularisation, commonly known as
the LASSO—Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selector Operator, has the penalty
form
|β∥1 = ∑pj=1 |βj|.
LASSO regression shrinks some coefficients to zero depending on their
contribution; meaning it does feature selection (as multiplication by zero drops
out the term).
In contrast, the L2 regularisation is called the Ridge regression. Ridge regression
penalises large coefficients, which can have a disproportionate influence on the
outcome. However, this makes them less interpretable than the LASSO. The
elastic net combines the two adding a quadratic component to the penalty, which
defaults to L2 when used by itself:
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Figure 4.6: Elastic net vs. LASSO and ridge regression
βˆ = argmin
β
(∥y −Xβ∥2 + λ2∥β∥2 + λ1∥β∥1)
Figure 4.6 demonstrates the relationship between elastic net and both types of
regularisations. In R, elastic net can be fit using the glmnet package (Friedman
et al., 2010). It has two hyper-parameters; alpha and lambda. The alpha
parameter can take any value between [0, 1] and denotes the type of penalisation:
0 for Ridge and 1 for LASSO. Any other value of alpha results in an elastic
net, which is a hybrid of the two approaches. On the other hand, lambda is a
continuous variable (0, 1] and control the magnitude of the penalty. These can be
supplied as value-pairs to the algorithm; 20 equally-spaced values of lambda are
tried with alpha values 0, 0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8 and 1. Similar to the feature selection
algorithms, repeated bootstrapped cross-validation (50) is used. In addition,
as identified in the exploratory data analysis, the following pre-processing
procedures are applied: near-zero variance and correlated variables are dropped;
all remaining covariates are centred and scaled; and the least-occurring class
label is up-sampled to match the frequency of the dominant class label. The
aforementioned pre-processing steps help optimise the data for the machine
learning algorithms as prescribed by Kuhn and Johnson (2013).
###Random Forest
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Random forest is one of the most popular ensemble learners. It is also one of the
most accurate machine learning algorithms (Caruana and Niculescu-Mizil, 2006;
Fernández-Delgado et al., 2014). It grows many smaller and weak decision-trees
into a strong, aggregated learner (Breiman, 2001). Random forests use the
bagging technique, which is shown to reduce variance (Breiman, 1996). The
randomness in the name refers to the process of randomisation that occurs
when the algorithm selects variables to split on. Ensemble models tend to
perform better when the underlying features are uncorrelated. The standard
implementation of the bagging procedure produces highly-correlated trees and
common features are shared widely between the trees. By randomising which
covariates are available to each singular tree, the random forest algorithm grows
less correlated trees. This type of randomisation also reduces the computation
time required to train the forest.
The ranger package (Wright and Ziegler, 2017) in R ports a fast implementation
of the original random forest algorithm (Breiman, 2001) written in C++.
There are three hyper-parameters that can be tuned: split rule, mtry, and
min.node.size. split rule determines the procedure used for splitting the
trees; for classification, the allowed rules are gini and extratrees. mtry
determines the number of covariates to possibly split at at each node. Finally,
min.node.size sets the minimum allowed node size. Similar to the elastic net
hyper-parameters, I supply various value-pairs consisting of split rule and
mtry while holding the min.node.size at its default (one).
4.4.2 Variable Importance
Tables 4.7 and 4.8 display the best (selected) hyper-parameter tunings and their
associated ROC values. Each selected model fit12 on a replication study ranks the
12The algorithm fits many models using the value-pair combinations; alpha and lambda for the
elastic net and split rule and mtry for the random forest. However, only the ‘best’ model—the
one that has the highest external ROC—is selected for computing the variable importance.
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Table 4.7: Elastic net selected hyper-parameters and ROC
Study ROC Reg. Type Penalty Top Predictors
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 0.812 Elastic Net 0.6316
Bagozzi 2016 0.799 Elastic Net 0.0001 Territory + Ethnic Frac. +
Democracy
Cunningham 2006 0.792 Elastic Net 0.0001 Coup d’etat
Bennett & Stam 1996 0.773 Elastic Net 0.0001 Strategy: OPDA
Cunningham 2010 0.750 Elastic Net 0.0001 Independent Intervention
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 0.741 Elastic Net 0.0001 Conflict at Border + Border x
Distance + Democracy
Nilsson 2012 0.727 Elastic Net 0.0001 Strategy: OADP +Strategy: OPDA +
Terrain
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 0.716 Elastic Net 0.0001 Territorial Control + Central
Command + Democracy
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 0.710 Elastic Net 0.0001 Institutional Constraints
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 0.707 Ridge 1.0000 Coup d’etat + Fighting Capacity +
Arms Procurement
Thyne 2012 0.677 Ridge 0.9474 Fight for Gov’t + Lenient Veto +
Coup d’etat
Burgoon et al 2015 0.675 Ridge 1.0000 UN PK + Strong Parity + Democracy
Caverley & Sechser 2017 0.662 LASSO 0.0001 Cold War + Natural Resources +
Ground Mechanisation
Conrad et al 2018 0.656 Elastic Net 0.2632 Extortion + Contraband
Escriba-Folch 2010 0.632 LASSO 0.0527 Sons of the Soil
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 0.581 Elastic Net 0.0001 Primary Commodity Exports +
Change in Commodity Price Index
covariates based on their contribution to predictive accuracy.
In Table 4.7, we see that the hybrid elastic net dominates the type of regression
selection based on ROC maximisation. Ridge regression was selected three times,
and the LASSO only two times. The most common penalty coefficient (lambda)
is the smallest possible option (0.0001). Moving onto Table 4.8, on average, the
gini impurity measure outperforms the extremely randomised trees in the split
rule column for the random forest. The second hyper-parameter, mtry is kept to
two for almost half of the studies.
Finally, the top three predictors excluding the time splines13 are reported next
to each study for both algorithms. Interestingly, even though Cunningham and
Lemke (2013) has the highest ROC value in both model fits, only the time variables
t + t2 are selected as predictive. Thus, no variable from the original model
specification is classified as a good predictor. This is striking, as the civil war
13The war months variable found in Cunningham (2006) is left in as it is part of the original
model specification and not a later add-in.
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Table 4.8: Random forest selected hyper-parameters and ROC
Study ROC Split Rule mtry Top Predictors
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 0.829 extratrees 2
Cunningham 2006 0.801 gini 2 War Months + Population
Cunningham 2010 0.794 gini 2 Population + GDPPC + Ethnic Frac.
Bagozzi 2016 0.779 gini 2 Ethnic Frac. + GDPPC + Population
Escriba-Folch 2010 0.753 extratrees 10 Contraband + GDPPC + Population
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 0.751 gini 7 GDPPC + Population
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 0.748 gini 2 Institutional Constraints +
Constraints x Tenure
Cunningham, Gleditsch & Salehyan 2009 0.746 gini 17 GDPPC + Population
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 0.743 gini 2 Distance to Capital + Border x
Distance + Democracy
Nilsson 2012 0.734 extratrees 21 Balance of Forces
Burgoon et al 2015 0.723 extratrees 8 Media Reporting + UN PK +
Amnesty
Bennett & Stam 1996 0.720 extratrees 2 Terrain + Territorial + Sum of
Population
Caverley & Sechser 2017 0.693 extratrees 11 Distance to Capital + Democracy +
GDPPC
Conrad et al 2018 0.650 extratrees 2 Democracy + Extortion +
Contraband
Collier, Hoeffler & Soderbom 2004 0.613 extratrees 10 GDPPC + Ethnic Frac. + Missing
Inequality
Thyne 2012 0.592 extratrees 8 Battle Deaths + Commitment Index
dummy is not found to be predictive of conflict duration in this combined dataset.
Democracy, GDP per capita, and population variables are frequently selected as
top predictors, as well as covariates proxying commitment issues (e.g. veto players,
peacekeeping, commitment index).
4.4.3 Performance Metrics
I provide both in-sample and out-sample performance metrics to gauge model fit
and predictive accuracy. First, I present the internal performance metrics: ROC,
sensitivity, and specificity. The explanations of the confusion matrix statistics are
provided in Figure 4.7 (Kuhn and Johnson, 2013). In-sample performance metrics
tend to be more optimistic than their out-sample counterparts. However, there are
several reasons why it is still a good idea to assess them in conjunction with the test
data performance. As the cross-validation procedure generates multiple resamples
during training, there is almost always more data available to assess model fit
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Figure 4.7: Confusion matrix statistics
at this stage. This comes in especially handy when analysing the true positive
(sensitivity) and the true negative (specificity) rates and their spread—external
performance metrics could be highly biased when they are not resampled enough
times.
4.4.3.1 In-Sample Performance
Figure 4.8 shows the ROC, sensitivity, and specificity metrics of all replicated
studies. Overall, across all resamples of elastic net and random forest models, the
average values are: ROC: 0.721; Sensitivity: 0.784; Specificity: 0.479. In other
words, the models do a much better job in identifying true positives in relation
to the true negatives, which is predicted slightly worse than what random chance
would dictate. If we stratify on model type, however, we see that the random
forest algorithm is more extreme in its classification than the elastic net (Table
8.2 in the appendix). It does an extremely good job in detecting true positives
(0.89), but really poorly in specificity (0.32). Elastic net performance, on the
other hand, is more stable across all three metrics.
Model nuances and differences across studies are visualised in Figure 4.8.
Elastic net metrics display more spread than their random forest counterparts,
indicating higher variation. Interstate war duration studies do not display the
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Figure 4.8: In-sample performance metrics
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sensitivity/specificity trade-off plaguing the random forest.
4.4.3.2 Out-Sample Performance
Moving onto external performance, I use separation plots to visualise the
classification performance. A separation plot “allows the analyst to evaluate
model fit based upon the models’ ability to consistently match high‐probability
predictions to actual occurrences of the event of interest, and low‐probability
predictions to non-occurrences of the event of interest” (Greenhill et al., 2011,
pp. 991). It is touted as being insensitive to the arbitrary probability thresholds
that are used to distinguish between true events and non-events. Figure 4.9
displays the separation plot of each study produced by the predictions of the
best elastic net model. For reference, a perfect classifier will produce complete
separation—red bars on one side (representing zeros) and white ones (denoting
ones) on the other. A trace line is added to each plot to improve legibility.
It should be noted that the number of observations do affect the visual
representation of the plots. Studies with lower n such as Bennett and Stam
(1996) and Nilsson (2012) feature comparatively larger blocks than studies with
larger n e.g. Burgoon et al. (2015). On the other hand, the aforementioned two
studies both only analyse interstate wars and they have the lowest out-of-sample
accuracy. Even though the difference in accuracy between the interstate war
studies and the least-accurate civil war studies is not that large, there is still a
categorical difference. While it is difficult to pinpoint why this is the case, the
lower n of interstate war studies is a likely culprit.
Finally, even though we do not observe a clear cut separation in any of the studies,
some are most discriminative than others (Buhaug et al., 2009; Caverley and
Sechser, 2017; Escribà-Folch, 2010). The external accuracy of Buhaug et al. (2009)
can be explained by the importance of geographical factors—many of which are
highly predictive—in conflict duration forecasting: distance to capital and conflict
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Figure 4.9: Out-sample (prediction) performance using separation plots
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at the border are two of the top predictors of conflict duration. Caverley and
Sechser (2017) focus on material and fighting capabilities as well as military tactics
and logistics. Along with their new variable capturing army mechanisation, their
model incorporates geography and regime type. Their analysis thus benefits from
multiple sets of good predictors. Escribà-Folch (2010) highlights factors linked to
economic sanctions and institutional constraints in his analysis. Again, a balanced
mixture of covariates measuring natural resource exploitation, geography (terrain
features), and political constraints pave the way for high out-of-sample accuracy.
The main takeaway of the out-of-sample predictions is that accurate duration
forecasts require a complementary mix of covariates capturing different aspects
of duration dynamics. As laid out in the theory chapter, duration can be
conceptualised as a function of capability-spending consisting of baseline material
capabilities and limitations (physical and non-physical) acting on them. Studies
featuring a diverse set of variables that proxy for all three components—even in
the form of control variables—are more likely to make accurate out-of-sample
predictions compared to others that only focus on one aspect.
4.4.4 Top Predictors Across All Studies
I briefly summarise the findings borne out of five different algorithms: recursive
feature selection, genetic algorithms, simulated annealing, and variable
importance from elastic net and random forest model fits. Doing feature selection
five times using a diverse set of algorithms resampled many times (293,600 model
fits in total)14 should offer a fair assessment of the predictive quality of the
covariates under scrutiny.
Figure 4.10 visualises the top predictors (with a threshold of minimum ≥ 5
selections overall) across studies. Top predictor is defined as being selected as one
14RFE 50 resamples/study; SA 5000 internal and 5000 external resamples/study; GA 1000
internal and 1000 external resamples/study; Elastic Net 6000 resamples/study; and random
forest 300 resamples/study.
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Figure 4.10: Top predictors of conflict duration
of the three top covariates excluding the cubic splines; for this reason, in some
cases there are less than three selected covariates per study—more extreme result
being the Cunningham and Lemke (2013) having no predictor getting selected
except for the splines in several cases. In those cases, only the time splines are
selected as predictive features and all other covariates are assigned an importance
score of zero.
Polity, either in the form of a democracy dummy or a polity score, is by far
the most selected feature (24) across studies. This is further complemented
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by institutional constraints on the decision-maker, which is selected seven times.
Structural determinants such as GDP per capita (11) and population size (10) are
also deemed strong predictors. This is followed by factors capturing geography,
such as having conflict at border (10) and distance to the capital (9). Balance
of forces, operationalised as the ratio of composite index of national capability
(CINC) of the belligerents (Singer et al., 1972), also makes the cut with six
selections. The number of actors and income inequality share the last two spots
with five selections each.
Moving away from physical capability, political constraints, and distance variables,
the use of military strategy is the second most frequently selected covariate (13).
However, it must be noted that this finding is likely to be driven by the same
study (Bennett and Stam, 1996). Military coup is also designated as a consistent
predictor of duration (9).
There is a caveat to assessing feature selection in this manner. Some covariates
are more frequently included in datasets than others. Variables such as GDP
per capita, population, regime type are ubiquitous. More specialised features
like the commitment index, or covariates borne out of new data such as ground
mechanisation are less likely to be included, let alone selected after a competitive
filtering process.15 Other than aggregating such distinct features into more
general umbrella terms—for example, commitment index under bargaining
or ground mechanisation under fighting capacity—this type of loss cannot be
prevented. However, doing so would result in a loss of resolution and granularity
that are present in the replication studies. Thus, I do not aggregate up distinct
predictors and accept their loss, as only about less than 3% of all variables are
truly idiosyncratic—their exclusion should not affect the systematic results in a
significant way.16
15It should be noted that they can; the selection of institutional constraints as a top predictor
being the case in point.
16Consult Table 8.1 in appendix for the complete list of included variables.
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For the more common variables (predictors that are labelled more or less
consistently), I take two precautions to reduce possible bias. First, as described
in the research design, I aggregate features capturing related phenomena and
report them under the top feature’s label. This way, both lenient and strong
veto players are coded as veto players. Second, I only consider the top three
predictors in each study, using five different approaches. Each approach consists
of many resamples using hold-out data, making sure each predictor is randomly
selected enough times. More specifically, each best individual model fit from
five different sources—three feature selection algorithms and two model fits—is
a product of about 250 separate model fits aggregating into one. In order to be
selected, a predictor needs to appear in the top three consistently across multiple
approaches.
Expecting high predictive accuracy also undermines potential problems stemming
from variable frequency. Even though nearly all replicated studies have either a
GDP per capita or population size variable. However, while a more common
variable—by definition—is more likely to be selected across studies given its
higher frequency, it is not a given that they are good predictors. Setting a high
threshold ensures such commonly occurring variables are only selected when they
do exceptionally well in predicting the right outcome, such as being amongst
the top three predictors in terms of accuracy. This instils a certain degree of
robustness to the results. For instance, rebels having i) a legal political wing
and ii) strong central command are frequently included variables across studies.
However, neither of them are consistently selected as top predictors.
4.5 Conclusion
This is the first comprehensive quantitative assessment of the determinants
of armed conflict duration. By leveraging both the internal and the external
resamples and performance measures, I demonstrate which covariates do a
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better job at predicting the true outcome. Normally, the predictors in a study
are divided into two groups: independent variables and the controls. Even
though both are just independent variables that are thought to be correlated
with the outcome, being a control indicates that the authors are not interested
in its substantive interpretation, and only include the term to account for an
alternative explanation. In null hypothesis significance testing studies, these
controls are merely mentioned in passing.
However, a closer look at 16 conflict duration studies using BTSCS data shows that
features commonly delegated to the control status have immense predictive power.
In line with the theoretical expectation of a nexus of physical capability, political
constraints, and geographical factors governing war duration, I demonstrate that
covariates that are used to operationalise these structural aspects are highly
influential in forecasting.
The replication enterprise acts as a sensitivity analysis of the conflict duration
literature. Under the assumption that the selected studies constitute a
representative sample of the published literature, it identifies which predictors
are more consistently better than others at forecasting. However, the study has
its limitations.
First, as discussed recently, the consistency of variable labels across studies are
manipulated for uniformity. There are other defensible ways of achieving
consistency. For example, similar predictors can be aggregated up to
a more general label. In this study, I treat different types of natural
resources—e.g. hydrocarbons, gems, contraband—as unique predictors. Although
existing research (Lujala, 2009) shows that they do behave differently, one could
also combine them all under ‘natural resources’. Doing so will make that variable
highly predictive, as contraband alone is ranked ninth overall.
Second, even though the project is defensible on the grounds that it
adequately represents yearly BTSCS studies, it does not necessarily mean
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the representativeness can be extended to daily and monthly BTSCS studies. As
data collection efforts improve, richer and more granular data become available to
researchers. It is possible that while trends that take a while to manifest—changes
in GDP P.C., military expenditures, troop size—are successfully captured in this
study, finer trends might have been ignored.
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Chapter 5
Machine Learning using
Combined Data
In this chapter, I empirically the test the general duration model using a
replication study (Cunningham and Lemke, 2013) containing both civil and
interstate wars. In addition to the original model specification, I add a rich
set of new covariates identified in Chapter 4 as the top predictors of conflict
duration. I employ a diverse cast of machine learning algorithms, ensembles,
and deep learning models. More specifically, I test the claim that whether
operational differences between civil and intestate wars (conceptualised as a
dummy indicator) can be successfully unpacked and explained away by predictors
that capture baseline capabilities and the limitations acting on them. If the
binary indicator of war type is not a consistent predictor of conflict duration, this
serves as initial evidence suggesting that a similar underlying data generating
process governing both types of armed conflict.
The bifurcated nature of conflict duration studies is reflected in the previous
chapter: 15 out of 16 replicated studies only look at either interstate or civil
wars. The sole exception is the Cunningham and Lemke (2013), a work aptly
titled Combining Civil and Interstate Wars. The authors cite (pp. 610) two main
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factors why conflict scholars traditionally separate the two types of warfare:
“First, theoretical arguments about war within and between states
were once quite distinct. Realism dominated international relations
research when large-n statistical studies of war first became common.
This approach viewed war as resulting from structural features such as
the number of poles and the distribution of power in the international
system. Comparativists studying internal conflict, by contrast, usually
emphasized state-level features such as government institutions, state
strength, and state-society relations, evaluating their theories almost
exclusively against a handful of cases.”
“Second, data availability likely also played a role. The original
Correlates of War data set included only interstate and extra-state
wars, excluding civil wars. COW was the most commonly used
data set for large-n analyses of conflict, and researchers interested
in conducting these analyses were therefore limited to studying
interstate and extra-state wars. By the time COW’s intrastate war
list became available in 1982, scholarly patterns likely had become
fixed.”
Both of these points have yet to be addressed in the conflict literature. Different
types of war are still studied separately,1 and data limitations have not been
improved. To the author’s knowledge, there has been no new study utilising a
combined dataset at the time of writing.
To help alleviate these shortcomings, I replicate the study using the same
guidelines established in Chapter 4. I take the original Cox Proportional-Hazards
model with the specified covariates and transform it to a logistic regression.
1It should be noted that this is not an oversight on behalf of conflict scholars; they study
civil and interstate wars separately as they believe them to be qualitatively different phenomena.
I do not challenge this notion; rather, I focus on whether theoretical explanations of war
longevity carry over across types given the similarities in how common measures of duration are
operationalised in empirical applications.
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I add cubic splines t + t2 + t3 where t is the duration of conflict to control
for the inherent time-dependency. Contrary to Chapter Four, where I employ
up-sampling to deal with severe class-imbalance, here I use down-sampling as
the class-imbalance is relatively less severe. Down-sampling, even though it
necessitates discarding some of the training data, is shown to result in better
out-of-sample accuracy compared to up-sampling.2 Finally, I pre-process the
data by centring and scaling all the variables, taking the natural log of skewed
numerical predictors, as well as dropping possible linear combinations that might
exist in the data.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. First, I briefly outline the original
model specification as published. Then, I add the covariates that I find to be
highly predictive of conflict duration informed based on the results of the previous
chapter. Next, I assemble a diverse set of shallow learning algorithms, including
ensembles, and make out-of-sample predictions. I then switch to deep learning
to generate additional insights from the data. Finally, I explain the predictions
of the neural network by employing the Local Interpretations of Model-agnostic
Explanations (LIME) framework.
5.1 Shallow Learning
First, in order to build on the findings of Chapter 4, I utilise several machine
learning algorithms to predict conflict duration. Although a distinction
between ‘shallow’ vs. ‘deep’ learning is rather artificial—representation (feature)
vs. hierarchical learning being the established terms—there is utility in separating
the two approaches.
In representation learning—that is, regular machine learning—, the focus is on the
features (i.e. variables in a model). Furthermore, the models and the functional
2A comparison chart of four common sub-sampling methods—up, down, ROSE, and
SMOTE—is supplied in the appendix.
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forms are also explicitly specified by the practitioner. In fact, all of the components
of this framework are designed by humans based on some heuristics.
‘Deep’ learning, on the other hand, does not put much emphasis on feature
selection. Instead, it creates its own features during the vertical layering
process—the moniker ‘deep’ highlights this aspect. In doing so, deep learning
models are highly suited to capture complex, hierarchical interactions between
the variables that would be quite difficult to otherwise capture using regular
machine learning methods (Mhaskar and Poggio, 2016).
Thus, employing both learning approaches simultaneously helps me investigate
the determinants of conflict duration in a more robust way. Shallow methods
are valuable tools to identify which covariates have predictive power beyond
traditional statistical significance. Deep learning techniques complement this by
uncovering high-order interactions between features that also increase predictive
accuracy.
5.1.1 Baseline Study
The original Cunningham and Lemke (2013) study features the following
covariates:
Outcome ~ Civil War Dummy + Territory + Recurring War + Troop Ratio +
Democracy + Total Troops + Total Population
Using a Cox Proportional-Hazards estimation, they find civil wars, wars featuring
democracies,3 and wars featuring larger populations tend to last longer, whereas
skewed troop ratios have a statistically significant shortening effect on conflict
duration.
3One caveat with this finding is that the authors use different operationalisations for
interstate and civil wars. When they stratify their model based on war type, they find that
democracies fight longer interstate wars but shorter civil wars.
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The authors readily acknowledge that the statistical significance of the civil war
dummy indicates that there are factors (that are thought to be common in both
types of warfare) that are not captured by their model specification. Further, on
page 621, they posit that:
Had we better measures of the bargaining concepts motivating research
on conflict duration, it is quite possible that the substantive and
statistical significance of the civil war dummy would be considerably
attenuated.
In a similar vein, although I do not focus on operationalising the concepts of
bargaining per se,4 I nevertheless take up their call and complement their dataset
by adding covariates that capture the effects of absolute and relative material
capabilities, political constraints on the head executive, and the geographic
realities of power projection.
5.1.2 New Covariates
Based on the empirical findings of Chapter 4, the following variables are added
to the original model specification to increase predictive accuracy of the original
model. The selection of the new covariates is guided by how closely they
resemble the top predictors and data availability. The latter can be a constraint
in some cases; the closer the dataset in construction to the Cunningham and
Lemke (2013) data, the higher the chances of compatibility. At this stage, I add
covariates generously, as linear combinations and near-zero variances5 will be
dropped automatically during the data pre-processing prior to model fitting.
4It should be noted that many authors operationalise bargaining concepts using absolute or
relative capabilities, so there is some overlap between the authors’ conjecture and the goal of
this project.
5Kuhn and Johnson (2013) recommend linear combinations and near-zero variance variables
should be dropped as they are uninformative.
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Material Capabilities
cinc: The quintessential national material capability indicator devised by Singer
et al. (1972). It is a composite index consisting of six separate indicators: milex,
milper, pec, irst, upop and pop.6 While the aggregated cinc index is an
indicator of relative capability (% of world resources possessed by a state; yearly
global total adding up to one), the components themselves are proxies of absolute
capability.7 Thus, the indices are included separately in addition to the summary
statistic; however the latter three variables are dropped as population is included
in the original model. For interstate conflicts, it is the average; for civil wars, it
is the score of the state actor.
parallel: The number of parallel ongoing conflicts in the same calendar year
for that conflict dyad. From a capability perspective, the more dispersed the
resources, the lesser the fighting capability. It is coded as a continuous variable
to account for the possible magnitude of the resource dispersion as a function of
increasing dyads.
alldrugs, ALLGEMSP, hydroD: A set of dummy variables indicating whether
exploitable resources—drug cultivation, valuable gemstones, oil and gas—are
present in the conflict zone (Buhaug et al., 2009). For interstate wars, conflict
zone is defined as the whole country (where the conflict takes place).
rebstrdum, figcapdum: Dummy indicators for overall rebel fighting capacity
taken from Buhaug et al. (2009). This provides power parity levels for the
rebel organisations vis-a-vis the state. It is also used for imputing ‘CINC’ score
categories for rebel factions. For example, if a rebel group is fighting a government
with a CINC score of .02 and their dyadic relationship is coded ‘3’ (parity) in the
dataset, the average CINC score for that dyad is also .02.
6Military expenditure, military personnel, energy consumption, iron and steel production,
urban population, and total population.
7Military expenditures are thousands of current year US Dollars, military personnel in
thousands, and primary energy consumption in thousands of coal-ton equivalents.
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rgdppc: Yearly GDP p.c. estimates of independent state compiled by (Gleditsch,
2002). As the dataset starts at 1950, measures for previous years are added using
different sources. For consistency purposes, in interstate wars it is averaged, while
for civil wars it takes the value of the state actor.
major: Binary indicator denoting whether a major power, as defined by the
Correlates of War project,8 is one of the conflict parties.
Non-Physical Constraints
polconiii: A composite index measuring the political constraints on the head
executive (Henisz, 2017). This measure is positively correlated with the democracy
(0.7) dummy included in the baseline model. However, it also captures additional
constraints on the executive use of force that are not captured by the democracy
dummy. It also acts as a proxy for institutional constraints. For interstate wars,
it takes the average value for the dyad; for civil wars, the average is calculated by
first imputing a score for the rebel side based on the Cunningham et al. (2013)
data.
coupx: Binary variable representing whether the conflict resulted from a military
faction seeking to overthrow the government (Cunningham, 2006).
Physical Constraints
All geographic indicators use Buhaug et al. (2009) for the majority (i.e. civil wars)
of the observations. Values for interstate wars are manually coded. Missingness is
dealt with imputation via k-nearest neighbours algorithm; variables with a large
number of missing values (i.e. > 25%) are not considered for inclusion as an added
covariate.
lndistx: The geodesic distance in kilometres between the belligerents. For
interstate wars, the distance between capitals as laid out by Mayer and Zignago
8Correlates of War Project. 2017. “State System Membership List, v2016.” Online, http:
//correlatesofwar.org
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(2011); for civil wars, the distance between the capital (government stronghold)
and the conflict region obtained from Buhaug et al. (2009).
confbord: Dummy variable for having a conflict at the border. The rationale is
that rebel groups can use an external state as a refuge and to conduct cross-border
operations. For interstate wars, the variable captures whether the belligerents are
contiguous states.
borddist: A multiplicative (interaction) term for border × distance, in order to
moderate the effect of border.
mt: Percentage of the conflict zone that are covered with mountainous terrain.
Indicators of rough terrain as an enabler of rebellion are commonly included in
conflict studies.
frst: Same as above, but for forested areas.
Figure 5.1 visualises the correlation plot with the added covariates. Insignificant
correlations are denoted with blank squares.
5.1.3 Algorithm Selection based on MaximumDissimilarity
The choice of algorithm (or its family) can be crucial to the success of predictive
modelling. All algorithms possess trade-offs that can be leveraged and exploited
in some cases but not so much in others. Further, model diversity can also
aid prediction accuracy on a more aggregate level. However, it needs to be
intentional in design—algorithms resulting in similar predictions are less useful
than divergent ones (Kuncheva and Whitaker, 2003), which can happen if they
are picked randomly. One formal way of ensuring a diverse cast of models is to
pick algorithms based on some distance metric. The Jaccard similarity coefficient
(Jaccard, 1912) is a popular method commonly used in computer imaging to
determine likeness and compare the similarity and diversity of sample sets.
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Figure 5.1: Correlation plot of Cunningham and Lemke 2013 with added
covariates
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The calculation of the dissimilarity distance metric of two samples, A and B, where
a score of 0 indicates perfect overlap between the two samples, while 1 denotes no
overlap (most dissimilar) can be shown as the following:
Dist(A,B) = 1− |A ∩B||A ∪B| =
|A ∪B − A ∩B|
|A ∪B| .
At the time of writing, the caret package in R has 238 available models to train.
Based on similarity tags featuring 57 identifiers, one can generate n number of
most dissimilar algorithms as a set using their Jaccard distance from a specified
input. I use the elastic net glmnet as the baseline model, as it is the closest
in specification to logistic regression, the literature standard. I add six more
algorithms to complement the elastic net in order to create a diverse ensemble
without sacrificing too much computational burden.
Based on Jaccard distance, the following algorithms are selected: extreme
gradient boosting, distance weighted discrimination with radial basis function
kernel, support vector machines with radial basis function kernel, random forest,
naive Bayes, and multilayer perceptron network with dropout. As the last
algorithm is actually a neural network using the high-level Keras framework,
which has its own section later in this chapter, I do not include it here. All in
all, the formalised selection process has identified a quite diverse ensemble of
algorithms including boosted and bagged trees, ensembles, discrimination models,
and probabilistic classifiers. In the next paragraph, I provide a succinct summary
of each classifier9 with the exception of random forest ranger, which is already
9Most of the selected algorithm families are not widely employed in social science. For
those interested in a technical yet accessible introduction, the Elements of Statistical Learning
(Friedman et al., 2001) provides detailed explanations at the following chapters: Kernel
smoothing methods in Chapter 6 (and the Naive Bayes classifier in subsection 6.6.3); gradient
boosting and its variants in Chapter 10, with special attention to subsections 10.10.2 and 10.10.3;
support vector machines and flexible discriminants in Chapter 12. Similarly, for those who are
interested in the applied form with accompanying R code, Applied Predictive Modeling (Kuhn and
Johnson, 2013) covers the following: Support vector machines and other non-linear regression
models in Chapter 7 (also 7.3, 13.4); boosting and other rule-based models in Chapter 8 (also see
14.5); discriminant analysis and other linear classification models in Chapter 12 (also see 13.3);
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covered in Chapter Four.
Extreme gradient boosting xgbTree is an efficient implementation of the gradient
boosting framework (Friedman et al., 2000; Friedman, 2001). It is an ensemble
learner consisting of many weak learners, and its regularised model formalisation
helps reduce the risk of over-fitting (Chen and Guestrin, 2016). Support vector
machine svmRadial is a discriminative classifier formally defined by a separating
hyperplane (Cortes and Vapnik, 1995). Its support of kernel methods makes it a
highly adaptable learner as the algorithm can change on-the-fly depending on the
kernel function (Scholkopf and Smola, 2001). Distance weighted discrimination
dwdRadial is based on the majorisation-minimisation principle to compute the
entire solution path at a given fine grid of regularisation parameters (Marron et al.,
2007). It was originally designed to solve the data piling issue found in support
vector machine implementations (Wang and Zou, 2016). Finally, naive Bayes nb
is a simple probabilistic classifier that is based on applying Bayes’ theorem with a
strong independence assumption between covariates (Rish, 2001). It is a popular
choice for text classification and event models (McCallum and Nigam, 1998).
5.1.4 ROC, Sensitivity, and Specificity
As a first step, I start with providing in-sample performance metrics of
the six selected algorithms to establish an empirical baseline. Even though
in-sample metrics are more optimistic than their out-of-sample counterparts, it
is nevertheless good practice to report both metrics so that comparisons can be
made later. Figure 5.2 displays the ROC, sensitivity, and specificity measures
across 50 resamples (10-k fold repeated five times). A comparative table of
ROC performance metrics across four sub-sampling strategies is included in the
appendix for reference; however down-sampling results in the highest ROC scores
across all algorithms and thus reported here.
non-linear classification models including Naive Bayes in Chapter 13; and finally classification
trees in Chapter 14.
127
Figure 5.2: In-sample performance metrics
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All six approaches yield similar ROC scores; meaning no single model performs
significantly better than any other. This is not necessarily surprising; in fact it
would be more concerning if the performance metrics display wild fluctuations
based on algorithm selection. Still, the exercise acts as an algorithm sensitivity
analysis—the findings are robust to the choice of algorithm; purely in terms of
predictive accuracy, nothing fundamental is dependent on one algorithm. With
that said, some algorithms do better than the others—extreme gradient boosting
and random forest models have slightly higher ROC values, followed closely by
the elastic net.
However, there is variation in detecting true positives and negatives across models.
The naive Bayes model does only slightly better than random chance when it
comes to detecting true positives, but it also produces the highest maximum true
negative score. The discriminant analysis, on the other hand, suffers from the
opposite trade-off: it is the best algorithm in terms of true positive detection,
however it does very poorly in identifying true negatives. Such trade-offs are
common in practice (Florkowski, 2008), and could be useful in ensemble settings
if right algorithms can be leveraged for the correct cases.
5.2 Ensemble Models
A more direct approach to algorithm diversity is to create ensemble models.
Ensembles models can be powerful, as they can harness the predictive power
of multiple algorithms and outperform individual algorithms if appropriately
constructed. This is especially the case when algorithms can complement each
others’ weaknesses, so that the final model (ideally) contains the ‘best’ parts of
each algorithm included. However, as a trade-off, ensembles are more difficult
to interpret, making them better choices for maximising predictive accuracy and
when explanation is not the primary concern. For the purposes of this project, I
only include ensemble models as a performance benchmark to which individual
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algorithms can be measured against.
Although models can be ensembled in many different ways, two basic approaches
are greedy and meta-model ensembles. Greedy ensembles are simple linear
combinations consisting of individual model predictions. Meta-model ensembles,
in contrast, can fit any algorithm on top of the existing predictions (Džeroski
and Ženko, 2004). For example, a random forest classifier can be build using
individual model predictions in which the predictions are the features. However,
more complexity does not always lead to better predictive accuracy; in some
cases, simple linear ensembles can perform better than more complex meta-model
ensembles (Sollich and Krogh, 1996). Finally, making an ensemble prediction is
also not guaranteed to outperform any one model’s predictive accuracy, especially
if one model is clearly better than the rest of the ensemble (Rokach, 2010).
5.2.1 Simple Linear Ensembles
The predictions of the previous six models are combined in a greedy ensemble. The
model predictions are weighted based on their accuracy, and then a final linear
model is fit to make new predictions on the hold-out (test) data. The ensemble
uses identical cross-validation (repeated 10-k fold), sub-sampling (down), and
pre-processing procedures that have been applied to the individual algorithms.
The following models were ensembled: glmnet, xgbTree, dwdRadial, svmRadial, ranger, nb
They were weighted:
-2.5535 1.9867 1.5765 2.6603 -2.7116 1.4449 0.3275
The resulting ROC is: 0.7546
The fit for each individual model on the ROC is:
method ROC ROCSD
glmnet 0.7327083 0.08021384
xgbTree 0.7412500 0.07850042
dwdRadial 0.7165972 0.08439435
svmRadial 0.7119097 0.08244908
ranger 0.7415625 0.06574621
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nb 0.7121875 0.08059927
The code output provides summary statistics of the greedy ensemble, including the
model weights and individual ROC values. Both the random forest and extreme
gradient boosting algorithms have a ROC score of approx. 0.741, and the ensemble
itself slightly improves on both with a ROC score of 0.7546.
5.2.2 Meta-Model Ensembles
More sophisticated ensembles beyond simple weighted linear combinations are
also possible. Stochastic gradient boosting gbm is a refinement of the gradient
boosting method in which at each iteration of the algorithm, a base learner is
fit on a sub-sample of the training set drawn at random without replacement
(Friedman, 2002). Figure 5.3 plots the relative contribution of each algorithm to
the final gbm model fit.
The make-up of the meta-model ensemble is shown in Figure 5.3, and it is different
from the simple linear ensemble. Even though the top algorithm is extreme
gradient boosting, the next two top performing models are naive Bayes and the
elastic net. Random forest, in contrast, is the second-to-last in terms of relative
influence. The performance metrics of the meta-model ensemble are: ROC 0.818,
Sensitivity 0.77, and Specificity 0.689—a vast improvement in ROC compared to
the individual algorithms and the linear ensemble.
5.3 Predictive Accuracy
Even though we have achieved better ROC scores moving from individual
algorithms to more complex ensembles, so far we have only evaluated in-sample
performance. The true validation lies in test scores, as internal accuracy metrics
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Figure 5.3: Meta-model ensemble relative influence graph
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tend to be optimistic. Thus, I predict class probabilities for all observations in
the held-out data using all six algorithms and two ensembles.
Algorithm ROC
1 ranger 0.8773902
2 svmRadial 0.7949076
3 dwdRadial 0.7889726
4 greedy 0.7858329
5 xgbTree 0.7814678
6 glmnet 0.7497164
7 gbm 0.7408645
8 nb 0.6632333
The ROC values of all models are displayed in the code output. The random
forest algorithm separates itself from the pack with a ROC score of 0.877, while
the naive Bayes predictions result in a similar distinction in the opposite direction
(0.663). We also see that both ensembles, even though scoring higher in in-sample
validation, are located in the middle of the pack. Furthermore, the simpler
weighted linear ensemble (0.785) outperforms the more complicated meta-model
ensemble (0.74).
Finally, we can extract variable importance from the elastic net, extreme gradient
boosting, and random forest algorithms.10 Figure 5.4 highlights the top predictors
across all three models.
Variable importance plots are useful tools to illuminate how the predictive process
underlying each algorithm unfolds. Recall that the elastic net has the lowest
out-sample ROC value amongst the three. We see one possible reason why it
under-performs: all predictive power is generated through the variable coup and
the cubic time splines.11 In other words, the determinants of conflict duration,
10Other algorithms featured in this chapter do not have an associated variable importance
extraction technique.
11There are two caveats. First, the immense predictive power of coups, especially in the
context of nullifying the effect of the civil war dummy, should be evaluated carefully. The main
reason for this is that the variable itself is a very good predictor of civil wars. Second, the cubic
splines, included in the algorithms for completeness (given their inclusion in the baseline logistic
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Figure 5.4: Variable importance after model fit
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according to the model, is whether the conflict is a result of a military coup and
the auto-regressive temporal aspect of the conflict (i.e. how long it has been going
on). The elastic net fails to utilise the vast majority of the covariates, and its
predictive accuracy suffers from it.
Extreme gradient boosting, in comparison, recruits a larger number of variables
when it comes to prediction. Even though the top two covariates are coups and
duration (first time spline), the following variables also contribute to predictive
accuracy: civil war dummy, geographic factors such as distance and mountainous
terrain, and several material capability predictors (e.g. population, troop ratio,
troop size, military expenditure).
Finally, the random forest algorithm nearly fully utilises the available covariates.
Unsurprisingly, the top three predictors are the cubic splines. The top three
is then followed by a dozen covariates that proxy either material capabilities
or aspects of geography. In contrast to the previous two models, out of 30
available variables, coups and the civil war dummy variables rank 20th and
23rd, respectively. This supports the theory that when the categorical differences
between civil and interstate wars are captured by multiple capability variables,
the dummy variable has minimal influence on duration prediction.
5.4 Deep Learning
The popularity of deep learning technologies in sciences—coined as a term in mid
80’s, however theoretically neural nets have been around a couple of decades before
that—has been on the rise since the computational power has risen up to match
theory in the last decade. As immensely powerful learners, deep learning tools are
especially adept at uncovering complex, layered interactions between individual
predictors. Given the complexity inherent in social sciences in general and conflict
regression models) may not necessarily measure the same effect that is picked up by a logistic
function.
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research specifically, I complement the previous two approaches—shallow learning
and ensemble models—with a neural net application.
More technically, deep learning (hierarchical learning) is a sub-field of machine
learning that display the following characteristics (Deng et al., 2014): i) utilising
a cascade of multiple layers of non-linear processing units for feature extraction
and transformation; ii) each successive layer using the output from the previous
layer as input; the model architecture can allow for no memory (each layer is a
blank slate) or some memory retention (e.g. Recurrent Neural Networks; Long
Short Term Memory models); iii) learning multiple levels of representations that
correspond to different levels of abstraction, which form a hierarchy of concepts;
and iv) can be supervised or unsupervised in nature.
5.4.1 Neural Nets with Keras
Keras is the most-popular high-level interface complementing the low-level
TensorFlow back-end and provides a simple API written to reduce the cognitive
load of the practitioner (Chollet and Allaire, 2018). TensorFlow is originally
developed by Google engineers working at Google’s Machine Intelligence Research
organisation for the purposes of conducting machine learning and deep neural
networks research (Abadi et al., 2016). Tensors are multi-dimensional data
arrays. A single digit is a dimensionless (0-D) tensor. A vector of numbers is a
1-D tensor, a matrix is a 2-D tensor, an array of matrices is a 3-D tensor, and so
forth.12 Working with tensors rather than data frames allows TensorFlow to be
used for fast prototyping, especially if the user has access to compatible Graphics
Processing Units (GPU).
Figure 5.5 demonstrates an example neural network. The input layer is defined
in such a way that its size is equal to the number of features in the data. Layer
connections are almost always activated using an activation function, which
12Images can be represented as 4-D tensors, whereas videos can be captured in 5-D tensors.
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Figure 5.5: Example multilayer perceptron architecture
applies a transformation (such as relu; rectified linear unit) to the weights
between layers. The intermediary layers—called hidden layers—are densely
connected to both the input and the output layers. The practitioner specifies the
number of units in these layers; larger numbers mean higher capacity (to learn)
but they are also more-prone to over-fitting. The number of hidden units and
layers depend on the problem at hand. Finally, the output layer contains the size
of the expected output (e.g. one for binary classification tasks) and the activation
function (e.g. sigmoid to obtain a value between (0, 1) for the same task).
Neural networks further require functions in addition to activation and the
optional normalisation: optimisers, loss, and metric. Optimiser functions such as
the efficient ADAM (Kingma and Ba, 2014) are mainly derivatives of gradient
descent algorithms used commonly in deep learning (Ruder, 2016). A loss
function provides a target to minimise during model fit, for example binary
cross-entropy for binary classification tasks. Finally, the metric is what the
model aims to maximise, in this case, validation accuracy.
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5.4.2 MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP) for Binary Classification
A MultiLayer Perceptron (MLP) is the ‘vanilla’ neural network, similar to
what Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is to linear regression. Neural network
architectures are highly capable, and this high capacity can lead to over-fitting.
Similar to shallow machine learning, there are several common counters that
can minimise over-fitting. One approach is to include dropout layers (Srivastava
et al., 2014). These layers randomly drop a user-specified fraction of input units
each update during training and can also be set to keep mean and variance of
inputs to their original values, ensuring self-normalisation (Klambauer et al.,
2017). In addition to including dropout layers, I utilise regularisation (both
L1 and L2, similar to the elastic net) and batch normalisation as suggested by
Ioffe and Szegedy (2015). The latter procedure normalises the activations of
the previous layer at each batch, applying a transformation that maintains the
mean activation close to zero and the activation standard deviation close to one.
Finally, I apply Gaussian noise to the dense layers, which is a natural choice for
corruption processes for real-valued inputs (Choi et al., 2017).
Figure 5.6 visualises the training evaluation of the MLP model. To clarify jargon:
twenty percent of the down-sampled training data is used for internal resampling
at each epoch—this is referred to as (internal) validation below. The held-out
validation is done using the untouched (no sub-sampling) test data—this is the
out-of-sample (external) validation.
Ideally, models should run for just enough epochs until the validation accuracy
stops improving while training accuracy continues to improve (i.e. divergence),
as the difference between the two accuracy metrics represent over-fitting. The
callback argument in Keras allows for early stopping when a user-specified
monitored metric stops improving; however it was disabled in order to generate
the plot so that whole 100 epoch performances can be seen. As epochs essentially
represent different models (i.e. using different weights), one cannot average their
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Figure 5.6: Multilayer perceptron training evaluation
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Table 5.1: Multilayer perceptron external performance metrics
ROC Sensitivity Specificity Accuracy Precision F1 Score
0.7321544 0.6764706 0.6570248 0.6604096 0.293617 0.4094955
accuracy over multiple runs. The top performing model in terms of validation
accuracy is used for held-out validation.13
Another callback argument adjusts the learning rate when the model hits
a plateau, which can be seen in the third row of the figure. Without such
adjustments, the loss function would not be updated in-between the model runs,
resulting in a flat-lining of the validation set. However, we see that incrementally
lowering the learning rate (at a factor of 0.9) does not always lead to an
improvement, evidenced by the fluctuations in validation accuracy over time.
5.4.3 Performance Metrics
By default, Keras provides accuracy (not ROC) as a performance metric, so other
external measures need to be created separately. Table 5.1 displays calculated
accuracy metrics. It has a ROC score of 0.732, on par with most of the shallow
learning algorithms but far behind that of the random forest. The MLP is quite
consistent with true positive and negative detection, showing no apparent trade-off
between sensitivity (0.676) and specificity (0.657).
Precision, the fraction of relevant instances among the retrieved instances, is at
0.293. Finally, the F1 score—the harmonic average of the precision and recall;
note that recall is equivalent to specificity—is about 0.41.14
Truth
13It should be noted that one-hit wonders—an epoch that has a significantly higher validation
accuracy than its surroundings—are likely to be outliers. Top performing models located in
peaks (e.g. performance drops both before and after that epoch) are more consistent models.
14F1 Score of 1 mean perfect precision and recall, similar to a ROC score of 1 indicating
perfect sensitivity and specificity. Both metrics are bounded by [0, 1].
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Prediction Negative Positive
Negative 318 33
Positive 166 69
Finally, the confusion matrix provides a breakdown of the class predictions.
Mirroring the summary statistics reported above, we see that the MLP model on
average correctly predicts two-thirds of the held-out test observations for both
categories (n = 586). Note that the class-imbalance does not seem to have a
performance-reducing effect on class predictions.
5.4.4 Local Interpretations of Model-agnostic Explanations
Deep learning models are thought to be black boxes. However, recent
developments have made significant progress in uncovering how deep learning
predictions are made. One such method is the Local Interpretations of
Model-agnostic Explanations (LIME) framework proposed by Ribeiro et al.
(2016).
A LIME explanation is a local linear approximation of the model’s behaviour as
pictured in Figure 5.7. While the actual model is likely to be complex at the
global level, it can be approximated within the proximity of a particular instance.
Instead of trying to explain the model as a black box, the instance under scrutiny
is perturbed. This results in an encompassing sparse linear model around that can
be learned as an explanation. In the figure, the blue/pink background represents
the model’s decision function, which is non-linear. LIME explains the instance
marked by a red cross. Next, the procedure samples instances around this area
and weighs them (indicated by size) according to their distance to the area under
inspection. Finally, a linear model (represented by the dashed line) is fit, which
is used to approximate the model well in the local proximity, but not on a global
scale.
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Figure 5.7: Illustration of a local interpretation according to the LIME framework
One of the features of LIME is the ability to generate explanation plots. After
local interpretations are calculated, selected cases can be plotted to visualise
i) which predictors contributed to that class prediction, and ii) the direction
of their contribution (supporting or contradicting the prediction). As most
of the covariates are scaled and centred, they are transformed to continuous
values. LIME can bin these continuous variables into discrete quartile chunks.
All explanation plots provide information in the following format: name of the
conflict dyad, class prediction, class probability, and the R2 value associated with
the local linear approximation.
I first present ten positive cases—the observations that the MLP model predicted
as 1—to scrutinise the selected predictors in detail. The most common predictors
for explaining positive cases are coups and parallel conflict. However, their
direction varies; coups tend to contradict whereas parallel conflicts support the
positive predictions. We also see that time splines are picked up quite regularly,
and they always support the positive forecasts. Distance is also identified as an
important predictor, but its direction varies from case to case. Other important
explanatory variables all relate to material capabilities: Composite index of
material capability, primary energy consumption, iron and steel production,
GDP p.c., and troop ratio.
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Figure 5.8: Explaining positive MLP predictions
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Figure 5.9: Explaining negative MLP predictions
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Moving on to the negative predictions, we find that most predictive covariates
from the positive cases carry over to the negative cases as well. Coups and parallel
conflict in conjunction with the cubic splines are the most common features.
In contrast, more geographic features are included in negative predictions such
as the interaction of border × distance, conflict at border, and mountainous
terrain. Note that all geographical variables are associated with support; meaning
these features are conducive to negative forecasts—that is, they predict prolonged
conflict.
Finally, I pool the covariates and tabulate their frequencies similar to that of a
variable importance chart. The number of parallel ongoing conflicts is selected
539 out of 586 times (92%) as an important predictor. Coups take second
place with 439 selections (75% regularity). Time splines, controlling for the
time-dependency, are picked 45%, 26%, and 24% of the time, respectively. This
hints at the auto-regressive influence of time being strongest initially. Material
capability indicators, such as GDP p.c., the composite index (cinc), and iron
and steel production are the remaining covariates in the top ten. Geographic
factors—distance, conflict at border, their interaction, and rough terrain—are
also included, however to a lesser degree. Exploitable resources are very scarcely
included as influential predictors. Political constraints also seem to have a
minimal impact, and this time democracy does not make the cut at all.
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Crucially, we see that the civil war dummy never makes into the top five in any of
the cases in the test data. Coupled with the fact that many material capability and
geographical variables are picked, this is further evidence that once the structural
factors are controlled for, the effect of the civil war dummy is indeed attenuated
as predicted by Cunningham and Lemke (2013).
Indeed, the repeated uninformativeness of the civil war dummy across a diverse
set of machine learning algorithms provides strong evidence in favour of a
similar data generating process underlying both types of conflict. At a basic
level, in terms of the operational differences between interstate and civil wars,
the dummy variable captures ‘everything else’ outside of what else has been
explicitly specified in a model. Cunningham and Lemke (2013) find that the
dummy indicator, even in the presence of several controls such as population and
troop size, is still a statistically significant factor that explains why civil wars last
longer than interstate conflicts. However, once relevant covariates—identified as
the most consistently top predictors established in Chapter 4—are introduced,
the dummy variable does not hold much predictive power. In other words, in
terms of forecasting, the positive categorisation of being a civil war does not
make a conflict more protracted.
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5.5 Conclusion
This chapter aims to build on Cunningham and Lemke (2013)’s study on combined
wars by enriching their existing model with highly predictive covariates identified
via a quantitative assessment of the conflict duration literature. I argue that the
explanatory power of the civil war dummy, proxying for the qualitative differences
between civil wars and interstate conflicts, stems from lacking covariates that can
capture the material capabilities of the belligerents.
First, I provide empirical evidence that the characteristics of civil war can
be moderated and even completely nullified by introducing relevant capability
indicators and limitations. I find that less successful models in terms of predictive
accuracy rely on fewer predictors—mainly coups and the time dependency—and
fail to generalise well to unseen data. In contrast, highly predictive models do well
to diversify their predictors and channel the full potential of their features. With
added features capturing various material capability and geographical factors
pertaining to war, accurate classification rates increase across all algorithms.
Further, the most powerful predictive models do not identify the binary civil
war indicator as an important predictor. From an empirical perspective, this is
evidence in favour of the proposed theory—a unitary model can capture conflict
duration in both types of war. When appropriately specified using relevant
covariates capturing capability and the constraints acting on them, the effect
of the civil war dummy is completely attenuated; it stops being an informative
covariate.
Second, both absolute and relative material capabilities affect conflict duration.
This is evidenced by the regularity of the selection of such variables: GDP p.c.,
primary energy consumption, iron and steel production, total population, and the
total number of troops as absolute measures; and troop ratio, the composite index
(as a fraction of world resources), and fighting capacity/parity for the relative
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measures. Geography is also an important factor, especially the distance between
the belligerents. As power projection is costly over distances, this findings fits in
well with the general theory of the loss of strength gradient.
Third, on a more methodological note, ‘shallow’ learning algorithms out-perform
their deep learning counterparts. More specifically, the random forest algorithm
does significantly better when it comes to out-of-sample prediction. Random
forests are known to perform well when underlying non-linear interactions hold
predictive power, as they are well-equipped to capture such interactions. Given
the superior performance of random forest over logistic regression in predicting
conflict onset (Muchlinski et al., 2016), if the aim of the practitioner is to maximise
predictive accuracy, more attention should be given to tree-based models. Further,
the trade-off associated with using tree-based learners can be controlled to a
degree, as the practitioner is able to dictate the depth of the trees. Shallow trees
are easier to visualise, and arguably even more intuitive than the assumptions
underlying logistic regression.
On the other hand, the neural network implemented using Keras seems to suffer
when faced with class-imbalanced data and the low number of observations that
come with down-sampling. However, they still provide value with their ability to
go deeper than regular machine learning algorithms. Especially when paired with
a framework like LIME, they can be useful in uncovering linkages that will not be
picked up by more shallow learning methods. Yet, as evidenced by their pedestrian
performance, conflict practitioners should not expect an improvement in predictive
accuracy just by switching to deep learning technologies. The immense learning
capacity of neural networks can lead to over-fitting much faster than any other
algorithm, and the decision to switch should be backed up by either theoretical
or methodological expectation (Cawley and Talbot, 2010).
148
Chapter 6
Analysis
In the previous two chapters, I have investigated the predictive determinants
of conflict duration using algorithmic modelling. In this chapter, I move the
discussion into a more in-depth analytical direction. Findings borne out of
machine learning are useful, but require effort to be made interpretable. In
addition, many numerical indicators—e.g. GDP p.c., population—cannot be
changed in a short amount of time, making policy-recommendations that depend
on them less useful. To this end, I provide two additional sets of empirics: i)
establishing directionality of the predictive covariates of war duration, and ii)
causes of capability shifts; what actors on the ground have to say about dynamic
factors that can dampen or enhance material capabilities using a limited case
study.
Establishing the direction of the predictive effects are important, as without
direction, it is hard to understand the true relationship between the predictive
variable and the outcome. It is one thing to identify a covariate—say, military
coups—as a reliable predictor of war duration; however, if we cannot speculate on
what type of effect military coups actually have on conflict longevity, our results
are nevertheless less robust than what they could be otherwise. Thus, I provide
an in-depth breakdown of each predictive covariate covering two points: whether
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the effect is positive or negative, and whether the effect is consistent between
civil and interstate wars. In doing so, I provide a firmer foundation in favour of
a unitary model of conflict duration while simultaneously outlining some of its
limitations.
Furthermore, there is a limit to how much we can explain using quantitative
methodology. The choice of methodology comes pre-packaged with a certain set
of assumptions about how the world operates. To this end, I employ a limited
case study that focuses on the limitations of the quantitative component of the
dissertation. More specially, I aim to identify possible pathways that the empirical
operationalisations of the theory—material capabilities and non-physical (political
and societal) constraints—can avoid detection by quantitative means.
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. In the first part, I expand on
Chapter 5 findings by establishing the directionality of the predictive covariates.
Then, I analyse how the three theoretical components of the general theory
influence conflict duration empirically. Second, I introduce a shadow case of Sierra
Leone. Based on 19 semi-structured interviews, I provide several narratives of the
interaction of material and political capabilities of the conflict actors—SLA, the
Executive Outcomes, ECOMOG, UN Peacekeepers, and the UK Expeditionary
Force. In sum, I bring together two sets of empirical evidence and analyse what we
have learned so far about the predictive determinants of armed conflict duration.
6.1 Predictive Modelling
In this section, I investigate the directionality of the covariates found to be highly
predictive in the conflict literature. More specifically, I look at whether the same
features have similar effects on both types of warfare or the direction of the effect
depends on conflict type. Unlike traditional statistical approaches, most machine
learning algorithms do not provide readily-interpretable coefficients that denote
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the direction of the observed effects. Instead, algorithms focus on which covariates
contribute the most to predictive accuracy. As a result, an additional step is
required to obtain directionality.
The procedure is as follows. I select the top performing algorithm across all
categories—shallow learning, ensembles, and deep learning—from Chapter 5;
which is the random forest. Then, using the best random forest hyper-parameter
tunings to the data (selected for maximum external fitness; out-of-sample
accuracy), I run the Local Interpretations of Model-Agnostic Explanations
(LIME) procedure, similarly described in detail in Chapter 5. Put simply,
the LIME framework computes variable importance and effect (coefficient) for
black-box algorithms at the local level, the main idea being what is complex
at the global level (the black box) is more interpretable at a lower (local) level
where individual decisions are made for each case. Finally, I aggregate these
effects with stratification (civil wars and interstate wars) and report their mean
value and dispersion for both types of war.
Figure 6.1 demonstrates the directionality of the most important predictors
according to the best random forest fit. The effects are local to the outcome
(predicting ‘1’ as the outcome, i.e. termination of conflict in that time-unit). The
box-plots indicate the inter-quantile range, with the mean value denoted with a
dash. Outliers are marked with dots. The zero line dividing the negative and
the positive directions should not interpreted as p-value significance, meaning it
can be crossed without losing importance. However, the line is nevertheless used
for establishing the main direction of the covariate, based on where the median
value lies. In some cases where the median value is nearly overlapping with the
zero line, the width of the boxes can be more informative.
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Figure 6.1: Random forest: directionality of the predictors
152
6.1.1 Material Capabilities and Non-Physical Constraints
For the purposes of this analysis, I discuss material and political variables in
unison. The main reason for doing so is that some predictors are closely linked
to both categories depending on context. For example, coups are sometimes
considered as a constraint on material capabilities and other times as political
proxies.
Material capacity and political constraints are also intertwined at the
theoretical level. While geographical factors can affect power projection
ex-ante—i.e. operational area being constrained by the loss of strength
gradient—they are mostly constant throughout the conflict once it is under
way. Political variables, either in the form of political constraints on the head
executive or more generally regime type, can vary from year to year within a
conflict.
Many absolute and relative material capability indicators are highly predictive
of war duration. Unlike geographical factors, most of the capability indicators
have consistent effects—war type does not usually change the direction of the
effect. This is striking, as it provides support to the idea that same underlying
processes might govern both types of conflict. At the very least, the fact that many
capability indicators are selected as accurate predictors in both cases suggest same
parameters are at play.
Starting with the covariates capturing absolute material capabilities, we see that
they are conducive to longer wars. Higher Composite Index of National Capability
(CINC), GDP per capita, military expenditures, and total population values are
associated with protracted conflicts in both types of war. On the other hand,
primary energy consumption has a shortening effect in interstate wars, while
prolonging civil wars.
On relative capabilities, only the troop ratio is consistently chosen as an important
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predictor. Surprisingly, higher (more skewed) ratios indicate longer conflicts. This
effect is consistent for both war categories. Natural resources (oil, gems, drugs)
and other capability-enhancing variables (e.g. contraband) are also included under
this heading. However, only oil production and gemstones are accurate predictors,
and they have opposite effects on duration. Having access to oil is associated with
shorter durations, while dealing in gemstones prolong conflicts. These effects are
again consistent for both types of war.
Finally, the three remaining important predictors are military coups, political
constraints on the executive, and the existence of parallel conflicts. Conflicts
stemming from coups have a prolonging effect on duration on average. However,
there are many outlying cases of civil war falling into the positive (shortening
effect) side. Parallel conflicts also extend war duration with the same caveat.
The effect of political constraints depends on war type. In interstate wars, it
has a strong shortening effect—politically constrained leaders are associated with
shorter international wars. On the other hand, similarly-constrained civil war
leaders are good predictors of protracted wars.
Overall, most of the predictive capability indicators behave quite similarly in both
types of conflict. Equally important is the fact that all capability indicators were
selected as highly accurate predictors for both types of war. Taken together,
these findings provide strong support to the notion that, as far as our modelling
approaches and choices of operationalisations go, conflict is conflict—it can be
modelled in a unitary fashion.
6.1.2 Physical Constraints
Geographical factors have the most diverse effects. Densely forested terrain has a
positive effect on interstate war termination, however the effect changes is negative
for civil wars. Mountainous terrain has a similarly prolonging effect on civil war
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duration. There is no interstate war entry for mountainous terrain as it is not
a good predictor of interstate war duration and as such, not picked up by the
algorithm.
The effect of distance also varies according to war type. For interstate wars,
longer distances have a negative effect. However, the sign is reversed for civil
wars. It should be noted that the median value is close to zero, and there are
many cases on either side of the line. Still, the changing sign of the distance
predictor is not surprising. Given the wide range of distance values and the
apparent predictive power the variable holds, future research should consider more
refined operationalisations of distance, including cubic polynomials i.e. distance+
distance2+distance3. This would be in line with existing research that looks into
power and proximity (Gartzke and Braithwaite, 2011). Finally, the interaction
term consisting of border and distance has a positive effect on both types of war.
The only caveat is that there are only a handful of interstate cases fulfilling the
criteria, and it is possible that the result is driven by a dominant case.
Moving away from directionality, these four geographical factors1 are consistently
selected by the algorithm as accurate predictors. This supports the theoretical
notion that such factors are important in both types of war. The large variances of
the covariates, however, indicate that there is more than meets the eye concerning
conflict geography. Difficult terrain types have a prolonging effect on civil wars, a
finding that is in line with the literature. However, the effect of different types of
terrain is not identical. Mountainous terrain has a more precise prolonging effect
on civil war duration; while many civil wars—both long and short—were fought
on densely forested terrain. One implication is that forest cover has an interactive
effect depending on some other factor.
The effect of increasing distance—shortening civil wars and prolonging interstate
wars—is contradictory to literature expectations. However, it is likely that the
variable is capturing the essence of high absolute material capabilities and the
1With the exception of mountainous terrain for interstate conflict.
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commitment to the fight as a proxy. When state actors project power over vast
distances—U.S. in Iraq and Afghanistan—this implies that they have very high
levels of operational (material) capabilities and they are committed to the fight
(Gartzke and Braithwaite, 2011).
6.1.3 Time Effects
I discuss the influence of the effects of time next. Although the cubic splines are
added to alleviate methodological concerns, they nevertheless provide insights on
the underlying temporal dependency found in conflict processes. In addition, the
stratified design makes it possible to assess whether the temporal effects manifest
similarly in both types of warfare.
The findings suggest the time effects are uniform; they behave similarly in both
civil and interstate wars. The first spline t, which indicates a linear functional
form with regards to the outcome, is slightly positive (i.e. has a shortening effect,
as the positive coefficient means contributing to a ‘1’ prediction of termination).
Both the second t2 and third t3 splines have a negative (prolonging) effect on
duration, however both splines have numerous outliers in the positive direction.
The median of t3 is also slightly less than the median of t2, indicating diminishing
returns over time.
All three cubic splines are important predictors of duration. Taken together,
time-dependency in armed conflict seems to manifest itself with a predictable
functional form. Initially, some wars terminate soon after their onset, increasing
the rate of termination and in effect, lead to shorter durations. However, once a
critical point in time is reached, wars are less likely to terminate as more time
passes.
The consistent time-dependency trend across war types may suggest explanatory
factors such as commitment problems should apply similarly to both types of
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conflict. This, however, assumes that the cubic splines capture what is not
explicitly modelled; e.g. information asymmetries and/or commitment issues. As
conducted, this project cannot assert that this is the case. Yet, it indicates that
whatever effects the time variables proxy for via omission (in the model), they
behave similarly in both types of conflict.
6.1.4 Variable Importance
Next, I analyse the variable importance more in-depth. First, parameter rankings
relating to the tree structure are summed up to identify the most important
variables. More important (i.e. better at splitting) predictors have desirable scores
in several tree structure features. Second, a predictive performance plot based on
both accuracy and Gini importance is shown to assess the relationship between
the two measures. Both visualisations are useful for evaluating the robustness of
the depicted metrics. Further, they can aid in making more qualitative inferences
regarding the random forest model fit.
Figure 6.2 visualises the three main tree structure features of a random forest: the
mean depth of the first split on a covariate (x-axis; smaller is better), the number
of trees in which the root was split on that covariate (y-axis; larger is better),
and the total number of nodes in the forest that split on that covariate (dot size;
larger is better). The colour of the dots denotes whether the covariate—based on
its overall summed up ranking for the three aforementioned features—is in top
ten (blue) or not (black). Certain clusters are readily apparent from the plot.
The cubic splines, capturing the effects of time, score highly on both axes and by
far the most important variables. Distance and CINC is another top performing
cluster. Further down, the total number of military personnel and mountainous
terrain are located in close proximity to each other. Finally, troop ratio, primary
energy consumption, and military expenditures form the remaining important
predictors.
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Figure 6.2: Random forest multi-way importance plot: tree structure metrics
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Figure 6.3: Random forest multi-way importance plot: predictive covariates
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Figure 6.3 emphasises predictive accuracy of the covariates. The top predictor,
based on the amount of performance loss caused in accuracy and Gini importance,
is the CINC score. It is followed by population and primary energy consumption.
Remarkably, the vast majority of the top ten variables pertain to material
capability: number of military personnel, military expenditures, troop ratio,
GDPPC, and iron and steel consumption. Only time t and the geographical
factor distance are considered top variables without being a material capability
indicator.
Taken together, multi-way importance plots provide several insights on the inner
workings of the random forest predictions. Tree structure metrics identify which
predictors are influential in terms of splitting the data. Time variables are
indisputably the best at this task. Material capability indicators also do a good
job at variable splitting, as well as geographical factors such as distance and
terrain. No political covariate is identified as an important variable.
One takeaway from Figure 6.2 is that time and absolute material capabilities of
an actor are highly discriminatory. The intervals of time are measured in years
in this project. As such, higher order splines are better at splitting: t3 is the
most important variable, followed by t2 and t, respectively. On the other hand,
given the yearly intervals of t can be considered as an idiosyncrasy of this project,
studies using more fine-grained time intervals (months, weeks, days) may not be
able to replicate this result this strongly.
Moving away from time, it is also not surprising that absolute material capabilities
(e.g. total troops, population, military expenditure) are more discriminatory than
their relative counterparts (i.e. measured in ratios). In absolute terms, these
indicators—even after log transformation is applied during the pre-processing
stage—are more likely to be skewed in real life while calculated ratios are naturally
smoother in their distribution.
In contrast, accuracy measures draw a different picture. Time loses its
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prominence; only t is included in the top ten. This is strikingly different
compared to their importance in data splitting: while they are excellent for
splitting on (i.e. categorisation or binning), they are not necessarily accurate
predictors. Material capability indicators plus distance, on the other hand, are
the most accurate predictors of conflict longevity. Given that the civil war
dummy is neither an important nor a predictive variable (placed 17th out of 30),
these findings support the notion that the proposed capability-projection model
attenuates its influence.
6.1.5 Case Explanations
Finally, I visualise how the random forest case predictions can be unpacked on
a case-by-case basis. Figures 6.4 and 6.5 display ten randomly selected case
explanations drawn from civil and interstate wars, respectively. These showcase
the similarities in the underlying trends governing conflict duration. Coupled with
the preceding analysis of common predictive covariates, there is ample evidence
supporting the notion that armed conflict is governed by similar characteristics
regardless of type.
A quick glance at both figures provides additional support for a unitary predictive
model that does not discriminate based on war type. First, in many cases, the top
five most influential variables for both civil and interstate wars overlap. Second,
there is a healthy amount of both exogenous and within-variable variation.2
Exogenous variation here refers to directionality that is dependent on the
outcome—i.e. the case labels ‘No’ and ‘Yes’ in the figures. In Figure 6.4, the
effect of coup d’etat (determined as <= -0.285 after applied transformations)
differ in cases of Cambodia vs. Khmer Rouge in 1973 (predicted No with a
probability of 0.53) and Philippines vs. CPP in 1978 (Yes with a 0.69 probability).
2It should be noted that both types of variation are not uniform; however this is expected
as no effect is perfectly consistent in large-n studies.
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Figure 6.4: LIME Random forest: ten randomly selected case explanations (civil
wars)
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Figure 6.5: LIME random forest: ten randomly selected case explanations
(interstate wars)
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Within-variable variation is the change of the effect direction based on differing
values of the variable. In Figure 6.5, access to oil (variable hydroD) has a negative
effect on Israel vs. Egypt in 1970 (label ‘No’) when the value of the covariate
<=0.417. On the other hand, when hydroD is >0.417, such as the case of China
vs. Vietnam in 1981 (label ‘No’), this time it has a positive effect.
6.1.6 Theoretical Implications
Based on the empirical evidence presented in this chapter, several theoretical
implications can be made. First, higher amounts of material capability are
associated with longer conflicts. High CINC values, GDP per capita, military
expenditures, and population all have a prolonging effect on conflict. This
supports the notion that actors (or actor dyads) with higher material capabilities
are able to continue bearing the costs associated with protracted fighting. An
alternative reading is that highly-capable actors are more likely to select into
prolonged conflicts. This could explain why increasing values of troop ratio,
which suggests imbalance (as higher ratios are more skewed in favour of the
stronger party), are also indicative of longer wars.
Oil and political constraints on the executive exert the strongest influence on
shorter wars. Given that the mining of valuable gems are associated with longer
conflicts, there are multiple possible explanations for the divergence in the
results. First, conflict type can account for some of the variation: oil-wars are
predominantly interstate affairs while gem mining is more prevalent in civil wars
(de Soysa et al., 2009; Lujala, 2009; Hendrix, 2017).
Unlike duration analysis (Buhaug et al., 2009), the type of terrain matters in
predictive modelling. Conflict in densely forested areas is associated with longer
civil wars but shorter interstate wars. One explanation is that interstate actors
have access to military technology that nullifies the effect of rough terrain. This
can also explain why mountainous terrain is not a predictive factor for interstate
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conflict but a strong predictor of longer civil wars. Non-state actors, in contrast,
are affected by difficult terrain for a multitude of reasons: i) they may lack the
capability to traverse rough terrain, ii) conversely, the government forces may not
be able to project force into such terrain, and iii) there could be strategic incentives
for the rebels to stay in relatively inaccessible areas where the government forces
cannot reach them easily.
Finally, the changing influence of distance between the power bases of the warring
parties depending on conflict type is telling. Interstate actors fight longer wars
when they project power further away from their base. Conversely, civil wars are
relatively shorter affairs when the distance between the capital and the conflict
zone is not large. Both findings are well-established in the literature (Gartzke and
Braithwaite, 2011; Buhaug et al., 2009). Similar to the effect of forested terrain,
variables that have diverging influences have the most explanatory power when it
comes to unpacking the civil war dummy.3
6.1.7 Conclusion
I provide further empirical support in favour of the proposed theory: not only the
top predictors of conflict are consistent across war types, the majority of them
also overlap in direction. In other words, the influence of the top predictors of
war duration is mostly persistent: whatever prolongs civil wars also increases
interstate war duration, and vice-versa. This is a strong indication that both
types of conflict are governed by a similar underlying process.
Further, knowing the directionality of the predictors help unpack what is usually
captured by the civil war dummy indicator. Recall that the rest of the original
model specification of Cunningham and Lemke (2013) consists of variables
capturing territory, recurring war, troop ratio, democracy, total troop size,
and population size. The addition of the literature covariates identified by the
3The civil war dummy is further unpacked using multi-way importance plots in the appendix.
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algorithmic replication process makes the categorical dummy redundant.
One key takeaway is that a diverse set of predictive covariates are required to
attenuate the predictive power of the binary civil war indicator. The original
model specification mostly focuses on absolute and relative material capabilities.
Given the complexity of conflict processes, it takes the addition of additional
capability indicators (e.g. natural resources), alongside with geographical
constraints, to make the civil war dummy uninformative from a forecasting
perspective.
With that said, some predictors have divergent effects on duration based on war
type. Geographical constraints on power projection are sensitive to conflict type.
The exploratory (and algorithmic) nature of this project does not organically
lend itself to finely articulated theory; however, further research can be more
discriminatory in this regard. Particularly, the influence of distance and various
terrain features should be explored further to pinpoint the conditions under which
the divergence occurs.
6.2 Shadow Case Study
I complement the quantitative findings with a shadow case study of Sierra Leone.
I conducted 19 semi-structured interviews with retired and active officers from
the Sierra Leonean Army (SLA), ex-combatants (both mid-level commanders
and rank-and-file) from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), defence ministry
officials, UN personnel, national security advisers, local academics, and a Western
diplomat between January-March 2017. The majority of the interviews took place
in Freetown, the capital. The rest were conducted in Makeni, known for being
the headquarters of the SLA 4th Brigade and where 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers
were famously disarmed and taken hostage by the rebel forces back in May 2000.
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6.2.1 Conflict Parties
The Sierra Leone Civil War (1991-2002) featured a rich set of actors, both
domestic and international. Even though the majority of fighting can be linked to
the Government of Sierra Leone vs. the RUF dyad, both sides had multiple actors
intervening on their behalf. The government forces were supported, at different
times (and sometimes in an overlapping fashion) by the many international
interveners—the Executive Outcomes, the South African mercenary group; the
ECOMOG, the Nigerian-led West African Task Force; UNAMSIL peacekeepers;
and the UK Expeditionary Force. The RUF, on the other hand, joined forces with
the Komojors—influential hunters from the Mende tribe—as well as receiving
support from NPFL4 in Liberia. In the next section, I briefly introduce the
conflict parties before covering the dynamics of capability shifts on the ground.
6.2.1.1 Domestic Powers
SLA
Throughout most of its history, The Sierra Leonean Army (SLA) was a ceremonial
power. Founded in 1961, the SLA was modelled after the former British Royal
West African Frontier Force. When the civil war broke out in 1991, it had
around 3,000 personnel. To bolster its forces against the rebels, President Momoh
expanded the army ranks to include “mainly drifters, rural and urban unemployed,
a fair number of hooligans, drug addicts, and thieves” (Clapham, 1998). This
trend continued when Captain Strasser, who took control of the government
following a coup d’etat in 1992, recruited young criminals, school drop-outs, and
semi-literate youths. The size of the SLA rose up to nearly 14,000 as a result.
At the same time, the SLA was constantly under-armed and under-paid. Many
soldiers came to the realisation that they could benefit from the war by joining
4National Patriotic Front of Liberia, the main rebel group led militarily by Charles Taylor
during the First Liberian Civil War (1989-1996).
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the rebels looting the civilians in the countryside. This led to the notion of sobels;
soldiers by day, rebels by night (Feldman and Arrous, 2013). For civilians, the
line separating the government forces and the rebels was quite thin.
RUF
The Revolutionary United Front (RUF) was the main rebel organisation during
the civil war. The ‘stated’ goals of the RUF were to overthrow the All People’s
Congress (APC) regime that governed Sierra Leone, to ‘liberate’ the peasantry,
destroy corruption, ensure an equitable distribution of the wealth of Sierra
Leone’s natural resources and institute a multi-party democracy (Day, 2015).
However, while the RUF had succeeded in mobilising relevant grievances, it did
not have a genuine guiding ideology. Their main motivation was to defeat the
government with the exclusive goal of replacing them. The lucrative diamond
mining, smuggled through Liberia, was the main source of income for the
otherwise under-funded rebels. The RUF had humble beginnings, with 100 or so
fighters at the onset of the conflict. In 2000, it had around 15,000 combatants.5
Komojors and the CDF
The Komojors were a group of traditional hunters from the Mende ethnic group
found predominantly in the southern and eastern parts of Sierra Leone. The
Komojors first joined forces with the government to fill in as the main security
forces at the wake of the ouster of the South African mercenaries (the Executive
Outcomes). This integrated security force was called the Civil Defence Forces
(CDF). Most estimates put their total number somewhere between 10,000 and
30,000 in 1997 (Hoffman, 2007). Some parts of the CDF eventually merged with
the RUF when the latter took control of Freetown in 1998.
5Uppsala Conflict Data Program, Additional Information on RUF. Retrieved from http:
//ucdp.uu.se/additionalinfo?id=532&entityType=0
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6.2.1.2 International Powers
ECOMOG
The Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG)
is a West African multi-lateral armed force established by the Economic
Community of West African States (ECOWAS). During the civil war, two
main factions were present in ECOMOG: the larger Nigerian contingent, and
the Ghanian strike force (‘the bombardiers’). Nigeria provided at least ninety
percent of ECOMOG troops (12,000 out of 13,000) and its funding during the
military intervention in Sierra Leone. It should be noted that the Nigerians were
also under similar obligations to the parallel ECOMOG mission in neighbouring
Liberia against Charles Taylor and his the National Patriotic Front of Liberia
(NPFL), stretching their material capabilities and political capital across two
conflicts.
Executive Outcomes
The paramilitary mercenary group from South Africa known as Executive
Outcomes (EO) arrived in Sierra Leone in March 1995. They costed around $1.5
million per month.6 They were given three objectives: i) return the diamond
and mineral mines back to government control; ii) locate and destroy the RUF’s
headquarters, and iii) operate a successful propaganda program that would
encourage local Sierra Leoneans to support the government instead of the rebels.
The military force of EO consisted of about 500 military advisers and 3,000
highly-trained and well-equipped soldiers with extensive combat experience,
backed by tactical air support and transport (Singer, 2011). As a military force,
EO was extremely capable and conducted a highly successful counter-insurgency
against the RUF during their tenure (Howe, 1998).
6The New York Times (1997). Pocketing The Wages Of War. [online] Available at: https:
//www.nytimes.com/1997/02/16/weekinreview/pocketing-the-wages-of-war.html [Accessed 7
Jul. 2018]
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UN Peacekeepers
The United Nations Mission to Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) began arriving in Sierra
Leone in December 1999. The main objective of UNAMSIL was to assist with the
disarmament process and enforce the terms established under the Lome Peace
Agreement (Olonisakin, 2008). Unlike other previous neutral UN peacekeeping
forces, UNAMSIL brought in serious military power. At that time, the maximum
number of troops to be deployed was set at 6,000. However, a follow-up UN
resolution authorised the deployment of 11,000 combatants after a few months.
In March 2001 that number was increased to 17,500 troops, making it at the time
the largest UN force in existence (Johnstone, 2006). They were mainly deployed
in the RUF-held diamond mining areas.
Despite these impressive numbers, UNAMSIL was frequently rebuffed and
humiliated by the much smaller RUF. They were regularly being subjected
to attacks, obstruction and disarmament. In an infamous incident in May
2001, over 500 UNAMSIL peacekeepers were captured by the RUF and held
hostage. Using the weapons and armoured personnel carriers of the captured
UNAMSIL troops, the rebels then advanced towards the capital. For over a
year, the UNAMSIL force avoided intervening in RUF-controlled mining districts
to prevent another humiliation. Only after Operation Palliser and Operation
Khukri by the intervening British, the situation had stabilised and UNAMSIL
regained control in Sierra Leone.
UK
In May 2000, British Paratroopers were deployed in Operation Palliser to
evacuate foreign nationals and establish order in the capital. Their intervention
stabilised the situation, and they were the catalyst for a ceasefire that helped end
the war for good (Penfold, 2013). The British forces, commanded by Brigadier
David Richards, expanded their initial mandate7, which was originally limited to
7Western diplomat, personal interview, Freetown 01/03/2017.
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evacuating commonwealth citizens out of Sierra Leone only. At the time, the
RUF was still in control of considerable territory. The 1,200 strong ground force
was further supported by air and naval power. One decisive British action was the
raid against the West Side Boys, a RUF splinter group that took several British
soldiers hostage outside of Freetown. The nature of the successful rescue and the
lob-sided casualty figures—one British soldier against 25 WSB combatant deaths
plus 18 captured including their leader—ended any lingering threat of further
obstruction to peace.
6.2.2 Dynamics of Capability Shifts on the Ground
As declared in the research design, the intention of mixing methods is not to
triangulate quantitative and qualitative results. Instead, the goal of the shadow
case study is to bring into focus the more dynamic characteristics of capability
that cannot be easily captured in observational studies. Five inter-related themes
emerge out of the interviews in regards to how conventional understanding
of capability can be more complex on the ground: having access to specialist
equipment, re-arming the enemy through incompetence, battle discipline/training,
operational mandate and military doctrine, and widely-shared beliefs in the
supernatural.
Specialist Equipment
One of the first points that is brought up by both the former fighters and active
soldiers is the enhanced capability provided by specialist military equipment.8
Note that specialist equipment in this specific context refers to night-vision goggles
and smoke bomb coverage provided by Chinook helicopters, and not high-calibre
weapons and ammunition, artillery, or other air strike capabilities that is available
to the military at large. Abu Bakarr Jaward, who fought for the RUF for three
8RSLAF Major, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017; Abu Bakarr Jaward, personal
interview, Makeni, 09/03/2017.
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years before integrating into the Sierra Leonean Army and later received training
from the British military advisors, explains the added capability gained by using
such equipment:
“Normally, you cannot just attack at day time like that. [Both] in
conventional or guerilla warfare…It is difficult, you have to be tactical.
But now with the specialist equipment, in the night time, you can
see even the small ants on the ground. So you use your night-vision
googles and you go very close to the enemy, and get rid of them. And
sometimes with the specialist equipment, like the smoke bomb, you
can put your enemy to sleep for some hours and you get close and
disarm them. You finish your mission and pull out.”
The importance of such specialist equipment seems to be the way they widen
the operational capabilities available to one side alone, leading to an asymmetry.
First-aid and other medical support on the ground is yet another factor that can
influence capability projection, especially over time.9
Another influential factor associated with having access to specialised equipment
pertains to target selection and troop movement. The Guinean contingent of the
ECOMOG forces were known as the ‘bombardiers’. They were known to be very
robust with their mortars and artillery, which was their first choice of engagement.
The RUF commanders had to strategise around this fact when they were fighting
them10. On the other hand, they were also specifically targeted for their military
hardware.11
Re-arming the Enemy
One of the consistent narratives in the Sierra Leone Civil War is the successful
re-armament of the RUF through defeated enemy forces. At the onset of the
9RSLAF Major, personal interview, Freetown 03/03/2017.
10Big Daddy, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
11Abu Bakarr Jaward, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
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insurgency, the size of the RUF was believed to be around 100 fighters in total.
The security establishment at the time was not sure whether this local uprising
would take hold beyond its immediate proximity, and subsequently not much
attention was given to them. However, even though they came really close to be
military defeated by the SLA in 1992, the RUF persevered—mostly owing to the
Strasser regime not challenging them in the provinces—and became stronger and
stronger by obtaining arms and equipment from the intervening forces.
A senior RUF commander, going by the nom-de-guerre ‘Big Daddy’ who
first fought in the Liberian civil war and then joined RUF as an experienced
commander in 1991, on his target selection strategy:12
“During the time of the ECOMOG, I enjoyed fighting. Because
everything I wanted, I got it from them…They have sophisticated
weapons…So every time I attacked the ECOMOG, I got good weapons
and ammunition.
I: So they had a lot of supplies and good equipment, but the RUF
would just take it from them?
Yes, yes, easy. Simple to collect it from them. The first weapon I got
from them, four anti-aircraft guns, mounted on pick-ups.”
The South African mercenary force, the Executive Outcomes, were highly-trained
and possessed advanced weaponry. However, as they were mostly protecting the
mining sites, they were not on the offensive. Even though the RUF had engaged
them from time to time to gain control of the mining areas, they were pushed
back.13 A security official who was in Kono during the war posits the RUF decision
to repeatedly attack the EO was ill-founded, given how well-trenched the EO was
at the mining sites and how difficult it would be to hold the mines once they were
captured.14. The general perception in the security establishment was that the
12Big Daddy, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
13RSLAF Brigadier General, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
14Security official, personal interview, Freetown 18/03/2017.
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EO did not suffer any casualties caused by the RUF during their deployment in
Sierra Leone,15 and none of their material capabilities went into the hands of the
RUF.
The UNAMSIL force also ended up greatly enhancing the fighting capabilities of
the rebels:16
“The arms they brought in all ended up at the hands of the rebels.
Tanks and all those equipment…That is also a problem for us, for the
military. In a way, the [aim of the] intervention was to meant to really
pacify, to calm down; instead, they feared the rebels…They have given
them their armoury.”
In sum, even though the military capabilities of the ECOMOG and UNAMSIL
forces vastly out-matched that of the rebels, the RUF was able to capitalise
on their victories and absorb the fighting capabilities of their enemies. More
disciplined forces, such as the professional mercenaries of EO and the UK
expeditionary force, were able to maintain control of their equipment and
engaged their opponents with an advantage in weapons technology.
Battle Discipline
Military discipline and training also cited as an important determinant of force
application. This heading captures reconnaissance, intelligence gathering, and
unit cohesion. The British forces made an immediate impact in Freetown:17
“The manner they land, you know that this is a fighting force. Because
you see, when they land, when real fighting soldiers land, you come
close and they tell you ‘Move back! Move! Move!’ They hold position,
they push you. So you know this guy means something.
I: But you could approach the UN Peacekeepers?
15Solomon B. Caulker, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
16Al-Shek Kamara, personal interview, 14/02/2017.
17Abu Bakarr Jaward, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
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Easily. They will not reject you, they will not say ‘No, no, go back’.”
Battle discipline can also manifest in the apparent commitment to fight. Several
interviewees brought up the point that Sierra Leoneans did not think highly of
their fellow African soldiers in terms of professionalism.18 ECOMOG forces were
also perceived as corrupt,19 and they committed a multitude of human rights
violations themselves.20 Sheka Forna, son of Dr. Mohamed Sorie Forna—former
minister of finance and deputy prime minister of Sierra Leone who was executed by
the regime in the 70s—motivates what he sees as differences in mental approaches
to battle:21
“I am not convinced by the efficacy of the African armies. A lot of
individuals across Africa would join because it is a means of earning
a living, as a profession. I do not think they are particularly effective
fighting forces…[On part of the Nigerian soldiers] How commited were
they to the fight? A British, American, European soldier would be
more committed to battle than someone who joined the army out of
expediency. In the UK, these are people who willingly join and know
that they may be sent to the front line. I would hazard very few
Africans join the army in the anticipation that they may be put in the
front lines.”
The EO mercenaries are also reported as having high battle discipline by the
rebels:22
“I fought against the EO. I found it somewhat difficult. They were
trained by the South African army, they had training in bush [war].
They have the same experience…It was hard to ambush them.”
18Security official, personal interview, Freetown 18/03/2017.
19Solomon Caulker, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
20Al-Shek Kamara, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
21Sheka Forna, personal interview, Freetown 08/03/2017.
22Big Daddy, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
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In addition to the overall fighting capabilities of the EO as a unit, individually
they were perceived as a serious threat as well:23
“One of their commanders, he and I, we met [on the battlefield]
one-to-one in Koidu (Kono) once. For every step I take and every
step he take, I knew that he was [dangerous].
I: So you were well-matched?
Yes. We fought, we wanted to capture but they resisted and resisted
and resisted.”
Mandate and Doctrine
Another point that has been brought up is the capacity to use force. RUF had a
very good understanding of the existing limitations and constraints (or there lack
of) on their enemies and capitalised on this.24 Foday Sankoy, the leader of the
RUF, was previously a corporal in the SLA. He would monitor the radio channel
frequencies that the military was using to coordinate their attacks, and relay the
enemy movements to his commanders so that they can either move out of the said
area or prepare an ambush.25 Similarly, many rebels had family connections in
Freetown, who provided them with information regarding the ECOMOG presence
in the capital, prior to the January 6 massacre.26
RUF command was also aware of the UNAMSIL mandate, even before the
peacekeeping force set foot in the country.27 Even rank-and-file soldiers were
aware of the fact that they were in Sierra Leone under Chapter 6 (and not
Chapter 7) Omar Lebbie, former RUF fighter and now a corporal in the SLA,
explains:28
23ibid.
24Al-Shek Kamara, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
25Big Daddy, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
26Oswald Hanciles, personal interview, Freetown 09/02/2017.
27Omar Lebbie, personal interview, Freetown 13/03/2017; Abu Bakarr Jaward, personal
interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
28Omar Lebbie, personal interview, Freetown 13/03/2017
176
“They are two chapters. Chapter 6, pure peacekeeping. Chapter
7–peace enforcement. When you know that peacekeepers are
coming…[peacekeepers] they never open fire until order came from the
above. That’s how the RUF took them in Makeni. The peacekeepers
saw the RUF coming, but their mandate was not to open fire.”
This is why the Makeni incident—a ragtag band of RUF fighters utterly disarming
and abducting 500 Kenyan Peacekeepers—went down the way it did. Overnight,
the UN lost credibility29, perceived as ‘pushovers’ to the rebels,30 and “even made
ECOMOG look good”.31 This also set the table for UK to take credit,32 which
was “a masterclass in psychology”33. On the other hand, the British had their
hands forced into action:34:
“It was a blessing in disguise that they [West Side Boys] captured
British troops. To us, it was a blessing. Because that was what caused
the justification for the British intervention.”
However, even it may be the case that UK was forced into action or experiencing
mission creep—it was mentioned out that the military commander on the ground
used his initiative for the operation—35this was one of the outcomes they had
considered in their contingency plans. A Western diplomat with close ties to the
UK High Commission in Sierra Leone shares that at the time, the UK government
was not “risk-averse” in regards to the military intervention, and they were
prepared for “acceptable losses”.36 This belief was also mirrored in the UK:37
“There is a different dynamic between the US and the UK. US seems
to be much more concerned with casualties than Britain is. Had the
29Francis Stevens George, personal interview, Freetown 07/03/2017.
30Solomon Caulker, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
31Security Officer, personal interview, Freetown 15/03/2017.
32Dr. Ibrahim Bangura, personal interview, Freetown 04/02/2017.
33Dr. Henry Mbawa, personal interview, Freetown 10/02/2017.
34Al-Shek Kamara, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
35Western diplomat, personal interview, Freetown 01/03/2017.
36Western diplomat, personal interview, Freetown 01/03/2017.
37Sheka Forna, personal interview, Freetown 08/03/2017.
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result been the same, as in Britain was engaged in Sierra Leone and
had had brought peace to the country, if that had been at the cost of 15
[British] military personnel, I think that would be acceptable…Britain
seems to be prepared to accept the unfortunate death of individuals
as a part of engaging militarily. Had there been a tangible result, the
British public would have accepted that.”
Finally, the multi-national character of the ECOMOG force contributed to the
lack of clarity in their military doctrine. Ret. Colonel Simeon Sheriff highlights
what he sees as doctrinal differences stemming from culture:
“Culture is very important here [Africa]. For instance, when I went
to the UK, we also went to Holland, Belgium…It was just like we
were moving in one country. Here in Africa, when you move from one
country to another, you see differences. A lot of differences. That is
the aspect of doctrine. What, in effect, doctrine is really about what
do we believe in and what type of equipment we think we should buy
[and training].”
Supernatural Abilities
Finally, material capabilities also suffered shifts caused by a more intangible
factor. Komojors, ethnic hunters from the Mende tribe dominating the south,
are believed by some to possess supernatural powers. One of these powers include
being bulletproof:38
“They told us boys that, ‘If I wash your body and I hit you and your
body, when I shoot you–you won’t die.’ This is how many of them
died.”
and39
38Abu Bakarr Jaward, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
39Big Daddy, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
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“They have traditions…They have talismans hanging on them. They
say they were protections against the bullets. So when you confront
your enemy, the bullet will not kill you. They deceived many, many
men. So many people.”
A more grounded explanation was given: The rebels were terrible marksmen,
often shooting at targets at a distance of 150-400 meters, resulting in a very low
accuracy which contributed to the perception of invincibility.40
Another commonly-shared Komojor ability was teleportation. The Komojors knew
the terrain quite well owing to their life-long profession as hunters, and they were
apt at utilising short-cuts and trails unbeknownst to the rebels. This gave the
illusion that they can appear and disappear at will.41
Finally, the Komojors could ‘sense’ who was a rebel. Al-Shek Kamara, Assistant
Inspector General of Police in Freetown who dealt with Komojor-related cases
during the war, provides an example:42
“[the Komojors] were in Freetown, when the attack was imminent
[January 6 massacre]. They confessed to possess some powers,
spiritual powers, that they could detect rebels…They got a hold of
one man, they said ‘We can see this man is a rebel’, and shot him. I
knew he was an innocent man. He had never been to the provinces.
But this [type of behaviour] was accepted, because the Komojors [are
believed to] possess powers.”
Komojors used to eliminate individuals that they have prior beefs43 with by
‘identifying’ them as rebels so that they can be killed and their properties can
be looted.44
40ibid.
41RUF ex-combatant, personal interview, Freetown, 16/02/2017.
42Al-Shek Kamara, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
43Dr. Ibrahim Bangura, personal interview, Freetown 04/02/2017.
44Oswald Hanciles, personal interview, Freetown 09/02/2017.
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Even though the Komojors eventually increased their numbers—estimates given
as 15,000—and were provided weapons (AK-47s, RPGs)45 by the government
after their official transition into the Civil Defence Force (CDF),46 the belief in
their supernatural powers did affect the strategic target selection of the RUF and
the ECOMOG forces (Komojors at times fought against both sides in the war)
when they lacked high levels of material capability. As a result, they were able to
hold onto territory beyond their actual capabilities. On the other hand, they were
instances where their professed powers also made them high-priority targets. More
secular RUF commanders would round them up upon capture and mass-execute
them in front of their troops to prove they are indeed mortal and susceptible to
gunshots like any other enemy.47
6.2.3 Insights from Integrative Mixed-Methods
As alluded in the research design chapter, certain empirical set-ups of
multi-method studies can lead to holistic insights when data generated
from two different paradigms are combined. In this section, I look at the
determinants of conflict duration in the Sierra Leone Civil War with evidence
from two approaches: case study insights and the LIME procedure. The utility of
doing so is two-fold. First, the underlying processes are traced and clearly linked
to the theoretical model of conflict duration; second, classification predictions
of the machine learning algorithms are interpreted from a duration perspective
to provide insights from learning conflict duration in a predictive modelling
framework.
The proposed theory posits that duration is a function of the length of the iterated
bargaining game, which begins with a power distribution q and terminates when
the status reaches p. This is so, because the ability to project power is the crux
45Solomon Caulker, personal interview, Freetown 14/02/2017.
46Bangaly Monorma Bah, personal interview, Freetown 02/03/2017.
47Big Daddy, personal interview, Makeni 09/03/2017.
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of the model. Further, the directional expectations inform us that capacity and
projection go hand-in-hand; their interaction (both within actor and dyadically)
provides insights into the duration function.
The case of the Sierra Leone Civil War is one of low-capacity and low-projection.
Both the government forces and the RUF had limited means to wage war. Material
capabilities were scarce on both sides in absolute terms; however the SLA had the
numerical advantage in terms of manpower.48 When the conflict was initially
under-way, the SLA outnumbered the RUF 30:1. In fact, the RUF was at the
brink of defeat by the end of the second year of the insurgency.
Several factors were crucial as to how the RUF did not succumbed there and then.
First, coup leader Strasser—the youngest head of state at the age of 25—was
happy to stay in Freetown. From hi perspective, there was no political incentive
to chase after the rebels when they have no credible means of threatening the
capital. Further, the conflict provided plausible cover for the government to take
part in the lucrative diamond trade. Many high-level government officials were
involved in the mining business in the east. These factors, both top-down, limited
any further military action against the rebels when they were down.
Second, eventually the RUF was able to gain material capability beyond what was
otherwise not available to them to attain. The intervention forces of ECOMOG
and later UNAMSIL were equipped with equipment that were undisputedly
superior to that of the RUF’s. However, owing to their knowledge of terrain
and the discrepancy between the rules of engagement between the RUF and the
intervention forces, the RUF was able to commandeer arms, supplies, and even
armoured personnel carriers. Doing so greatly enhanced the fighting capability of
the rebels, especially vis-a-vis the government forces. Once the rebels were strong
enough, they stormed the capital and sacked in 1996—an otherwise unthinkable
development previously.
48It must be noted that, even though the SLA was more sizeable than the RUF, both sides
lack sufficient training and discipline for the majority of the conflict.
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Figure 6.6: LIME Random forest: Sierra Leone Civil War Predictions 1991-2000
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Moving onto predictive modelling, so far studies using time-series data had
been transformed into classification problems as machine learning development
is lacking when it comes to duration analysis. Before concluding the empirical
analysis, I offer additional insights by reverse-engineering the classification
findings and interpret them from a duration point of view.
In line with the concept of complementarity, Figure 6.6 displays the LIME
classification predictions for all years of the Sierra Leone Civil War. First
takeaway from the graph is that the algorithm always predicts continuing
war—getting it right for the first nine years but resulting in a false negative in the
tenth. Additionally, all predictions are backed up with about 80% probability, so
the covariates strongly favoured the forecasts.
Excluding the effect of time (cubic splines) given that they are not theorised as a
model component, the most important covariates utilised in the prediction of the
Sierra Leone Civil War are the logged total number of troops, troop ratio, and
absolute material capability indicators (CINC, military expenditures, GDP p.c.,
Primary Energy Consumption).
More specifically, we see that when the logged total number of troops is ≤ 1.79,
they contradict the predictions of continuing conflict. In contrast, when it is ≥
3.51 in the latter half of the conflict, they now support the predictions of prolonged
war. Further, the logged troop ratio parameter supports the null predictions when
it is ≤ 1.61, however it contradicts when its value is ≤ 2.3 in 1992. Finally, the
infinitesimal CINC value of ≤ .000256 places the government Sierra Leone towards
the very bottom of absolute military capability rankings.
Taken together,49 the interaction of the very low capacity of the Sierra Leonean
government and their relatively low projection (except for the first couple of
years when they had the numerical advantage) levels results in shorter duration
49As increasing logged values of total troops and troop ratio represent high projection and
high relative capability, respectively.
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predictions. This is especially true for the first three years of the conflict
(1991-1993), and indeed, the RUF barely recovered in this period thanks to the
lack of political willingness on Chairman Strasser’s part.
6.2.4 Conclusion
Even though material capabilities and political constraints are shown to have
predictive power, the in-depth study of the Sierra Leonean case of military
interventions reveal multiple pathways that can lead to capability shifts that
cannot be captured by observational studies. Furthermore, they provide a
novel insight. Material capabilities, once brought to the ground, can end up
enhancing the fighting capacity of the enemy if captured. On a theoretical
level, the implication is that there is more to be modelled beyond absolute and
relative capabilities of the actors themselves, but also the level of capacity that
is available on the ground which can be captured and utilised by others. Such
conditional interactive effects are difficult to capture using observational data,
given the currently achievable data-granularity levels in conflict research.
To sum up, unsecured material capability can be appropriated by the enemy,
making them a more robust fighting force. The RUF started their rebellion with
minimal material capability in 1991, but after years of leeching Nigerian and
Guinean military hardware, they were able to storm Freetown in 1997. Similarly,
the UN peacekeeping force, at the time the largest of its kind in the world, ended
up bolstering the RUF fighting capacity even more as a result of their constrained
rules of engagement. Only when the British conducted several successful military
operations the UN could regain control of the military situation.
Further, the added value of greater weapons technology is not limited to
conventional artillery support or air strike capabilities. Certain types of military
hardware can enhance the overall capability of a fighting force more than others.
Specialist equipment that make otherwise-impossible maneouvers—night-vision
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and smoke screens—allows for a wider range of tactical options to be taken
against the enemy.
Second, training and mandate can make or break an intervention, regardless of
absolute material capability. The Nigerian-lead ECOMOG forces numbered at
16,000. They were backed up by jet fighters, attack helicopters, and armoured
personnel carriers. The Guinean contingent supported mortar and artillery
support. However, the Nigerian soldiers were not fully committed to the fight,
and sidelined their mission in order to pursue economic activities. The UN
peacekeepers were embarrassed by the rebels when they were abducted in broad
daylight as a result of their restrictive rules of engagement. The British, on the
other hand, fielded the smallest amount of troops in comparison to the other
international actors. Still, their battle discipline and military doctrine—combined
with the timing of their intervention—allowed them to discredit their opposition
and prevail militarily.
Finally, widely-shared regional beliefs can affect the performance of various
international actors and how they choose to mobilise their military capabilities.
Certain traditions and beliefs were shared between the local Sierra Leoneans
and the intervening Nigerian forces. The latter, in some cases, chose not to
engage such enemies. In contrast, the actions and the strategy of both the UN
peacekeepers (predominantly Kenyan) and the British forces were not influenced
by such factors. One implication of this phenomenon is that local approaches
such as ‘African solutions to African challenges’ (Duursma, 2015) can have
unintended side effects and there could be a trade-off between regional solutions
and extra-regional interventions.
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6.3 Conclusion
This chapter brings together various empirical findings to identify and explore
the structural determinants of conflict duration. The results are leveraged
and explained in a self-contained manner, as empirical triangulation is not
the underlying goal of this chapter. Instead, I summarise the main findings
under three headings: the examination of the proposed theoretical framework,
the observation of the commonalities between the two types of war, and the
synergistic insights borne out of utilising predictive modelling and case studies
together.
First, there is ample evidence that the proposed theory of conflict duration
encapsulates the most predictive set of variables that are out there. Various
operationalisations of material capability, political constraints, and geographical
factors are frequently selected as informative covariates in explaining war
duration. While the empirical counterpart is not as parsimonious as the
theoretical framework, it is evident that more than one operationalisation of each
aspect is required to achieve high predictive accuracy. As the quality of the data
gets better, it is possible that the parsimony of the theoretical approach can be
implemented empirically as well.
Second, the predictive modelling findings suggest that the vast majority of the
predictive variables behave the same way in both civil and interstate war settings.
The implication of this insight is that armed conflict can be modelled using
a unitary framework that does not discriminate between the types of warfare.
So far, the literature on conflict, both in regards to onset, termination, and
duration, are bifurcated by conflict type. These results should further the agenda
of combining interstate and civil war studies under a common theoretical and
empirical umbrella. Future research has several avenues. Most importantly, more
joint data collection is required. One of the most challenging parts of this research
was putting together a compatible dataset that includes variables for both types of
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war. Another path forward is to understand where the divergences occur. Some
covariates have indeed opposite effects depending on war type. The source of
these incompatibilities should be unpacked to better understand the underlying
data-generating mechanism.
Third, bringing together predictive modelling and case study findings together
generates additional insights that would not be as revealing if only one method was
utilised. While the quantitative aspects pertaining to actor capability is captured
using observational data, the perception of such capability is captured via
semi-structured interviews. Narratives borne out of such consultations highlight
several qualitative nuances. Some actors—ECOMOG, UNAMSIL—who would
appear materially ‘capable’ on paper were thought to be not so. In contrast,
ethnic bands of hunters known as Komojors were widely respected and successful,
as the common belief (which was crucially shared by both sides in the war) was
they had supernatural powers. The Komojors were able to exploit this perception
of themselves and over-achieved in the battlefield. Finally, the UK, even though
having contributed the least amount of troops internationally, managed the get
the lion’s share of the credit for ending the eleven-year civil war. The British,
in addition to their successful PR narrative, accomplished this feat via military
precision and discipline, which helped them achieve the largest yield with the
minimal capacity required for the task (Ucko, 2016).
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Chapter 7
Conclusion
The divided study of conflict based on war type is currently at a state that is
ripe for consolidation. Decades of theorising on interstate war situated in the vast
international relations literature, combined with the rich and diverse empirical
findings borne out of civil war studies in the last twenty years, can be a powerful
combination together. However, we have yet to fully harness the potential of this
union.
This project sets out to challenge the widely-adopted notion of studying civil
and interstate wars separately by demonstrating that a unitary model can
successfully capture the most important predictors of armed conflict duration.
To do so, I posit a simple general model, built by aggregating the most consistent
quantitative predictors of war longevity, comprised of three main components:
material capability, and the physical and non-physical constraints acting on
it. Conceptualising the sustained effort to continue fighting as a function of
successful power projection in a world of limited resources, I argue for a dynamic
model of limitations that can help explain the temporal variation found in
war. This does not mean there are no qualitative differences between civil and
interstate wars; rather, it is an extension of the notion (Lake, 2003) that the
extant models in the literature should be applicable to both types of conflict.
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7.1 What Have We Learned?
In support of the general theory, the empirical findings shed light on various
determinants of war longevity exerting influence in both types of conflict. More
importantly, the vast majority of predictors behave similarly in both conflict
settings; whatever prolongs one type of conflict also increases the duration of
other. On the civil war front, this is perhaps not terribly surprising; however, the
project still makes an empirical contribution to the literature: similar to that of
Hegre and Sambanis (2006), but instead using algorithmic predictive modelling
on BTSCS data by doing a sensitivity analysis of common civil war duration
predictors. On the interstate war front, this project is the first of its kind to
leverage covariates identified in civil war literature and use them explicitly to
predict interstate war duration. The following three paragraphs provide more
specifics as to how certain covariates influence the duration of political violence.
Several material capability indicators come out as top predictors of armed conflict
duration. Standard measures of state capability—Composite Index of National
Capability (CINC) and Gross Domestic Product per capita (GDP p.c.)—are
shown to increase conflict duration. Further, similar effects on longevity are also
caused by having large civilian populations, high number of military troops, and
increased military spending. Taken together, the empirical findings demonstrate
that actors with higher material capabilities are associated with longer wars. This
is in line with the proposed theory that treats capability as a resource pool that
can be ‘spent’ on power projection.
Further, natural resources—specifically hydrocarbons (crude oil and natural gas)
and valuable gems—influence conflict longevity: while the presence of oil is linked
to a shorter wars, gems are associated with longer conflicts. This divergence of
the effect direction is also found by Lujala (2009) on conflict onset.1 It should be
1However, other than being more intense in terms of battle-related deaths, she also notes
that oil conflicts are generally longer.
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also noted that even though the effect of oil reported here is based on its median
value, there are numerous cases associated with shorter and longer wars.
Moving on to the second theoretical component, politics operationalised
as non-physical limitations of the continued application of military force,
encapsulates several predictive covariates that are common to both types.
Political constraints on the head executive, either as a composite measure
by itself or via categorical regime type (democracy) are the most influential
covariates in this class that lead to shorter wars. This demonstrates the
dampening effect of power projection through non-physical means and mirrors
the extant findings in the literature (Stam, 1996; Bennett and Stam, 1996),
even though the advantages of democracy are shown to be declining over time
(Bennett and Stam III, 1998). Further, it suggests that a similar mechanism
underlying the canonical example of U.S. withdrawal from Vietnam is applicable
to conflict at large.
In contrast, conflicts associated with military coups are slightly prolonged in
duration. In interstate settings, this can be attributed to either diversionary
war (Miller, 1999), rally-around-the-flag effect (Mueller et al., 1973; Baker and
Oneal, 2001), or to a counterbalanced military (Belkin and Schofer, 2005). With
that said, again there is a large amount of outliers found in civil war cases, in
which the effect of coups are in fact shortening. For example, Thyne (2017) shows
that coups can act as shocks to otherwise protracted bargaining situations, aiding
their termination.
Regarding geographical factors, conflicts taking place near international borders
are identified as drivers of longer conflicts for both types of war. One common
explanation is the transnational dimensions of war (Gleditsch, 2007) and contagion
(Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008). The finding suggests that cross-border operations
do have a dampening effect on military force projection regardless of actor type.
There are multiple possible explanations on why this is the case (also see Forsberg,
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2016): actors could be constrained by international pressure, or they might select
international targets that they can rapidly defeat. This effect is more precise
in interstate settings, as certain civil wars are prolonged as a result of having
cross-border sanctuaries (Salehyan, 2009). However, the overall effect is consistent
for both conflict types.
Finally, this study provides further evidence that conflict is time-dependent
(Vuchinich and Teachman, 1993). The effects of time, measured in the form of
t, t2, and t3 can be described as follows. The linear effect of time, that is t,
is slightly shortening on average. Meanwhile, both the squared and the cubed
transformations of time, which allows for slope changes, are associated with
longer conflict durations. In terms of robustness, the linear time effect is the
most commonly observed out of the three; however, this could be driven by the
much-smaller set of observations containing the most protracted conflicts.
The empirical analyses conducted in this project also reveal certain limitations.
Even though the existence of common predictors of armed conflict duration across
war types is a novel finding in conflict forecasting;2 these results, in the end, should
still be seen as exploratory in nature. The process of replicating a large number
of existing studies always comes with a margin of error. Even though a diverse
set of algorithms and feature selection methods are utilised using bootstrapping
procedures, only a representative set of candidate studies are used. These sixteen
studies were selected in order to enforce uniformity across observations, variables,
and units of analysis. It is hard to conjecture how the results would look like when
we expand the scope of the replications to beyond yearly BTSCS studies. Some
variables may perform better when captured in finer time intervals (i.e. months,
days).
Further, covariates pertaining to the geographical constraints on power projection
still come out as conflict type-dependent. These findings could be driven by
2Cunningham and Lemke (2013) test their hypotheses using a Null-Hypothesis Significance
Testing framework which focuses on in-sample explanation rather then predictive performance.
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data issues: they might be flagging up incompatibilities regarding variable
measurement and operationalisation across conflict types, or they could be
manifestations of omitted variable bias. For example, the effect of rough terrain
might be attenuated if army mechanisation or air force capabilities are accounted
for. On the other hand, the divergent results could be theory-related. Distance
has a different meaning across war types. For interstate wars, the ability to
project force over vast distances imply immense military capabilities (Gartzke
and Braithwaite, 2011). In civil war settings, increased distance between the
capital and the conflict zone could hinder the effectiveness of the government
response (Buhaug and Gates, 2002). In the former case, the willingness to
project force over such distances could proxy for the salience of the issue for the
instigating actor (Rummel, 1979). In the latter cases, the government actors
might feel less pressure to quench civil strife in the periphery, especially when
the conflict-ridden areas are not of primary interest along economic, ethnic, or
strategic lines (Fearon and Laitin, 2011). With that said, foreign interventions
can also suffer from the same and become quagmires (Taliaferro, 1998). Thus,
one avenue for future research would be focusing on unpacking the conditions
under which the divergence occurs.
7.2 Predictive Performance of Machine Learning
Forecasting in conflict research has been on the rise (Schneider et al., 2011).
However, many forecasting applications continue to utilise traditional statistical
tools adopted from the literature-standard Null-Hypothesis Significance Testing
framework. Only very recently there have been attempts to broaden the range of
analytical tools available to conflict researchers (Colaresi and Mahmood, 2017).
A diverse set of classification algorithms have been implemented in this project.
The literature standard logistic regression was also included to act as a baseline
to compare against various shallow, deep, and ensemble learning algorithms.
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The complexity of machine learning algorithms should not be thought of as
certain advantage; in many fields traditional statistical approaches outperform
machine learning algorithms (Makridakis et al., 2018)—more complex does not
automatically mean more accurate.
However, in the case of conflict duration forecasting, this study shows that random
forest and extreme gradient boosting algorithms do greatly outperform (by 5-7%)
logistic regression in out-of-sample predictive accuracy. These two algorithms
are commonly named as top performing in many fields in science (Moisen et al.,
2006; Ogutu et al., 2011; Freeman et al., 2015). Coupled with other recent studies
showing that machine learning algorithms do better than traditional statistical
approaches (Muchlinski et al., 2016; however see Neunhoeffer and Sternberg,
2018), this should serve as a reminder to conflict researchers that they should
not limit their choices solely to generalised logistic regression umbrella of models
(e.g. zero-inflated, negative binomial) and be more open-minded about introducing
machine learning techniques to their methods toolbox.
In contrast, deep learning approaches using the state-of-the-art Keras front-end
do not result in better predictive accuracy compared to the baseline logit. Similar
to ‘shallow’ machine learning techniques discussed above, more complexity does
not necessarily mean better performance. Instead, models with higher complexity
are more prone to over-fitting given their enormous learning capacity. Neural
networks are commonly cited as the most ‘capable’ machine learning method
available (Gevrey et al., 2003). Thus, it is not surprising that they are overtaken
by most machine learning algorithms.
One possible domain-related explanation for the underwhelming performance of
the MultiLayer Perceptron model is that the existing BTSCS data is not ‘rich’
enough to leverage the full potential of the neural network. This study uses the
Cunningham and Lemke (2013) dataset with added predictive covariates identified
in the quantitative civil war duration literature. With about slightly less than
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2,000 observations and 30 covariates, there may be not enough ‘dynamism’ in the
data for the neural network to unpack. Instead, the neural network—regardless
of many cautions taken to prevent it via altering the model architecture—resorts
to over-fitting very rapidly; i.e. it learns the specific noise of the data rather than
the true underlying pattern. This is not a criticism of the authors of the original
datasets; rather, it is a representation of the overall state of conflict data collection
efforts.
Another possible explanation is the severe class-imbalance inherent in conflict
research (Cederman and Weidmann, 2017). Shallow machine learning methods
are more apt at recovering the true signal in the presence of class-imbalance
(Muchlinski et al., 2016). Studies using BTSCS data, by construction, will be
ridden with class-imbalance problems than most other types of data formats. It
is conceivable that ensemble learners such as random forest will continue to be a
better fit for such applications compared to neural networks in the near future. On
the other hand, given its superior performance in other fields, deep learning can
be more conducive to nascent image-as-data approaches to conflict studies—for
example, see Alanyali et al. (2016).
Finally, statistical models can only be as good as the underlying data. Further,
the necessary step of variable operationalisation can be another source of
hindrance. A shadow case study focusing on the warring factions in the Sierra
Leone Civil War highlights several possible shortcomings of large-n research.
Access to specialist equipment, re-arming the enemy by losing assets that are not
otherwise available to them, battle discipline, nuances of mandates and military
doctrine, and shared local beliefs can all cause capability shifts on the ground.
These variables are unlikely to be captured fully using observational data ex-ante.
However, researchers can use this type of value-added information to be more
wary of their research designs and perhaps consider multi-method approaches
that are aimed at minimising possible empirical blind spots.
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7.3 Implications for Future Research
The effects of the bifurcated nature of conflict studies can be seen at both the
theoretical and empirical levels. Nearly two decades of theory-building using the
civil war template has increased our understanding of conflict dynamics greatly.
However, it has also led to a several theoretical blind spots, as its practitioners only
sought to explain the temporal variation found in civil wars. Similar frameworks
are discussed in both civil and interstate war literatures, but explicit linkages
to one another prove elusive. This lack of theoretical coherence pertaining to
the study of armed conflict hinders the accumulation of knowledge, especially
the coveted positivist end-goal of discovering the true underlying data generating
processes.
Similarly, restricted empirical testing of such type-specific theories are by
nature under-powered. Limiting oneself to only a certain subset of political
violence—even though it is mostly in favour of the dominant class of events that
is civil war—is akin to discarding observations from a dataset meeting a certain
criteria (e.g. missingness). However, the empirical impact of excluding interstate
wars (as opposed to the methodological debate on dropping missing observations
in datasets) is rarely discussed. Combined datasets including observations for
both types of conflict over time enriches the empirical scope and can lead to
general insights applicable to all, as demonstrated by this project.
Specifically, conflict researchers should focus on the standardisation of variable
operationalisations across conflict types. Some concepts are easier to proxy than
others. For example, for a rebel group with explicit ethnic links as identified in the
Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) Dataset (Vogt et al., 2015), the geographical area
dominated by that ethnic group and its population can be the rebel equivalent
of country size and population, respectively. In other cases, however, there may
not be a clear cut answer (democracy) or the logic can be dependent on conflict
type (i.e. the differing meaning of distance). Perhaps, there are other meaningful
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operationalisations of democratic behaviour and proximity rather than regime
type and the distance between conflict parties. We should strive to come up with
such operationalisations for all relevant predictors of conflict that are applicable
to both contexts.
More generally, joint data collection efforts should be encouraged and must be
pursued as a part of a larger agenda of advancing predictive modelling in conflict
research. There are two available avenues: expanding existing repositories and
applying for grants for new data-gathering projects. There are pros and cons for
each option. Existing conflict databases such as UCDP/PRIO and the Correlates
of War project, if they can be expanded in scope, provide the easiest way of
establishing a common empirical ground for war studies. On the other hand,
popular datasets are usually products of many decades of established rules and
tradition, making them resistant to structural changes given the relatively high
entry costs.
Conversely, new data gathering projects can prioritise the inclusive scope if
planned specifically for the task. With the wide adoption of open-source
frameworks amongst conflict researchers, we could be approaching the ‘ripe’
moment for taking such an initiative. However, start-up costs associated with
undertakings with this calibre of ambition necessitate, probably multiple, large
grants. Given the relative scarcity of research grants in social sciences, securing
a large enough starter fund might prove challenging. On the other hand,
automated approaches to data collection can be a crowd-sourced alternative.
Conflict researchers should be in the driving seat of gathering such data, as
their domain knowledge and expertise can cut down the costs associated with
ambitious data collection efforts by optimising the most time-intensive parts
(i.e. identification, operationalisation) of the process.
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Chapter 8
Appendix
The appendix provides additional robustness checks and sensitivity analyses
pertaining to the empirical chapters. For Chapter Four, I expand on the
exploration of the replication studies using BTSCS data. In addition, I
demonstrate the process employed to achieve consistency among variables across
multiple studies. Next, I present additional in-sample performance metrics based
on elastic net and random forest model fits.
The addentum for Chapters 5 and 6 focus on the Cunningham and Lemke (2013)
study, both using the original model specification and with added predictive
covariates. First, I compare the performance of the sub-sampling process for
the random forest model fit. Next, I provide deeper insights into the random
forest algorithm by: i) unpacking the determinants of armed conflict duration
using the randomForestExplainer package (Paluszynska and Biecek, 2017); and
similarly, ii) investigating what goes into the civil war dummy variable. Finally,
for completeness, I include logistic regression and survival analysis (employing Cox
Proportional-Hazards) analogues of the algorithmic modelling enterprise using the
NHST framework using the survminer package (Kassambara and Kosinski, 2018).
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8.1 Chapter 4
8.1.1 Replication Studies
Figure 8.1 visualises the correlation analysis of all 16 replicated studies using
BTSCS data.
Table 8.1 contains original model specifications of all 16 replicated studies. For
consistency across multiple studies, some variables are renamed. These new names
can be found under the ‘New Label’ column.
Table 8.1: Variables from replication studies (with relabels where applicable)
Replication Study Variable New Label
Bagozzi 2016 Malaria prevalence
Rebel strength
Malaria x Rebel strength
War on core territory Sons of the soil
ELF index Ethnic fractionalisation
Ethnic conflict
Democracy
Ln GDP per capita GDDPC
Two or more dyads Number of actors
Territorial control
Ln population Population
Percentage tropics
Africa
Burgoon et al 2015 Media reporting
Human rights violations
UN peacekeeping Peacekeeping
Media reporting x UN peacekeeping
Territorial control
Rebel strong/parity Rebel strength
Legal political wing
Ethnic conflict
GDP per capita (log) GDDPC
Population (log) Population
Democracy
Buhaug, Gates & Lujala 2009 Distance to capital (In)
Conflict at border
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Table 8.1: Variables from replication studies (with relabels where applicable)
(continued)
Replication Study Variable New Label
Border distance
Rebel fighting capacity at least moderate Rebel strength
Gemstones in conflict zone Gems
Petroleum in conflict zone Hydrocarbons
Drugs in conflict zone Drugs
Mountains in conflict zone (%) Terrain
Forest in conflict zone (%) Terrain
Democracy score at onset Democracy
GDP capita at onset (In) GDPPC
Bennet & Stem 1996 Strategy: OADM Military strategy
Strategy: OADA Military strategy
Strategy: OADP Military strategy
Strategy: OPDA Military strategy
Terrain
Terrain x Strategy
Balance of forces
Total military personnel Military personnel
Total population Population
Population ratio
Quality ratio
Surprise
Salience
Repression
Democracy
Previous disputes
Number of states Number of actors
Year
Collier, Hoeffler, Soderbom 2004 Income inequality
Missing inequality Income inequality
Per capita income GDPPC
Ethnic fractionalization
Ethnic fractionalization square
ln population Population
1970s
1980s
1990s
3rd and 4th years of war
5th and 6th years of war
7th year of war and beyond
199
Table 8.1: Variables from replication studies (with relabels where applicable)
(continued)
Replication Study Variable New Label
Change in commodity price index (CPI)
Primary commodity exports/GDP (sxp)
CPI x sxp
Cunningham 2006 Strict veto players Veto players
Lenient veto players Veto players
Coup Coup d’etat
Log population Population
Ethnic fractionalization
War months
Cunningham 2010 Clearly independent interventions Military intervention
Quasi-independent interventions Military intervention
Non-independent interventions Military intervention
Any intervention Military intervention
Lootable resources Natural resources
Logged battle-deaths Battle deaths
Democracy
Log population Population
Incompatibility
Log GDPpc GDPPC
ELF Ethnic fractionalisation
Proportion of neighboring democracies
Cold war dummy Cold war
Conrad et al 2018 Extortion
Smuggling Contraband
Extortion x smuggling
Territorial control
Mobilization capacity Rebel capability
Arms capacity Rebel capability
Coup Coup d’etat
International intervention Military intervention
Ethnic conflict
Ln(GDP per capita) GDPPC
Democracy
Ln(Population) Population
Cunningham, Gleditsch, Salehyan 2009 Territorial control
Strong central command
High mobilization capacity Rebel capability
High arms-procurement capacity Rebel capability
High fighting capacity Rebel capability
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Table 8.1: Variables from replication studies (with relabels where applicable)
(continued)
Replication Study Variable New Label
Legal political wing
War on core territory Sons of the soil
Coup d’etat
ELF index Ethnic fractionalisation
Ethnic conflict
Ln GDP per capita GDPPC
Democracy
Two or more dyads Number of actors
Ln population Population
Cunningham & Lemke 2013 Civil war
Peacekeeping
Territorial war Territorial conflict
Recurring war
Troop ratio
Democracy
Total troops (logged) Military personnel
Population (logged) Population
Caverley & Sechser 2017 Ground mechanization
Aircraft mechanization
Combined arms
Distance to capital
Conflict at border
Border distance
Rebel fighting capacity Rebel capability
Rebels’ relative strength Rebel strength
Natural resources
Rough terrain Terrain
Incumbent democracy Democracy
GDP per capita GDPPC
External support: rebels
External support: government
Sons of the soil
Insurgency
Post-cold war years Cold war
Escriba-Folch 2010 Mountains Terrain
Forests Terrain
Log population Population
Log GDP per capita GDPPC
Mineral exporting Gems
201
Table 8.1: Variables from replication studies (with relabels where applicable)
(continued)
Replication Study Variable New Label
Oil exporting Hydrocarbons
Oil production Hydrocarbons
Diamond production Gems
Ethnic fractionalization
Ethnic fractionalization Square
Contraband
Number of borders
Army size (log) Military personnel
Deaths/year Battle deaths
Ethnic war Ethnic conflict
Sons of soil war Sons of the soil
Military intervention
Economic sanctions
Sanction duration
Threat
Imposed sanction
Nilsson 2012 Strategy: OADM Military strategy
Strategy: OADA Military strategy
Strategy: OADP Military strategy
Strategy: OPDA Military strategy
Terrain
Terrain x Strategy
Balance of forces
Military personnel
Total population Population
Population ratio
Quality ratio
Surprise
Salience
Repression
Demoracy
Previous disputes
Number of states Number of actors
Offense-defense
Balance
Thyne 2012 Institutional constraints
Political constraints
Political polarization
Parliamentary Political constraints
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Table 8.1: Variables from replication studies (with relabels where applicable)
(continued)
Replication Study Variable New Label
Exec’s Longevity
Exec party’s longevity
Opposition vetoes Veto players
Battle deaths (ln) Battle deaths
GDP/capita (ln) GDPPC
Fight for gov
Coups Coup d’etat
% Forest (ln) Terrain
Uzonyi & Wells 2016 Ln(Tenure)
Institutional constraints
Ln(Tenure) x Institutional constraints
Strong central command
Legal political wing
Multiple actors Number of actors
Wucherpfennig et al 2012 Ethnic linkage Ethnic conflict
Ethnic linkage with included group Ethnic conflict
Ethnic linkage with excluded group Ethnic conflict
Territorial conflict
Strong central command
Legal political wing
Territorial control
Democracy
ln GDP p.c. GDPPC
ln Population Population
Natural resources
Sons of the soil
Ethnic linkage x Territorial control
Veto players
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Figure 8.1: Correlation analyses of all replicated BTSCS studies
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Table 8.2: Elastic net and random forest in-sample performance metric averages
model metric mean sd
Elastic Net ROC 0.7132 0.0801
Elastic Net Sens 0.6785 0.0952
Elastic Net Spec 0.6318 0.1469
Random Forest ROC 0.7290 0.0674
Random Forest Sens 0.8900 0.1013
Random Forest Spec 0.3255 0.2055
8.1.2 Performace Metrics
Table 8.2 displays the in-sample performance metric averages of the elastic net
and the random forest algorithm used in model fitting.
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8.2 Chapters 5 & 6
8.2.1 Random Forest Performance based on Sub-sampling
Figure 8.2 demonstrates head-to-head in-sample and out-sample performance of
the random forest model fits. Four sub-sampling techniques are implemented:
up-sampling, down-sampling, ROSE, and SMOTE.
The ROSE package (Lunardon et al., 2014) provides functions to address binary
classification problems in the presence of class-imbalance. Artificially balanced
samples are generated using a smoothed bootstrap approach which in turn aids
both the accurate evaluation of the classifier in the presence of a rare class and
the phases of estimation.
The Synthetic Minority Over-sampling Technique (SMOTE) oversamples the
rare class by employing bootstrapping and k-nearest neighbour approaches to
synthetically generate additional observations for that class. The algorithm is
included by the DMwR package (Torgo, 2010).
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Figure 8.2: Random forest sub-sampling performance
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Figure 8.3: Variable importance for Cunningham and Lemke 2013 without cubic
splines
8.2.2 Random Forest: Original Model Specification
Figure 8.3 shows the random forest variable importance plots for the Cunningham
and Lemke (2013) study using the original model specification and with added
cubic splines, respectively.
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8.2.3 Random Forest Explained: Duration
Figure 8.4 plots the bilateral relations between several importance measures.
Figure 8.5 shows the bilateral relations between the rankings of variables according
to selected importance measures.
Figure 8.6 visualises the distribution of minimal depth amongst the trees. The
mean of the distribution is shown by a vertical bar with a value label. The scale of
the x-axis ranges from 0 to the maximum number of trees in which any covariate
was used for splitting. Minimal depth for a predictor in a tree equals to the depth
of the node which splits on that predictor and is the closest to the root of the tree.
If this value is low, this suggests a large number of observations were divided into
groups on the basis of this covariate.
Figure 8.7 reports the 30 top interactions calculated by the mean of conditional
minimal depth. The horizontal line displays the minimum value of the selected
statistic amongst interactions for which it was derived. The interactions are
considered in the following way: root variables first, and then all possible values
for the second variable.
Table 8.3 shows various importance measures of the random forest fit.
Figure 8.8 plots the predictions of the random forest depending on values of
components of the interaction between distance and CINC with the values of
remaining predictors are sampled from their empirical distribution.
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Figure 8.4: Relations between measures of importance
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Figure 8.5: Relations between rankings according to different measures
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Figure 8.6: Distribution of minimum depth and its mean
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Figure 8.7: Mean minimal depth for 30 most frequent interactions
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Figure 8.8: Interactive predictions for different values of distance and CINC
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Table 8.3: Random forest importance measures sorted by accuracy
Variable Mean Min. Depth No. of Nodes Accuracy Decrease Gini Decrease No. of Trees Times a Root p-value
cinc 3.010 9161 0.040 40.023 500 36 0
logtotalpop 3.506 8957 0.033 37.270 500 10 0
pec 3.742 8762 0.032 34.925 500 3 0
logtotaltroops 3.376 8473 0.025 35.371 500 21 0
milex 3.800 8650 0.022 33.949 500 6 0
lndistx 2.940 6339 0.021 35.409 500 36 0
irst 4.768 5149 0.020 19.496 500 0 0
logtroopratio 3.702 8517 0.017 34.853 500 1 0
rgdppc 3.806 9087 0.016 36.737 500 1 0
polconiii 4.534 4541 0.014 17.865 500 2 0
t 3.476 4425 0.014 31.745 500 72 0
tcub 3.414 4420 0.013 30.470 500 81 0
borddist 4.432 4469 0.013 17.130 500 6 0
mt 3.804 5467 0.013 22.836 500 20 0
frst 4.680 4639 0.013 16.173 500 0 0
tsq 3.482 4418 0.013 29.547 500 78 0
civil 5.027 935 0.009 12.905 479 40 1
parallel 5.440 3294 0.008 10.724 500 6 1
coupx 4.292 764 0.007 16.455 463 56 1
ALLGEMSP 7.728 1110 0.006 4.266 457 14 1
democ 8.454 1240 0.005 3.620 461 1 1
confbord 6.632 1188 0.005 6.503 472 4 1
figcapdum 8.261 1129 0.005 4.108 462 4 1
territorial 9.071 1144 0.004 3.348 452 0 1
hydroD 8.570 1328 0.003 3.717 470 0 1
alldrugs 10.382 771 0.003 2.405 396 0 1
recurringwar 7.916 1611 0.003 4.316 486 0 1
territory 9.124 1256 0.003 3.578 457 0 1
rebstrdum 8.280 932 0.002 2.645 437 2 1
major 11.278 495 0.001 1.256 319 0 1
8.2.4 Random Forest Explained: Civil War Dummy
Figure 8.9 combines two multi-way importance plots. The first figure follows the
same guidelines described in Figure 6.2. The second plot displays two importance
measures that were derived from the role a covariate plays in prediction. The
p-value is based on a binomial distribution of the number of nodes that were split
on that covariate assuming that the covariate selection process was random.
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Figure 8.9: Multi-way importance plot for civil war dummy
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Figure 8.10: Logistic regression coefficient plot
8.2.5 NHST Replication: Logistic Regression
Figure 8.10 plots the coefficient estimates of the logistic regression analogue of
the Cunningham and Lemke (2013) study with added covariates.
Figure 8.11 visualises the coefficient effects based on the logistic regression model
fit.
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Figure 8.11: Logistic regression variable effects
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8.2.6 NHST Replication: Survival Analysis
Figure 8.12 plots survival curves stratified by conflict type with 95% confidence
intervals. The p-value denotes the log-rank test score. Additionally, the
cumulative number of events and censors are shown in both absolute and relative
terms.
Figure 8.13 displays the Cox Proportional-Hazard coefficient estimates of the
Cunningham and Lemke (2013) study using the original model specification.
Figure 8.14 replicates Figure 8.13 with added predictive covariates.
Figure 8.15 shows the results of the scaled Schoenfeld residuals for each covariate
in Figure 8.14.
Figure 8.16 visualises influential observations and outliers by plotting the
estimated chages in the coefficient when each observation is removed in turn.
Figure 8.17 plots deviance residuals that are normalised Martingale residuals.
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Figure 8.12: Cox-PH fit stratified by war type
220
Figure 8.13: Cox-PH estimates for Cunningham and Lemke 2013
221
Figure 8.14: Cox-PH estimates for Cunningham and Lemke 2013 with added
covariates
222
Figure 8.15: Schoenfeld residuals for Cunningham and Lemke 2013 with added
covariates
223
Figure 8.16: Cox-PH diagnostics (estimated change) for Cunningham and Lemke
2013 with added covariates
224
Figure 8.17: Cox-PH diagnostics (deviance) for Cunningham and Lemke 2013
with added covariates
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